1968 SCMR 212 (PLP)
MESSRS NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN, DACCA-Appellants Versus FARIDSONS LTD. AND ANOTHER — Respondents
| Citation | 1968 SCMR 212 (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | High Court |
| Bench Members | S. A. Rahman, Hamoodur Rahman and Muhammad Yaqub All, JJ |
| Parties | MESSRS NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN, DACCA-Appellants Versus FARIDSONS LTD. AND ANOTHER — Respondents |
| Primary Law | (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1968 SCMR 212 (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1968 SCMR 212 (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: S. A. Rahman, Hamoodur Rahman and Muhammad Yaqub All, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1968 SCMR 212 (PLP) (MESSRS NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN, DACCA-Appellants Versus FARIDSONS LTD. AND ANOTHER — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Asrarul Hossain, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (Rafiqul flag, Advocate Supreme Court with him) instructed by Muhammad Nurul Haq, Attorney for Appellants.
- Mazher Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by S. M. Abbas, Attorney for Respondents.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of East Pakistan, Dacca, dated the 14th March 1966, in C. R. No. 953 (F) of 1965).
S. 5-Appeal to High Court barred by time-Question, whether High Court justified in condon ing delay-Special Leave to. Appeal granted by Supreme Court. (b) Appeal to Supreme Court-Appellant competent to agitate in question of condonation of delay in presenting appeal before High Court-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 105-Limitation Act of 1908), S. 5.
Judgment & Decree
S. A. RAHMAN, J.-The appellants obtained a decree for recovery of Rs. 5,91,651.35, with interest, against the respondents. The latter appealed to the High Court of East Pakistan at Dacca, and as prima facie the appeal was barred by 52 days, an applica tion was presented under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay. The High Court, by order dated the 14th March 1966, condoned the delay, and admitted the appeal which is still pending in the High Court. The appellants obtained special leave to appeal from this Court to consider the question ,4 whether the High Court were justified in condoning the delay in circumstances of this case. Mr. Asrarul Hossain, the learned counsel for the appellants, was apparently under the impression that unless the impugned order was challenged by a separate appeal, his clients would be barred from assailing it later on even on appeal from the final 8 order of the High Court. This impression is erroneous in the face of the clear language of section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the appeal is decided on the merits in favour of the respondents by the High Court, and the Bank wishes to appeal from that order, it would be open to the Bank to agitate the question of the condonation of the delay in presenting the appeal to the High Court also as a ground of appeal. In view of this legal position we do not think it is necessary to consider the present appeal on the merits. It may be that if the appellants succeed in the High Court, the question raised on the present appeal would not call for any consideration at all. We, therefore, formally dismiss the appeal but leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. Appeal formally dismissed.