CLC 1998

1998 PLP 736 (CLC)

MUHAMMAD YOUNIS‑‑‑Appellant Versus Syed MUHAMMAD YAKOOB‑‑‑Respondent

Jurisdiction / Court
Karachi
Decided Date
First Rent Appeal No.45 of 1993, heard on 4th September, 1997.
Honorable Judges
M. L. Shahani, J
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1998 PLP 736 (CLC)
Forum / Court Karachi
Bench Members M. L. Shahani, J
Parties MUHAMMAD YOUNIS‑‑‑Appellant Versus Syed MUHAMMAD YAKOOB‑‑‑Respondent
Primary Law Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVIII of 1979)‑‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1998 PLP 736 (CLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVIII of 1979)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1998 PLP 736 (CLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: M. L. Shahani, J.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1998 PLP 736 (CLC) (MUHAMMAD YOUNIS‑‑‑Appellant Versus Syed MUHAMMAD YAKOOB‑‑‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVIII of 1979)‑‑‑

Representation

  • S. Abdur Rehman for Appellant.
  • A. M. Mobeen Khan for Respondent.
  • Date of hearing: 4th September, 1997.

Headnotes / Summary

‑‑‑‑Ss.2(j) & 21‑‑‑Default in payment of rent ‑‑‑Ejectment‑‑‑Relationship of landlord and tenant‑‑‑Denial of such relationship by appellant‑‑‑Rent Controller adjudged appellant to be tenant of demised premises and ordered his ejectment for default in payment of rent‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Appellant, who was in occupation of the premises had admittedly received notice by respondent that he having become owner of premises in question, was entitled to receive rent‑‑‑Appellant did not have any title to possess those premises or occupy the same and he was bound to pay rent for possession/occupation of premises, therefore, he was tenant‑‑‑Appellant in spite of receipt of notice did not pay rent to respondent, therefore, default was established on the face of record‑‑‑Order of ejectment passed by Rent Controller was maintained in circumstances. Muhammad Tufail v. Barkat Ali PLD 1967 Kar. 151; Qassim through Legal Heirs v. Aziz Baig 1993 CLC 2385; Muhammad Shabbir and another v. Mst. Hamida Begum 1992 MLD 323; Mst. Parveen Akhtar v. Shafiq Ahmed 1990 CLC 2019 and Muhammad Rifatullah Alvi v. Imran Ansari PLD 1990 SC 369 ref.

Judgment & Decree

"tenant means any person who undertakes or is bound to pay rent as consideration for the possession or occupation of any premises by him or by any other person on his behalf and includes‑‑‑ (i) any person who continues to be in possession or occupation of the premises after the termination of his tenancy; (ii) heirs of the tenant in possession or occupation of the premises after the death of the tenant; and" He has further relied upon the judgment reported as Muhammad Shabbir and another v. Mst. Hamida Begum 1992 MLD 323 in which it has been held that tenant is a person who is in possession or occupation of premises owned. by someone else although he may not have undertaken to pay rent to owner thereof, but was normally bound to pay the rent to him as a consideration for being in possession or occupation of that premises and such person in fact would be a tenant. He has further relied upon 1990 CLC 2019 in which late Mr. Justice Qaiser Ahmed Hamidi, again defined the tenant in the case of Mst. Perveen Akhtar v. Shafique Ahmed on the same pattern. He further relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Rifatullah Alvi v. Imran Ansari PLD 1990 SC 369 in which their lordships were pleased to define the concept of possession in relation to the rent laws and held as follows:‑‑‑ "In the area of the law relating to landlord and tenant, the tenant as well as the landlord are both in possession of the demised premises, but their respective possession falls under different species of possession. The possession of the landlord is 'mediate possession' and that of the tenant what is described as 'immediate possession.' Their lordships have also defined the word 'occupation', as follows "The word 'occupation' means, inter alia, actual holding or possession especially of a place or of land. In the context of subsection (2) of section 14 of the Ordinance, the word carries the meaning of actual physical possession of a building. This specie of possession is immediate or direct possession. " Admittedly the appellant claimed to be the owner of the premises, that claim of the appellant was denied by Hon'ble Supreme Court who ruled in favour of the predecessor‑in‑interest of the respondent who transferred the ownership of the premises by means of registered giftdeed. Strictly he may not be the tenant in terms of section 30 of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 as he was not the tenant under that law which has since been repealed. He became tenant in occupation of the premises wher the notice was served on him that the respondent has become owner and demanded rent from appellant. In his notice which is on record, vide paragraph 5 rent was demanded from him at a rate with effect from 26‑2‑1992. Paragraph 5 of the notice is reproduced: "

5. That you are also liable to regularly pay rent of the property in possession as a tenant of my client at the rate of Rs.1,000.00 per month from 26‑2‑1992 uptodate and in future till you vacate and deliver the possession of the said premises to my client. It may be pointed out that the property in question is very valuable property and is situated in a thickly populated area where the properties adjacent and around the said property fetch rent of similar accommodation and location at Rs.1,500 and above per month. " The appellant has admitted that he received the notice but he did not reply the same. Admittedly, the appellant is in possession of the premises. He is also in occupation of the premises. He does have any title to possess those premises or occupy those premises but since he was bound to pay the rent for possession/occupation of the premises, therefore, he was tenant. The word bound has been defined in the Balck's Law Dictionary and means as follows: "As an adjective, denotes the condition of being constrained by the obligations of a bond, contract, covenant, or other moral or legal obligation. " The appellant was under moral obligation to compensate the owner of the use of premises and for continuing to remain in possession of the premises. In spite of the notice that the respondent is owner and demanded rent, the appellant was unmoved and did not discharge his obligation. Although strictly there may not be the legal obligation but moral obligation binds a person to compensate the owner for continuing to remain in occupation as well as in possession. I would therefore, hold that since the appellant was bound to pay the rent, therefore, he was tenant in terms of section 20) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. Admittedly, the appellant in spite of notice did not pay any rent to the respondent, as such, default is established on the face of record. In view of my finding that the appellant has committed wilful default in spite of notice and demand from the owner as he did not pay the rent, therefore. I would maintain the judgment of Rent Controller. Since I have held that the appellant is defaulter, it is not necessary to go into other grounds of ejectment i.e., personal) use or nuisance. For these reasons after hearing the parties in open Court this appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs. A.A./M‑210/K Appeal dismissed