P L D 1988 Supreme Court 382 (PLP)

NASIM HASAN SHAH, J‑‑By this petition under Article 188 of the Constitution, review is sought of this Court's judgment dated 13‑5‑1987 passed in Civil Appeal No.253 of 1981. While disposing of the above‑noted civil appeal it was observed that "the real question, which fell for determination in this case was not whether the land and the building which was built as a school and used as such was attached to it vested in the Government under para. 5 of Martial Law Regulation No.118 but the true question, in the facts and circumstances of this case, was whether the vesting of the Rang Mahal Mission School in the Provincial Government had the effect of making it the property of the Government alongwith its assets, as claimed in the impugned letter of 21st September, 1980." In the discussion of this question it was observed by this Court that the word "vest" is a word of variable import not having a fixed connotation and does not necessarily mean "vest in title". The Court after referring to several decisions, ultimately answered this question as follows:‑ "We are, therefore, of the opinion that merely because the privately‑managed schools, alongwith their assets were to vest in the Government, under the terms of para. 5 of Martial Law Regulation No.118 it did not imply that Government had become the owner in relation to the buildings wherein schools or colleges were being run. The intention of Martial Law Regulation No.118 manifestly was only to take over the management of the institutions and not to confiscate the property in which the privately‑managed school was being run." In this review petition it is urged that the meaning given to the word "vest" is not correct. This submission is explained in ground "c" of the Review petition (para. II) as follows:‑ "That it is true that the word 'vest' is capable of being used in various senses but it is respectfully submitted that a more comprehensive appreciation of the dictionaries of the case‑law and of various laws and provisions where this word has been used would reveal that wherever the word 'vest' has been used without being qualified or restricted, like in Article 274 of the Constitution, it always means vesting in title with full proprietary rights as an absolute owner and further that whenever 'vesting' is meant not to confer ownership then a qualification is added with this word." The above averment reveals clearly that a reversal of the conclusion earlier reached by the Court, after full consideration of the question, is being sought. This, however, is not possible, in the exercise .of the review jurisdiction. The mere incorrectness of a conclusion reached after a full consideration of the matter can never be a ground for review. "To permit a review", as was observed by this Court in Lt.‑Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. The Controller of Estate Duty, Government of Pakistan, Karachi and another (P L D 196 S C 335 at 354), "on the ground of incorrectness would amount to granting the Court the jurisdiction to hear appeals against its own judgments or perhaps a jurisdiction to one Bench of the Court to hear appeals against other Benches; and that surely is not the scope of review jurisdiction. No mistake in a considered conclusion, whatever the extent of that mistake, can be a ground for the exercise of review jurisdiction". The Court went on to add "It is not because a conclusion is wrong but because something obvious has been overlooked, some important aspect of the matter has not been considered, that a review petition will lie". In other words, it is only where a decision is given per incuriam (i.e. through oversight) without considering some statute or the like, that its reconsideration may be justified, but where the statutory provision has been considered and an interpretation given thereon merely because another view of the provision of a statute is possible, will not make it liable to review. The present is, therefore, not a fit case for exercise of review jurisdiction. Dismissed. M.B.T. /G‑86/A Petition dismissed.