1994 PLP 2212 (MLD)

The appellant-landlord sought eviction of the respondent-tenant on the grounds of default and personal requirement. The learned Controller has dismissed the Rent Case on both the grounds. As to the question of default it was pleaded and averred that the tenant without any refusal on the part of the landlord had started depositing rents in a Miscellaneous Rent Case. From the side of the tenant it was urged that the deposit had taken place following upon a refusal from the side of the landlord to receive rent. The evidence could well be of word against word and, therefore, on the question of default I would prefer to say nothing at this stage because in view of what follows in the context of personal requirement that question loses some of its importance. As to personal requirement the landlord in paragraph 5 of the eviction application had submitted as under:

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5. That the applicant requires the shop in occupation of the opponent for his personal bona fide need as he does not own any other business place in Karachi to start his business and so much so that he is out of business for the last two and half years and has no source of other income, but to earn his livelihood by starting his own business." In the written statement the quoted averment was denied in the following words:

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5. That the contents of para. No.5 of the plaint is strongly denied. It is submitted that applicant has no personal bona fide need and he is doing the work of watch-maker at Saddar and claim of the applicant is mala fide." In evidence the landlord examined himself and witnesses Muhammad Riaz and Nisar Ahmad whereas the tenant apart from himself examined witnesses Bashir Ahmad and Muhammad Anwar. Examining the evidence I find that the case of the landlord for bona fide personal requirement was not baseless. In the first place the landlord's evidence in context remained unshaken. On the other hand, while the tenant reiterated that the landlord was a watch-maker and doing his own business at Saddar Karachi, being cross-examined on the point he stated as under:

"It is incorrect to suggest that the applicant has no shop. The applicant is owner of the said shop. I cannot produce any proof of the ownership of the applicant in respect of the shop situated at Saddar, Karachi. It is incorrect to suggest that the applicant is doing his business of watch maker on the footpath." The words "said shop" above-quoted were made use of in the following context:

"The applicant is running a watch-making shop at Saddar, Karachi. I do not know the number of the said shop of the applicant at Saddar .It is incorrect to suggest that the applicant has no shop." As against this the tenant's witness Bashir Ahmad in cross-examination stated as under:

"I have not seen the said shop of the applicant at Saddar, Karachi but I have heard about it. It is a fact that applicant does not own any other shop but again says that I do not know this fact." Muhammad Anwar in the evidence from the side of the tenant admits in cross-examination as below:

"At present said Khalid is doing business of Watch-making on foot path in front of a shop for last 3 or 4 years. I do not know prior to this where said Khalid was working. Khalid has no other shop at Karachi." In the above evidentiary background it was inconceivable as to how the learned Controller could have disallowed the application for eviction on the ground of personal requirement within the terms of section 15(2)(vii). However, he seems to have been impressed with some contradictions in the evidence from the side of the applicant. But those contradictions which pertained to the situation in which the tenancy was created were hardly relevant in context. Another supposed contradiction was that the applicant in the rent application had purportedly stated that he had no other business for his livelihood whereas according to the learned Controller in cross-examination he admitted that he was doing business of watch-making at Saddar on a foot path. I have already reproduced above what the landlord have stated about his personal requirement and due reference to that would show that all he had stated at the time of filing the Rent Case was that "he did not own any other business place in Karachi to start his business .". This too accordingly was, no contradiction. In such circumstances while I do not feel called upon to decide the question of default I am of the view that the fording of the learned Controller on the question of personal requirement deserves to be recalled. To that extent the impugned order is modified and Rent Case of the appellant is allowed. As suggested, 60 days' time is allowed to the respondent-tenant to vacate provided that he continues to deposit rents, as before. H.B.T./M-1978/K Appeal allowed.