YLR 2009

2009 PLP 1950 (YLR)

KHALID RIZWAN & CO through Proprietor — Petitioner Versus PUNJAB COOPERATIVE BOARD FOR LIQUIDATION through

Jurisdiction / Court
Lahore
Decided Date
Petition No.70/C of 2006, decided on 19th May, 2009.
Honorable Judges
Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry, J
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 2009 PLP 1950 (YLR)
Forum / Court Lahore
Bench Members Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry, J
Parties KHALID RIZWAN & CO through Proprietor — Petitioner Versus PUNJAB COOPERATIVE BOARD FOR LIQUIDATION through
Primary Law Punjab Undesirable Co-operative Societies (Dissolution) Act (I of 1993)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2009 PLP 1950 (YLR)?

This judgment primarily cites: Punjab Undesirable Co-operative Societies (Dissolution) Act (I of 1993) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2009 PLP 1950 (YLR)?

The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry, J.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 2009 PLP 1950 (YLR) (KHALID RIZWAN & CO through Proprietor — Petitioner Versus PUNJAB COOPERATIVE BOARD FOR LIQUIDATION through). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Punjab Undesirable Co-operative Societies (Dissolution) Act (I of 1993)

Representation

  • Javed Iqbal Bhatti for Petitioner.
  • 3. Preliminary objection has been raised by learned counsel for respondents that the order was passed on 2-12-2004 while this petition has been filed on 6-6-2006 after more than sixty days and is barred by time. Learned counsel for respondents contends that section 5 of Limitation Act is not applicable as it is Special Law and delay in filing the petition against the order of Judicial Officer cannot be condoned, hence petition may be dismissed.
  • 4. On the other hand learned counsel for petitioner has contended that the impugned order is illegal and unlawful which was passed on the back of the petitioner; that the act of the respondents is hit by the principle of promissory estopple; that the order dated 2-12-2004 is not speaking one which has been passed without affording opportunity of hearing to petitioner, and that the impugned order is violative to law under section 24-A of General Clauses Act according to which any order passed by Public Functionaries should be based on reasonable and fair grounds.

Headnotes / Summary

S. 11

Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5

Application for condonation of delay--Scope

Application under S.11 of Punjab Undesirable Co-operative Societies (Dissolution) Act, 1993 was filed after more than sixty days before the Co-operative Judge

Respondents contended that S.5 of Limitation Act was not applicable as it was a special law and delay in filing the application against order of Judicial Officer could not be condoned

Validity

No provision of Punjab Undesirable Co-operative Societies (Dissolution) Act, 1993 empowered the Co-operative Judge to entertain an application under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which stated that it did not automatically apply to all the enactments but its application had to be specifically extended to the provisions of any enactments

High Court refusing to interfere dismissed the application for condonation of delay. Muhammad Hanif v. Collector/Deputy Commissioner, Kasur and 2 other PLD 1982 Lah. 239 and Rana Zulfiqar v. Judicial Officer and other 2007 CLC 1542 rel. Ahmad Hassan Anweri for PCBL.

Judgment & Decree

IJAZ AHMED CHAUDHRY, J.--Through this petition under section 11 of the Punjab Undesirable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Act (I of 1993) the petitioner has challenged the order dated 2-12-2004 through which Award amounting to Rs.15,60,095 has been passed against the petitioner.

2. The brief facts are that respondent No.1 had filed a suit before respondent No.2 under section 7 of the above said Act, in which an ex parte Award for an amount of Rs.11,21,812 had been passed which was later on cancelled and fresh Award amounting to Rs.15,60,045 was passed on 2-12-2004. The applicant after coming to know about the above said Award filed an application under Order IX rule 13, C.P.C. for recalling and setting aside the above said initial Award, which was declined by respondent No.2. The petitioner again filed another application for production of certain loan documents in order to defend himself in addition to written statement filed by him, whereby he categorically denied to avail the loan facility. However respondent No.2 summoned the record etc. from the other respondents but they failed to produce the same despite of availing so many opportunities and then the Executive Incharge of respondent No.1 who was contesting the case, openly admitted through application dated 29-9-2003 and reply that in fact the respondents had no other record except the loan ledger which he called as only basic documents. Despite the above said admission of inability to produce any loan document, respondent No.2 issued Award dated 2-12-2004 amounting to Rs.15,60,095 against the petitioner without any legal justification. The counsel did not inform about the order dated 2-12-2004 rather, on 5-5-2006 the applicant came to know about the said award dated 2-12-2004 through a notice about which he had absolutely no knowledge.

3. Preliminary objection has been raised by learned counsel for respondents that the order was passed on 2-12-2004 while this petition has been filed on 6-6-2006 after more than sixty days and is barred by time. Learned counsel for respondents contends that section 5 of Limitation Act is not applicable as it is Special Law and delay in filing the petition against the order of Judicial Officer cannot be condoned, hence petition may be dismissed.

4. On the other hand learned counsel for petitioner has contended that the impugned order is illegal and unlawful which was passed on the back of the petitioner; that the act of the respondents is hit by the principle of promissory estopple; that the order dated 2-12-2004 is not speaking one which has been passed without affording opportunity of hearing to petitioner, and that the impugned order is violative to law under section 24-A of General Clauses Act according to which any order passed by Public Functionaries should be based on reasonable and fair grounds.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through carefully.

6. It is admitted fact that impugned order was passed on 2-12-2004 by the Judicial Officer while this petition with this petition has been filed under section 11 on 8-6-2006 after expiry of period of sixty days along with application under section 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay. No provision of Act of 1993 empowers this Court as a Co-operative Judge to entertain an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act a perusal of which indicates that it does not automatically apply to all the enactments, but its application has to be specifically extended to the provisions of any enactments. This Court has already thrashed the provisions of sections 5 and 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act in Muhammad Hanif v. Collector/Deputy Commissioner Kasur and 2 others PLD 1982 Lah. 239 and held as under:-- "The cumulative effect of these provisions of the Limitation Act is that section 5 thereof would not apply to a special enactment unless such an enactment contains an express provision extending thereto the application of section 5."

7. Similarly in Rana Zulfiqar v. Judicial Officer and other 2007 CLC 1542 a Division Bench' of this Court held that provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 would not apply to the application filed under the provisions of Punjab Undesirable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Act (I of 1993) beyond the period of limitation.

8. In view of above, as provisions of section 5 of Limitation Act have not been made applicable to the proceedings conducted under the Undesirable Co-operative Societies (Dissolution) Act, 1993, the application filed by the petitioner for condonation of delay cannot be entertained, which stands dismissed.

9. Resultantly, this petition being patently barred by time is dismissed accordingly. M.Y./K-36/L Petition dismissed.