1986 PLP 357 (PLC)
MUHAMMAD ASLAM Versus Messrs PECO KOT LAKHPAT, LAHORE and others
| Citation | 1986 PLP 357 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | IInd Labour Court Punjab |
| Bench Members | M. Masud Ahmad Ansari, Presiding Officer |
| Parties | MUHAMMAD ASLAM Versus Messrs PECO KOT LAKHPAT, LAHORE and others |
| Primary Law | Industrial dispute‑‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1986 PLP 357 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: Industrial dispute‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1986 PLP 357 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the IInd Labour Court Punjab bench comprising: M. Masud Ahmad Ansari, Presiding Officer.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1986 PLP 357 (PLC) (MUHAMMAD ASLAM Versus Messrs PECO KOT LAKHPAT, LAHORE and others). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑‑Resignation Mode of severance of relationship of employee and employer Resignation when considered effective‑‑Eventualities explained‑‑Workman submitting resignation requesting for its acceptance within 24 hours‑‑No order passed by employer‑‑Workman stopping attending to his duty‑‑Ceased to be in employment on expiry of time mentioned in resignation‑‑Cannot legally be processed for misconduct of absence from duty and order of dismissal from service, in circum stances, held, has no blessings of law hence set aside by Labour Court accepting grievance petition‑‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), S.25‑A, West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), Ss.15(3) & (4).
Judgment & Decree
4. Before proceeding further it will be pertinent to acquaint, ourselves with the term resignation' and its consequences. "Termination from service" and on "resignation from service" are two different modes of severance of relationship between the employer and his employee. The former mode is available to the employer and it is subject to the legal obligations but not to the approval of the employee. It takes effect as soon as an order to this effect is passed. While the latter mode is adopted by an employee He has two options open to him:‑ (a) He may straightway resign from the post. (b) He may resign from the post and leave his resignation to be accepted by the employer within or without a time limit. The resultant effect of etch of the eventuality stated above shall be different and may be as under:‑ (a) If the employee say 11 resign' and stops attending his duty, he will cease to be in the service with submission of resignation. (b) If he says 'my resignation may be accepted' his resignation will become effective only when he is intimated about its acceptance by the employer. In case no order is passed or communicated to the employee within the specified time it will be o4en to employee either to stop working after that date or wait till a reply is received. But where he stops working from that bate, he will be deemed to have resigned and the severance of relationship of employer and the employee will come into being.
5. Now what we have to see is under which category the resignation of the petitioner falls it appears from EXh.P.l that the petitioner submitting his resignation and requested that it should be accepted within 24 hours. The Managing Director being the over‑all incharge of the establishment was competent to pass an appropriate order but no I order within the contemplated period was passed. The petitioner after submitted his resignation stopped attending to his duty. He ceased to be in the employment of the respondent from 12.01 mid‑night of 18‑8‑1983. Thus, a workman who ceases to be on the pay‑roll of its employer cannot be departmentally proceeded. Standing Order 15(3)(e)` which has been called in aid of the impugned order is not attracted‑ k Absence without leave for more than ten days must be of a workman who is in service but where a workman has severed his connection with his employer cannot become absent from his job. Thus, the law under which the petitioner has been punished is not applicable to him.
6. The learned counsel for the respondent has emphatically asserted that the resignation of the petitioner was conditional. He was asked to submit unconditional resignation or join duty but he did not do it. He is, therefore, to be blamed for his misfortune. In this connection, he has referred to a letter Exh.R.3. I have carefully gone through this letter. It is, dated 1st September, 1983. It was issued when the petitioner had already been charge‑sheeted. It says 'If you are no more interested to work with the Company, as it is evident from your application, you may tender your resignation accordingly'. It is really strange that the respondents even after having come to know from Exh.P.l that the petitioner was no more interested to work with the Company, did not consider his letter as that of resignation i feel it was a mala fide act on the part of the respondents to have asked for another resignation.
7. Considering the entire evidence on record and the law placed before me, I am of the opinion that the petitioner submitted his resignation on 18‑8‑1983 and ceased to be in the employment of the respondent from that date. All the disciplinary action initiated or completed after that, date has no blessing of law because it was done when the petitioner had ceased to be a workman. I accept this petition, set aside the order of dismissal, dated 18th October, 1983 and hold that the petitioner has resigned from service of the respondent w.e.f. 18‑8‑1983. A.E. Petition accepted.