1988 PLP 169 (CLC)

‑‑‑5. 24‑‑Notice‑‑Resumed land, a Chiragah land allotted in first instance to a third party‑‑Validity of resumption‑‑Held, if petitioner's case could be founded on the principle of audi alteram partem, even then he could not have a case capable of succeeding because there was no evidence to prove that land in dispute was not a Chiragah land and was not allotted in the first instance to a third party‑‑In such case no notice was necessary in law to be given for reversing earlier orders passed without jurisdiction. Mst. Shahzadi Asfia Sultana Begum v. The Chief Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and 4 others P L D 1964 Pesh. 114. (d) Maxim‑‑ ‑‑Audi alteram partem"‑‑Scope of applicability‑‑Order passed without jurisdiction‑‑Reversal‑‑Whether notice required‑‑No notice required in law for reversing such order. Mst. Shahzadi Asfia Sultana Begum v. The Chief Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and 4 others P L D 1964 Pesh. 114 rel. M. Saleem Zeervi for Petitioner. Date of hearing: 28th September, 1987 State‑land measuring 90 kanals and 12 marlas situated in Chak No.460, tehsil and district Jhang, despite its having been reserved as Chiragah land, was claimed to have been allotted on 12‑2‑1979 in the name of some Mst. Sharifan, an alleged evictee of Gujranwala Cantonment, and then transferred in the name of the plaintiff‑Petitioner Allah Ditta by the order dated 20‑8‑1980 allegedly passed by the Collector of the District which, however, was not approved by the Board of Revenue who by the order dated 27‑12‑1982 required the land to be resumed and, in .pursuance thereof, the Collector actually resumed the land by his order dated 17‑9‑1984. Allah Ditta petitioner filed the present suit on 22‑1‑1985 for declaration that the order dated 27‑12‑1982 passed by the Board of Revenue and effectuated by the Collector on 17‑9‑1984 was unlawful, ultra vires and of no effect for the reason that the land had vested in him as a full owner thereof. The suit was contested by the respondent Province by filing a written statement to defend the impugned orders and proceedings taken there-under. The respondent does not appear to have taken any further interest in the proceedings of the suit wherein ultimately it was ordered on 28‑5‑1985 to be proceeded ex parte. In the ex parte‑evidence the plaintiff‑petitioner got himself examined as P.W.1, and produced 11 documents wherein, however, he did not produce a copy of the basic Order No. 676‑82/ 3116‑C111, dated 27‑12‑1982 passed by the Board of Revenue with regard to cancellation of allotment on the ground that it is a Chiragah land. The plaintiff did not produce any order passed by the Collector whereby proprietary rights in the suit land may have been conferred on him. Learned trial Judge held the view that mere payment of money by the plaintiff into the Government Treasury, without an appropriate order passed by the Collector specifying the amount against which transfer of ownership in the land could be made to the plaintiff, could not be accepted as having made him the owner of the suit land to divest the Collector of the Board of Revenue of the locus poenetentie for resumption of the land as had actually been done by the Collector in his order dated 17‑9‑1984 (Ex.P.3) in furtherance of the Letter/Order dated 27‑12‑1982 passed by the Board of Revenue on the ground that it is a Chiragah land which fact had not even been controverted successfully by the plaintiff. Consequently, by his judgment dated 15‑2‑1986 learned trial Judge dismissed the suit of the plaintiff whose appeal there against was also heard and dismissed on 17‑2‑1987 by an Additional District Judge upon affirming the view of the trial Court and upholding its decree inasmuch as the orders passed by the competent authorities did not suffer either from any illegality or defect of jurisdiction. He has now come up to this Court on revision.

2. Although the view concurrently held by the two Courts below do not appear to be suffering from any error and seem to be correct, yet, even if they were to be incorrect, without affecting the exercise of their jurisdiction, there would not have been made out a case for exercise of revisional jurisdiction. But the fundamental question in this case is that the order Ex.P.3, in implementation of the Board of Revenue's order dated 27‑12‑1982, was passed by the Collector on 17‑9‑1984 after due notice to Mst. Sharifan and the petitioner Allah Ditta to resume the land after hearing them. The plaintiff‑petitioner Allah Ditta had maintained the present suit on 22‑1‑1985, after the expiry of more than 2 years of the passing of the basic order dated 27‑12‑1982 by the Board of Revenue against a period of one year's limitation provided by Article 14 of the Limitation Act so that his suit was liable to be straight‑away dismissed under Section 3 thereof.

3. Although the implementing order Ex.P.3 had duly provided opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and his predecessor‑in -interest, yet, even if the petitioner's case 'could be founded on the principle of audi alteram partem so far as the 1982 order of the Board of Revenue is concerned, even then he could not have a case capable of succeeding because there is no evidence pointed out to have been led to prove that the land in dispute was not a Chiragah land and was lawfully allotted in the first instance to Mst. Sharifan. The case Mst. Shahzadi Asfia Sultana Begum v. The Chief Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and four others (P.L.D 1964 Peshawar 114 (D . B .) may be cited as a precedent for the view that no notice is necessary in law to be given for reversing the earlier orders passed without jurisdiction.

4. In the above view of the matter, ultimate dismissal of the plaintiff's suit, on whatever ground, does not become liable to be interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Hence, dismissed in limine. A . A . / A‑213/L Revision dismissed.