1986 PLP 1367 (CLC)

Abdul Hameed Puri for Respondent. Date of hearing: 11th February, 1986. This appeal under section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 is filed by the appellant /tenant against the order of Rent Controller, dated 30‑5‑1985 directing eviction of appellant from the premises occupied by him. The respondent /landlord who was given a pre‑admission notice in the case has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal. It is contended on behalf of respondent that the order of Rent Controller was passed in the case on 30‑5‑1985 while the application for grant of certified copy of the order was filed on 15‑7‑1985 which was granted on the same date and the appeal was presented in Court on 20‑7‑1985 which is time‑barred. In support of the preliminary objection the respondent's counsel has relied on the cases Mst. Rukhsana Ahmed v. Tariq Attaullah P L D 1977 Kar. 569 and Abdul Bari v. Muhammad Saeed 1982 C L C 2269. In the first noted case, the impugned order was passed by the Rent Controller on 31‑5‑1976. The tenant /appellant applied for certified copy of order on 30th June, 1976. The certified copy was granted to him on 7‑7‑1976 and appeal was preferred on 9‑7‑1976. The first appeal was held as beyond time by five days. However, in second appeal before this Court the learned Single Judge after allowing the period upto the date of preparation of the copy held that the appeal was time barred by one day. In that case, it was, held that the application for copy having been made on the last day of limitation, namely, on 30th June, 1976 the period available to the appellant for filing the appeal was only one day after the grant of certified copy whereas in that case the appeal was filed on the second day, namely, on 9‑7‑1976. The petition for leave to appeal against the judgment in Mst. Rukhsana's case was dismissed by the Supreme Court and the decision is reported in 1980 S C M R

36. In the second noted case of Abdul Bari the judgment was announced on 31st of May, 1978. The application for certified copy of the order was made on 1‑7‑1978. The period from 1‑6‑1978 to 30th June, 1978 was the period during which the civil Court and Rent Controller's Court were closed for summer vacation. The certified copy was granted to the appellant on 4‑7‑1978. The appeal before this Court was presented on 5‑8‑1978 as the High Court was closed for summer vacation upto 4‑8‑1978. Although the appeal was filed on the reopening day of the High Court the learned Single Judge in that case, held, that it is beyond time as the application for certified copy of the judgment was moved after the expiry of the period of limitation. The above‑noted decisions fully supported the above contention of learned counsel for the respondent. The learned counsel for the appellant on the other hand relied on the case of Munshi Mahton v. Lachmanlal A I R 1929 Pat. 615 and Saminatha Ayyar v. Venkatasubba Ayyar I L R 6 Mad.

21. In the Patna case the plaint was rejected by the Court on 4th October, 1926. The Courts were closed for vacation on 5th October, 1926 and re‑opened on 8th November, 1926. The plaintiff applied for a certified copy of the order on 23rd November, 1926 and the copy was granted on the same day. The appeal was then preferred on 1‑12‑1926. The learned Judges of the Patna High Court relying on the decision in the case of Debicharan Lal v. Mehdi Hussain (1916) 1 P L J 485 held that the plaintiff was entitled to exclude the entire period of vacation for the purpose of computing the period for making application for certified copy of the judgment and, therefore, it was held that the appeal filed on 1st December was within time. In Madras case cited above, the judgment in the case was delivered on the afternoon of the last Court day before the commencement of Christmas vacation. Application for certified copy of judgment was made on the day the Court re‑opened after vacation. The appeal was presented on a subsequent date which would have been in time if the period during which the Court was closed was deducted. The Court in repelling the contention that the appeal is time barred held as follows at pages 22‑23 of the report:‑ "In this case judgment was delivered on 22nd December, 1900, the last day before the Christmas vacation at 4 p.m., when, according to the practice of the Court, papers were not received. The appellant made his application for a copy of the judgment on 7th January, 1901 the day on which the Court re‑opened after the Christmas holidays and presented his appeal on a day which would be in time if he is entitled to deduct the period during which the Court was closed. His contention is that, in computing the period for appeal, the time during which the Court was closed should be deducted. The contention on the other side is that, inasmuch as no application for a copy of the judgment was made before the Court closed, the appellant is not entitled to have the period during which the Court remained closed deducted in the computation of time. The argument was that the words "requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment" presuppose an application for the copy. There is nothing in the section itself to suggest that these words ought to be so construed. It is not impossible to conceive of cases where time may properly be deducted, though the commencement of the period from which time is deducted precedes the actual application for a copy of the judgment. On the facts of the present case we think it may be said that this is one of those cases. For this reason we think the appellant is entitled to deduct the period from 23rd December to 6th January, both days inclusive as such period, in the circumstances of the case, must be taken to be part of the "time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment". No doubt Patna and Madras decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant supported his contention but in view of the fact that the ratio laid down in the case of Mst. Rukhsana Ahmed has been A approved by the Supreme Court as a result of dismissal of leave to appeal petition on merits, I am of the view that the present appeal is beyond time. It is accordingly dismissed as such summarily. After I announced the order, Mr. Maroof Ali Khan, learned counsel for the appellant requested that the order of the trial Court may be stayed for a period of two months in order to enable his client to file an appeal before the Supreme Court. The prayer made by the learned counsel is quite justified and I accordingly direct that for the period of two months no proceedings will be taken by the Rent Controller's Court against the appellant. A. A. Appeal dismissed.