YLR 2003

2003 PLP 1997 (YLR)

Messrs MARBLE AND MARBLE (PVT.) LTD. — Petitioner Versus K. E.S.C. — Respondent

Jurisdiction / Court
Karachi
Decided Date
Constitutional Petition No.B-108 of 2003, decided on 30th January, 2003.
Honorable Judges
Muhammad Roshan Essani and Anwar Zaheer Jamali, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 2003 PLP 1997 (YLR)
Forum / Court Karachi
Bench Members Muhammad Roshan Essani and Anwar Zaheer Jamali, JJ
Parties Messrs MARBLE AND MARBLE (PVT.) LTD. — Petitioner Versus K. E.S.C. — Respondent
Primary Law (a) Electricity Act (IX of 1910), (b) Electricity Act (IX of 1910)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2003 PLP 1997 (YLR)?

This judgment primarily cites: (a) Electricity Act (IX of 1910), (b) Electricity Act (IX of 1910) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2003 PLP 1997 (YLR)?

The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: Muhammad Roshan Essani and Anwar Zaheer Jamali, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 2003 PLP 1997 (YLR) (Messrs MARBLE AND MARBLE (PVT.) LTD. — Petitioner Versus K. E.S.C. — Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

(a) Electricity Act (IX of 1910) (b) Electricity Act (IX of 1910)

Representation

  • Abdul Karim Khan for Petitioner.
  • Date of hearing: 30th January, 2003.

Headnotes / Summary

S.39

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.249-A

Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199

Quashing of case-- Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court -- Scope

Applicant/accused without first approaching the Trial Court under S. 249-A, Cr. P. C., had directly filed Constitutional petition for quashing of criminal case against him

Validity

Petitioner had not exhausted remedy before proper forum provided under the law

Constitutional jurisdiction was not an additional or' alternate remedy and if alternate remedy was available, Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court could not be invoked

Powers of High Court under Constitutional jurisdiction were though very wide, but were not supposed to be exercised to override express provisions of law

High Court was not to weigh, assess or evaluate the evidence of prosecution or defence under Constitutional jurisdiction-- Evaluation of evidence was function of Trial Court

Delay in lodging of F.I.R. could not be held to be a valid ground for quashing of proceedings in each and every case-- Question of delay and its consequent effect on, prosecution case could only be considered and determined by Trial Court at the time after prosecution witnesses were examined and cross-examined

Prayer of petitioner/accused for quashing of proceedings in respect of criminal case pending against him, was misconceived and consequently was dismissed. A. Habib Ahmed v. M.K. alias Scott Christian PLD 1992 SC 353 ref.

S.39

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.249-A

Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199

Quashing of F.I.R.-- Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court-- Scope

Matter was at investigation stage and case against the accused had not been sent up to the Court--If case after investigation was sent up in the Court and petitioner/accused was challaned, he could avail of remedy before Trial Court under S. 249-A, Cr. P. C. for his acquittal after proving that charge was groundless or there was no probability of his conviction

High Court could not quash F.I.R. when investigation was not completed no challan had been submitted in the Court and no proceedings were pending in the Court

Mala fides or fact that the F.I.R. disclosed civil liability could not be the grounds for quashing the F.LR.--'High Court could not interfere in the investigation undertaken by police. Shehnaz Begum v. Honourable Judges of High Court of Sindh and Balochistan PLD 1971 SC 677 and Ahmed Saeed v. The State 1996 SCMR 186 ref.

Judgment & Decree

MUHAMMAD ROSHAN ESSANI, J.

By this Constitutional petition, the petitioner Noman Siddiqui has sought quashment of two cases registered under section 39 of Electricity Act, 1910 pending against him in the Court of Special Magistrate Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, Karachi (KESC) which arose out of F. I. R. No. 187 of 1998 and F.I.R. No.188 of 1998 of Police Station KESC. He has also sought quashment of two F.I.Rs. bearing Nos.26 of 2001 and 27 of 2001 under section 39 of Electricity Act, 1910 registered against him at Police Station KESC, Karachi pending investigation with police. The brief facts of the four F.I.Rs. stated hereinabove are that the petitioner is running a marble factory at Karachi. A raiding party of KESC alongwith police of concerned police station raided the factory and found the petitioner committing theft of electricity by tampering the electricity meter as well as supply line/cable of electricity. He was getting energy by illegal source and thereby caused loss to the tune of millions of rupees to KESC. I have heard Mr. Abdul Karim Khan learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and perused the material placed on record. In the first instance we would like to examine the prayer relating to quashment o proceedings. The perusal of material placed of record shows that the petitioner has no exhausted remedy before the proper forum provided under law. It is well-settled that the Constitutional jurisdiction is not additional or alternate, and if alternate remedy is available, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked. Moreover, the statutes are creatures of the Constitution. Admittedly, the applicant/accused has not approached the trial Court under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. but has directly tiled present petition under Article 199 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of 1973. The powers of High Court under Constitutional jurisdiction are though very wide but they are not supposed to bet exercised to override express provisions of law. It is not the function of this Court to weigh, assess or evaluate the evidence of prosecution or defence under Constitutional jurisdiction. The evaluation of evidence is function of the trial Court. The delay in lodgment of F.I.R. cannot be held to be a valid ground for quashment of proceedings in each and every case. The question of delay and its consequent effect on prosecution case could only be considered and determined by the trial Court at the time after the prosecution witnesses are examined and cross-examined. In the case of A. Habib Ahmed v. M.K. alias Scott Christian reported in PLD 1992 SC 353 it was observed that if prima facie offence had been committed the ordinary course of trial before the Court was not to be allowed to be deflected by approach to special revision or inherent jurisdiction of I High Court. Resultantly, the prayer for the quashment of proceedings in respect of two cases pending before the Special Magistrate, KESC is misconceived and is dismissed. The next prayer relating to quashment of two. F.I.RS. registered against the petitioner and pending investigation with police is also misconceived. The F.I.R. during the investigation cannot be quashed. In the case of Shehnaz Begum v. Honourable Judges of High Court of Sindh and Balochistan reported in PLD 1971 SC 677 a Full Bench of the apex Court held that the High Court cannot interfere in the investigation undertaken by police. Again in the case of Ahmed Saeed v. The State reported in 1996 SCMR 186, it was held by the Honourable Supreme Court that the High Court is not competent to quash the F.I.R. when the investigation was not completed and no challan has been submitted in the Court and no proceedings were pending in the Court. It was further observed that the High Court cannot quash F.I.R. on the ground of mala fide or F.I.R. discloses civil liability. Admittedly, the matter is at investigation stage and case has not been sent up to the Court. If the case after investigation is sent up in the Court and applicant is challaned he can avail of remedy before the trial Court under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. for his acquittal after proving that the charge is groundless or there is no probability of his conviction. Consequently the prayer for quashment of F.I.Rs. pending investigation with police is declined. Resultantly, we see no merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed. The trial Court is, however, directed to complete the trial of two cases pending against the petitioner as early as possible. The above are the detailed reasons of our short order dated 24-10-2003. H.B.T./M-497/K Petition dismissed.