1970 PLP 212 (PLC)

In the next place it was very strenuously contended that there is no evidence to show that the appellant was habitually absent for more than ten days. It would be useful to reproduce

In next (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) habitual absence without leave or absence without leave for more than ten days." It was contended that the word "or" is conjunctive. The word "habitual" should be read after "or" as well. There is no substance in this contention. Mr. Majeed relied on the case of Saifee Development Corporation Ltd.'s case (P L D 1965 Kar. 347.). Tn that case Waheed ud din Ahmad, J., as he then was while interpreting Standing Order 13(3)(i) held that the word "or" was conjunctive. Standing Order 13(3)(i) reads as under:‑ "habitual negligence or neglect of work". Bib Lordship observed as under:‑ Firstly, neglect of work is also a kind of negligence and being of a lesser kind would be covered by it, which has a broader meaning." I respectfully adopt the observation in interpreting Standing, Order 13(3)(e). Habitual absence without leave is of a lesser kind than absence without leave for more than ten days. It appears, therefore, that‑the word "or" is used by the Legislature as disjunctive in Standing Order 13(3)(e). Whether a certain word is used as disjunctive or conjunctive would depend primarily upon the language used.,' In the second place if the word "or" is used C as conjunctive the idea expressed earlier by saying "habitual absence without leave" would not carry much sense. Absence on number of occasions even for one day would amount to habitual absence. On the other hand if a workman is absent without leave for more than ten days even once it would amount to misconduct. The idea appears to be that while the employer way be able to manage if the workman is absent once for a day or so but if he is absent for more than 10 days continuously the work may suffer. I would hold that the word "or" in Standing Order 13(3)(e) is used as disjunctive. In the third place it was submitted that in another Application No. 2 of 1967, under section 30(2) of the Repealed Ordinance the learned Chairman had held that the appellant was on leave from 31st May 1965 to 7th of October 1965. I have gone through the Order of the learned Chairman the question in the application was as to whether the appellant had committed some act of misconduct during the period of 31st May 1965 to 7tfi October 1965. Admittedly the appellant was absent from duty from 31st May 1965 to 7th October 1965, The issue before the learned Chairman in the Application No 2 of 1967 was not as the Whether the appellant was on leave. The observation, there fore, in Industrial Dispute No, 2/67 cannot bind the G. T. S., its the present application. It was contended in the fourth place that the Medical Certificated produced by the appellant was quite in order as it was signed by the Medical Officer of the Town Area Dispensary, Phuleli, Hyderabad, which is a' Municipal Dispensary. The Medical Certificate is dated 7th October 1965. The Doctor certified that the appellant was under his treatment from 11th June 1965 to 10th October 1965. Under the Medical Leave Rules of the R. T. C., the Medical Certificate should accompany the leave application. Admittedly the appellant did not send any Medical Certificate along with his two leave applications. Moreover the appellant did not apply for leave after 10th June 1965. In these circumstances the appellant was absent from duty without leave for about four months. This would amount to misconduct within the meaning of Standing Order 13(3)(e). Lastly, it was submitted that the District Manager was biased against the appellant. There is no force in this contention whatsoever. In this connection the appellant relied on three orders of the District Manager. The first order is dated 5th July 1965, whereby the District Manager ordered that the appellant should be charge‑sheeted. The second order is dated 23rd July 1965, whereby the District Manager ordered that the r services of the appellant should be terminated on one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof. The last order that the District Manager passed was on 13th September 1965. He ordered that as the appellant was absent from duty his services were to be terminated. There is nothing in this order to suggest that the District Manager was biased against the appellant. He had passed these orders bona fide in performance of his duties. That this was so would appear from the order dated 14th October 1965. The District Manager on that date ordered that the appellant should be allowed to resume his duty and then charge sheeted. It appears that the other orders were passed in ignorance of the fact that the appellant was an office bearer of the Union. There is nothing to suggest on the record that the District Manager was biased against the appellant. Before I dispose of the appeal, I would like to make certain observations. Mr. Majeed, for the appellant, stated that the appellant is still working as an accountant with the Government Transport Service, Hyderabad. He stated that if his client is re employed he will not claim any back benefit or any other financial advantage for the past. I bad adjourned the matter and asked Mr. Sirajul Haq Qureshi to find out from the District Manager if this was possible. I am told by Mr. Qureshi that the District Manager, in view of the appellant's past record, is unable to re employ him. Under the provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance I cannot direct the District Manager on merit of the appeal to re‑employ the appellant. There is however no allegation of moral turpitude against the appellant. The only allegation against him is that he used to absent himself without leave. I am assured by the appellant that he will be very careful in future. I would suggest the District Manager to re‑consider his decision and, if possible, re‑employ the appellant, specially when he is working with the Government Transport Service, Hyderabad, at present. With these observations, I would dismiss the appeal.