PLC 1982

1982 PLP 161 (PLC)

Syed ABID ALI SHAH AND 2 OTHERS Versus THE CHAIRMAN SIND ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND 2 OTHERS

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal, Sind
Decided Date
N/A
Honorable Judges
A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal.
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1982 PLP 161 (PLC)
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal, Sind
Bench Members A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal.
Parties Syed ABID ALI SHAH AND 2 OTHERS Versus THE CHAIRMAN SIND ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND 2 OTHERS
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1982 PLP 161 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1982 PLP 161 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Sind bench comprising: A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal..

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1982 PLP 161 (PLC) (Syed ABID ALI SHAH AND 2 OTHERS Versus THE CHAIRMAN SIND ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND 2 OTHERS). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Judgment & Decree

DECISION Certain employees of the Sind Road Transport Corporation were re moved from service in purported exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation (West Pakistan) Removal of Undesirable Employees Ordinance, 1965, hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance. Three of such employees, who are the present appellants, assailed the orders of their termination of services before the learned Sixth Labour Court at Hyderabad which by separate but similar orders, made on 4th April, 1981, took the view that inasmuch as the three appel lants were neither informed of the grounds on which their services were sought to be terminated nor they had been afforded a reasonable oppor tunity of showing cause against such termination of services, the action of the authorities was in contravention of the rules of the natural justice and was not free from mala fides. It accordingly has ordered the re‑instatement in service of the three appellants but at the same time observed that it would be open to the Chairman, of the S. R. T. C. to terminate the services of any undesirable employee of the S.R.T.C. in accordance with the provisions of the said Ordinance. In other words, according to it, it is still in force and applicable to the employees of the S. R. T. C. and action there under could be taken against the appellants. It is this latter finding of the learned Labour Court which has been assailed in the three present appeals.

2. Mr. A. Majeed, the learned representative of the appellants, has assailed the impugned orders of the learned Labour Court on the grounds‑ (i) that the said Ordinance has died a natural death on the dissolu tion of the Province of West Pakistan and is no longer in force; and (ii) that in any case the said Ordinance was applicable only to the employees of the Road Transport Corporation of West Pakistan, which organization has ceased to be in existence, and does not apply to the employees of the Sind Road Trans port Corporation, which admittedly came into existence after the promulgation of the said Ordinance.

3. The mere fact that the province of West Pakistan has ceased to exist does not lead to the inference that the said Ordinance has lapsed or ceased to be in force. On the contrary, Article 19 of the Province West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order, 1970, specifically provides for the' continuance of existing laws but subject to necessary adaptations and modifications on account of the re‑formation of the Provinces of N.‑W.F.P., Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan. The said Article read as follows:‑ "

19. Constitution and adaptation of existing Laws.‑Except as expressly provided by or under this Order all existing laws shall continue in force, so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations, until altered, repealed or amended by the appro priate Legislature or other competent authority. (2) For the purposes of bringing the provisions of any existing law into accord with the provisions of this Order, in relation to laws in the Central Legislative field, the President, and in relation to other laws, the Governor of the Province concerned, may by order, make such adaptations, whether by way of modi fication, addition or omission, as he may deem necessary or expedient, and any order so made shall, unless otherwise provided therein. (3) Any Court, Tribunal, or authority required and empowered to enforce an existing law shall, notwithstanding that no actual adaptations have been made in such law by an order made under clause (2), construe the law with all such adaptations as are necessary to bring it into accord with the provisions of this Order. Explanation.

In this Article, "existing law" means any Act, Ordinance, Order, rule, regulation, bye‑law, notification or other legal instrument which, immediately before the appointed day, had the force of law in the whole or any part of the Province of West Pakistan whether or not it had been brought into operation.

4. The said Ordinance admittedly was "existing law" for the purposes of the aforesaid Article. As such unless it is expressly or impliedly repealed it will continue to remain on the statute book and apply with full force, subject of course to any adaptations, which may be necessary on account of the dissolution of the Province of West Pakistan.

5. No doubt no adaptations have been made in the said Ordinance by the Governor of Sind, as have been made for the Province of Punjab by the Governor of that Province, but the absence of such adaptations for Sind can neither lead to the inference that the Ordinance has ceased to be operative nor even that the Ordinance is not to be read with the necessary adaptations consequent upon the dissolution of the Province of Pakistan for clause (3) of Article 19 of the Province of West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order, 1970, specifically requires the Courts to enforce existing laws with the necessary adaptations, This Tribunal, therefore, is required to read and construe the said Ordinance with the nece4sary modifications/adaptations.

6. This brings me to a consideration of the second contention of Mr. Majeed namely that the said Ordinance is restricted in its applica tion to the employees Of the Road Transport Corporation of West Pakistan and does not apply to the employees of the Sind Road Trans port Corporation. The main ground urged by Mr. A. Majeed in support of his contention was that whereas the Road Transport Corporation of West Pakistan was established under section 43‑A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which was enacted by the Central Legislature, the Sind Trans port Corporation has been established under section 70 of the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965. It may be pointed out that the latter Ordinance, has repealed and replaced the former in the areas com prised in the Province of West Pakistan. Subsection (1) of section 7 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, provides that where this Act or any other West Pakistan Act repeals and re‑enacts with or without modifica tion, any provisions of a former enactment, then reference in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provisions so repealed shall unless a different intention appears; be construed as reference to the provision so re‑enacted. Reference in the said Ordinance to the Corporation cons tituted under section 43 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, after the enactment of the West Pakistan Motor. Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, are accordingly to be construed as references to the Road Transport Corporation constituted under section 70 of the latter Ordinance. Since admit tedly the Sind Road Transport Corporation has been constituted under section 70 of the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, there fore, the provisions of the said Ordinance relating to the removal o undesirable employees of the Road Transport Corporation would appear to be applicable to the employees of the Sind Road Transport, Corporation.

7. For the reasons discussed by me above, I find no force in these three appeals and would, accordingly, dismiss them in limine.