P L D 1988 Supreme Court 39 (PLP)

MUHAMMAD HALEEM, C.J.‑‑This appeal, by leave, arises from the order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 19th of November, 1975, whereby the order dated 12‑4‑1975, appointing the arbitrator, was annulled. The appellant was awarded a contract for the construction of Grid Sub‑Stations at Sadiqabad, Liaqatpur, D.I. Khan and Kot Addu as a result of the letters exchanged between the parties subject, however, to the conditions contained in the letter of the Chief Engineer (Construction), Water and Power Development Authority, dated 10‑4‑1967. The conditions were accepted after negotiations for some amendments by the appellant by letter dated 2‑6‑1967. One of the stipulations in the letter dated 10‑4‑1967 related to arbitration, which clause reads as under:‑‑ "If at 'any time any question, dispute or difference shall arise between you and the Department both of us shall, as soon as reasonably possible, give to the other, notice in writing of the existence of such question, dispute or difference, specifying its nature and the point of issue and the same shall be referred to the Arbitration of a person to be agreed upon by both of us. The award of this Arbitrator shall be final and binding on both the parties. The venue of arbitration will be at Lahore." A dispute between the parties arose as to the claim of the appellant under the contract in regard to which the appellant served notices on the Chief Engineer (GSC) WAPDA, one dated 7=11‑1974 demanding Rs.38,23,845 and the other dated 12‑3‑1974 demanding Dollars 1,05,501.20. As the claim remained unsettled the appellant served another notice on 19‑12‑1974 calling upon the respondent to concur to the appointment of Mian Maqbool Ahmad, Secretary, Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 11‑Race Course Road, Lahore, as an arbitrator within a period of 15 days from the receipt of the notice. The respondent did not respond to the letter, therefore, the appellant filed an application on 11‑1‑1975 under section 8 of the Arbitration Act in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Lahore, wherein it sought the appointment of Mian Maqbool Ahmad as the sole arbitrator or in the alternative to the appointment of any other arbitrator for deciding the dispute. The respondent filed its objections to the appointment of arbitrator. Some of those which are material are reproduced as under:‑‑ "(1) That there is no arbitration agreement within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Arbitration Act 1940 and as such the application cannot proceed. (2) That the alleged agreement upon the basis of which the application has been made is not stamped and as such cannot form a valid basis for an application under section 8. (7) That there being no contract the question of there being a clause does not arise." On the date of the order, the Civil Judge recorded the filing of the copy of the "arbitration clause", the correctness of which was stated to have been admitted by the respondent. As regards the notice under section 8 of the Arbitration Act issued to the respondent for appointment of an arbitrator, it was stated that a copy of it was on the file. The statement of the counsel for the respondent was recorded who admitted the receipt of the notice, but disputed the appointment of Mian Maqbool Ahmad as the arbitrator. He also admitted that the respondent did not give any reply to the notice for the appointment of arbitrator. Thereafter, the Court appointed Mian Maqbool Ahmad as arbitrator for the reason that in spite of having received the notice, he did not reply to it wherein he was asked to concur to the appointment of Mian Maqbool Ahmad as the sole arbitrator, and in the alternative he failed to exercise his option to nominate any other arbitrator of his own choice. The arbitrator entered on the reference and gave his award on 22‑4‑1975. In proceedings before the arbitrator, the respondent in its written objections filed on 20th of April, 1975, took the plea that his appointment as arbitrator was void ab initio and of no legal effect, and that the respondent was taking steps to challenge the appointment in "revision petition" and further that the participation of the respondent in these proceedings was "under protest". It was also averred that in the absence of evidence to show that the appellant was registered under the Partnership Act, it could not initiate any proceedings in view of the bar contained in section 69(1) of the Partnership Act, 1932. Again on 20‑4‑1975, the respondent upon the registration Certificate No. 4395, dated 26‑10‑1962 having been produced by the appellant, took the objection that the firm comprised of three partners namely Muhammad Latif, Muhammad Bashir and Muhammad Nazir, but in the proceedings before the "Civil Court" only two partners namely Muhammad Bashir and Muhammad Latif were mentioned. Therefore, the firm at Lahore was a different firm from that which was shown in the certificate of registration as comprised of,three partners. On the same date, that is, 20‑4‑1975, the counsel for the respondent requested, in writing, for enlarging time, but the arbitrator by order dated 22‑4‑1975 refused to give further time. The respondent after receiving the notice of the award filed a civil revision in the Lahore High Court challenging the award on various grounds. Those which are relevant are contained in paras 2 and 3 of the civil revision petition which are reproduced as under:‑‑ "That the appointment was opposed by the present petitioner and following preliminary and other objections were raised before the said Civil Judge:‑‑ (1) That there was no written agreement within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Arbitration Act. (2) That the so‑called agreement was not stamped under the Stamp Act and as such could not be acted upon. (3) That one partner had no authority to refer the matter to arbitration. That the learned civil Judge on 12‑4‑1975 without deciding the pleas raised by the present petitioner, without framing any issues and without calling any evidence appointed Mian Maqbool Ahmad, Secretary, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Lahore as sole arbitrator although it was specifically stated in the written statement made by the counsel that Mian Maqbool Ahmad was not acceptable to the present petitioner." The appellant also filed an application wherein he raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the civil revision which was, however, dismissed on 13‑10‑1975. On merits, the High Court rejected the respondent's contention that there was no arbitration clause in writing, but allowed the revision by order dated 19‑11‑1975, firstly, on the ground that at least one of the documents needed stamp duty which was not paid and, therefore, the arbitration clause was ineffective; and, secondly, that the application under section 8 of the Arbitration Act was not signed and verified by both the partners. Leave to appeal was granted to consider the following questions: (a) Whether the impugned order of the High Court dated 19‑11‑1975 was contrary to the express provisions of Rules 1 and 2 of A Order XXX, C.P.C., and (b) As to whether the civil revision filed against the order appointing the arbitrator itself was not maintainable as it was filed after the arbitrator had entered on the reference and gave his award. In paragraph 17 of the judgment, the High Court formulated the disputed point for consideration as under:‑‑ "But the question still remains disputed whether one partner can sue on behalf of the firm against the provisions of Order XXX Rule 1, C.P.C." This question arose as the application under section 8 of the Arbitration Act for the appointment of the arbitrator although made by the M/s. Combined Enterprises, was signed and verified by one partner only. The Court then went on to observe that M. Bashir who was one of the partners of the appellant‑firm had stated in para 1 of the said application that he had the authority to institute it. Nonetheless, an objection was raised in reply thereto that M. Bashir had no implied authority to get the matter referred to arbitration and no express authority has been filed alongwith the application. And, therefore, as he was incompetent to make the application it merited dismissal. The High Court next held that the application should not have been decided in a haste, but the Civil Court should have "first framed an issue to decide whether or not the application was in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code." Having held so, the High Court concluded: "For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order appointing an arbitrator and entertaining the application which was not signed by two of the partners, was without jurisdiction." The conclusion of the Court rests on the averments of the parties. In para 1 of the application, as asserted, one of the partners namely M. Bashir was stated to be authorised to file the petition. The respondent, however, disputed and stated in para 1 of its objections that M. Bashir "being a partner has no implied authority to get the matter referred to arbitration and no express authority has been enclosed with the applications", and on that basis it was averred that the application was by an incompetent person. Hence, the formulation of the question by the High Court appears to be in the light of these averments as only one of the partners had signed and verified the application, and the conclusion appears to be on the footing of an infraction of the ordinary rule that when several persons have a joint cause of action, all such persons should sign the pleadings. In effect, therefore, there was a violation of Order 1 Rule 1, C.P.C. and Order 6 Rule 14, C.P.C. Additionally if they are to sue or to be sued then it would be a violation of section 45 of the Contract Act though these violations have not been expressly stated in the impugned order. Evidently, what appears to me is that the High Court did not have a proper comprehension of Order 30 Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. This Order provides a mode or form and the procedure for suits by or against the firms. By section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this procedure is made applicable as far as possible to all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. Order 30, C . P . C . is an enabling provision and it was introduced in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Rule 1 of this Order permits partners constituting a firm to sue or be sued in the name of the firm. Clause (2) of Rule 1 provides that it will be sufficient if the pleadings or other document is signed, verified or certified by any one of such partners. Rule 2 of the said Order further provides that where a suit is instituted in the name of the firm an obligation is cast on the plaintiffs or their Advocate that on demand in writing by or on behalf of any defendant, forthwith declare in writing the names and places of residence of all the persons constituting the firm on whose behalf the suit is instituted. In case of failure to do so, the Court is empowered to stay all the proceedings in the suit upon such terms as it may consider fit. B Where, however, the required information is furnished, the suit shall proceed in the same manner, and the same consequences in all respects shall follow, as if all the partners had been named as plaintiffs in the suit. There is also a proviso that all the proceedings shall nevertheless continue in the name of the firm. This provision is against the ordinary rule that when several persons wish to obtain a decree against a person all such persons must be made a party to the suit. Similarly when a person makes a promise to more than one person, the right to enforce the promise rests with them all under the provisions of section 45 of the Contract Act so that all of them are necessary parties to a suit to enforce the promise. Here it would be necessary to mention that there was no corresponding provision in the old Code of 1882, which, in terms, provided that in a suit by or against a firm all the partners of the firm were necessary parties. Accordingly, Order 30, C . P . C . is an exception to the ordinary rule of joinder of persons having a joint cause of action and also an exception to the provisions of section 45 of the Contract Act insofar as the initiation of proceedings by or against a firm is concerned. Under the law a firm is not a juristic person but is a compendious name for all the persons who are the partners of the firm, and the effect of using the name of the firm is to bring all the partners before the Court which is a convenient method for showing the persons who constitute the firm at the time of the accrual of cause of action, and a decree in favour of or against a firm, has the same effect as a decree in favour of or against all the partners. As permitted by clause (2) of Rule 1 of Order 30, the pleadings can be verified by anyone of its partners. This special provision prevails over the requirements of Order 6 Rule 14, C . P . C . which is a general provision. The provisions of Order 1 Rule 1 will also have no application as the firm is the collective name of the individuals who are members of the partnership, and where a suit is brought in the name of the firm the effect is to bring all the partners before the Court. A partner is the agent of the firm for the purposes of business of the firm. This is so provided in section 18 of the Partnership Act. However, section 18 is subject to the provisions of section 19 and other provisions of the Act, and the authority of a partner to bind the firm conferred by section 19(1) of the Partnership Act is controlled by the limitations enumerated in section 19(2) of the Act Subsection (2) of section 19, therefore, specifies acts in respect of which a partner has no implied authority to bind his co‑partners while purporting to act on behalf of the firm without their express authority or usage or custom of trade. The partner, therefore, has no authority to submit a dispute relating to the business of the firm to arbitration. Barring the aforesaid limitations, each partner is prapositus negotis sociatatis and binds the other partners by his acts in all matters which are within the scope and objectives of the partnership. Reverting now to clause (2) of Rule 1 of Order 30, there is no requirement laid down for a partner to have an authority from the other partners before initiating an action by way of a suit. This is not without a purpose as on account of the relationship of each partner being a principal and an agent for each other they are, under the law, regarded as representating the other and for that matter as an agent of the firm. In Subramanian v. T. R. M. T. S. T. Firm, Ela, A I R 1935 Rangoon 209, it was held that while construing Order 30 Rule 1(1) and (2), the suit must be brought in the name of the firm and no partner should be mentioned in the head of the plaint, but as to the requirement of the person signing it, it was observed that he should describe himself while signing and verifying the pleadings to be one of the partners of the firm. In the case under consideration the partner signing it has not said so while signing and verifying the application, but has nonetheless mentioned in para. 1 of the application which is not denied. If, at all, this was a defect it was merely technical and stood remedied by the disclosure in the application itself. There was, therefore, communication of his status as one of the partners of the firm. In Bholabhai v. Rattan Chand, A I R 1958 Punjab 260, the importance of communicating the status as partner was held to be necessary otherwise the suit would be hit by the provisions of section 45 of the Contract Act. Necessarily, therefore, in that eventuality all the persons will be required to sign and verify the pleadings which is clear from the observation at page 262 of the report as under:‑‑ "There can be little doubt that Order 30, was introduced into the Code as an exception to the provisions of section 45 of the Indian Contract Act, and it is an enabling provision inasmuch as it allows two or more partners to sue provided the suit is brought in the name of the firm." In this case, the judgment in the case of Hari Singh v. Firm Karam Chand Kanshi Ram, A I R 1927 Lahore 115, was followed and in particular the following observations at pages 116 and 117 of the report need mention: "By using the name of the firm the effect is to bring all the partners before the Court, and when that is done 0.30, R. 4 permits a partner to sue in this character though some of his co‑partners may have died before the suit was instituted, and, if the suit has been instituted permits it to be continued without the joinder of the legal representatives of a partner who may have died during its pendency. But these rules only apply when suits are brought in a firm's name. The rules do not enable one of several co‑contractors to sue in his own individual name." And further: "I am unable to accept the view that the clear effect of S. 45 of the Indian Contract Act has been modified by the Civil Procedure Code, save as appears in 0.30, which is confined to cases where suits are brought not by individuals but in the name of the firm under which they are trading." In Bhadreswar Coal Supply Co. v. Satis Chandra, (A I R 1936 Cal. 353), the question for consideration was that a suit under the provisions of Order 30, C . P . C . could be instituted in the name of the firm only if the suit was instituted by two or more partners of the firm, and as the suit had been instituted by one partner only in the name of the firm, the suit was not maintainable. It was held that this proposition was not correct as the suit which had been instituted by one partner in the name of the firm was a good suit and to such a suit the other partners who had refused to join were not necessary parties in the sense that they ought to have been named in the cause title and served with summons of the suit. In Lakhmichan.d v. Gokuldas (A I R 1926 Sind 75), it was held: "A firm as such has no existence. The partners carry on business both as principals and as agents for each other within the scope of the partnership business and the firm's name is a mere expression and not a legal entity. But Order 30, Rule 1, permits the use of the firm's name for the sake of convenience. When a suit is instituted against a firm in the firm's name, it is a suit filed against every partner of the firm and a decree against the firm has the same effect as a decree against all the partners. Where therefore a suit is filed against a firm and some partners are served individually the mere fact that any individual partner of the firm was not served would not at all affect the maintainability of the suit." It may be of interest to mention here that in a suit of this kind the cause of action against the partners of the firm is a joint cause of action against all the partners and each partner of that firm is jointly and severally liable for the whole claim and not only to a part limited to the proportionate amount of the interest which he may have as a member of the firm. In Allah Bux Moula Bux v. Aijaz Moula Bux, (P L D 1973 Karachi 468) , it was held that the bar of section 45 would not apply to a claim by the firm. Now reverting to the objections taken by the respondents inj reply to the application filed by the appellants for appointment of. the arbitrator; the first related to the absence of any arbitration: agreement within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Arbitration Act,; 1940, and the second to the non‑production of the express authority) to file the application for the appointment of arbitrator on the premise that he had no implied authority to do so. However, when his oral statement was recorded he not only admitted the receipt of notice but also stated that no reply was given to it. He abandoned his aforesaid objections and only disputed the appointment of Mian Maqbool Ahmad as the arbitrator. The conditions, therefore, necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction under section 8 were fulfilled and the Court was empowered to appoint the arbitrator as it did by order dated 12th of April, 1975. If, at all, the respondents were serious in regard to their objections they could have certainly raised an issue before the Court which they failed to do, and subsequently before the High Court adverted to them in the revisional jurisdiction. The High Court did not attend to the question of the abandonment of the objections, but held that the Court had acted in a haste in appointing an arbitrator without deciding the question as to whether the partners had the express authority to initiate the proceedings. If the plea had been abandoned I do not think that lI there was any scope for reagitating it in the revisional jurisdiction muchless the necessity to frame an issue and to record evidence. Even otherwise there is no requirement for an express authority as such. The recovery of money due to the firm is an ordinary incident of the business and in view of the relationship of the partners as principal and agent for each other, there was no bar for a partner to initiate proceedings for the appointment of an arbitrator in the name of the firm for referring the dispute to arbitration. In terms of i Rule 1, Order 30, C . P . C . , all the partners were before the Court in such proceedings as the firm itself is the collective name of the individuals. It is only where a partner submits a dispute relating to the business of the firm to arbitration that he had no "implied authority" in the absence of any usage or custom of trade to the contrary, which is not the case here as the initiation of proceedings was against a third party for the realisation of the claim pursuant to an agreement to refer disputes to arbitration, in which case the question arose for the appointment of an arbitrator as the respondent had failed to concur in the appointment of an arbitrator named by the appellants nor gave their own choice. There was, therefore, no impedement in the way of a partner to initiate the proceedings in the name of the firm and to sign and verify the pleadings. There is statutory sanction for it in clause (2) of Rule 1 of Order 30, C.P.C., which reads: "Suffice if such pleading or other document is signed, verified or certified by any one of such persons." The limitations provided in section 19 or any other provision of the Partnership Act did not, in any manner, affect the implied authority of a partner as an agent of the firm, that is, collectively the individuals constituting the firm. Even section 186 of the Contract Act recognises the implied authority of an agent and section 188 of the Contract Act I further provides that where an agent has the authority to carry on business he has an authority to do every lawful thing necessary for the purpose or done in the course of conducting such business subject, of course, to the limitations in the Partnership Act itself. These provisions could be equally applicable to a case of a partner who has the statutory authority to conduct the business of the firm. Accordingly, the High Court was in error in not adverting to this aspect of the case while holding that the application filed under section 8 of the Arbitration Act was not maintainable as it was not signed by two of the partners. In view of the decision of this Court reported as Union Insurance Co. of Pakistan Ltd. v. Muhammad Siddique, (P L D 1978 S C 279), the learned counsel for the respondents Mr. S.M. Zafar did not press the point as regards the stamp duty on at least one of the letters containing the agreement for referring the matter to arbitration, and this point, therefore, does not need any consideration. This brings me to the consideration of the second question namely as to the maintainability of the civil revision itself after the arbitrator had entered on the reference and given his award. In this connection it will be necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). Section 14 of the Act provides that the arbitrators or umpire shall cause the award to be filed in Court and the Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the award. Section 31 of the Act lays down that subject to the provisions of this Act, an award is to be filed in any Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates. It is this Court which, according to the language of section 31(2) of the Act, has the exclusive jurisdiction to decide all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement or the persons claiming under them.. Section 32 of the Act bars the G filing of the suit in any Court for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award. A further bar is that no arbitration agreement or award may be set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in this Act. Lastly, there is section 33 of the Act which provides that an arbitration agreement or an award should be contested by an application, and in such an eventuality the challenge to the existence' or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award shall be decided on affidavits. In effect, section 33 of the Act is a corollary of section 32 and is illustrative of the most usual type of cases arising in arbitration proceedings. Speaking broadly the purpose of sections 31, 32 and 33 of the Act obviously is to entrust the relevant controversies to the specified Court and to oblige the parties to bring such controversies for decision before the Court in the form of applications. It would be of relevance here to mention that before the enactment of the Arbitration Act, it was a matter of common knowledge that unscrupulous and dishonest parties to the arbitration', on a number of occasions chose to deny the existence of the said' agreements even after the arbitration proceedings had concluded and ended in awards and that resulted in making all arbitration proceedings' futile. It was that often these pleas ultimately failed but it resulted in considerable delay and waste of time and substantial expense. The Court mentioned in section 31(2) is the Court defined in section 2(c) of the Act, namely: "a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject‑matter of the reference if the same had been the subject‑matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under section 21, include a Small Cause Court", and this is the Court in which an award has also to be filed. It appears from the record that after the impugned order dated 12th of January, 1975, the arbitrator entered on the reference and after due notice to the parties gave his award on 22nd of April, 1975. It is also clear from the record that the respondents entered appearance under protest and that in their written objections objected not only to the maintainability of the application on the ground that there was no arbitration agreement within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Act but also denied the identity of the firm. The proceedings ended in the making of the award. However, it is not clear from the record as to whether this award was filed in Court, but this much is clear that civil miscellaneous No.1922‑C of 1975 was filed in the High Court on 10th of May 1975, by which the maintain ability of the civil revision was objected to on the ground that it was not competent as the award had already been made, and the Court which would go into the controversy was the Court mentioned in section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act had the award been filed in Court. This application was dismissed on 13th of October, 1975. The High Court did not in that order attend to the effect of these sections of the Arbitration Act in regard to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction considering the language of section 41 of the Act. Even on the premise that the respondent had objected to the admissibility of the arbitration agreement and on that account the appointment of the arbitrator .the edifice of the dispute namely the existence ` of valid contract nevertheless would have led to the consequential relief about the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement and in that eventuality the jurisdiction to be exercised by the specified Court under the Act was a question pertinent to the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. Could the High Court then in the exercise of its powers in revision set aside the order leading to the reference and the award when section 41 of the Arbitration Act itself says: "Subject to the provisions of this Act, (a) the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all proceedings before the Court and to all appeals, under this Act." Therefore, the reference and the award could only be interfered with in the manner laid down by sections 30, 31, 32 and 33 and to that extent the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are expressly excluded and no Court other than that mentioned therein could deal with the matter. The statutory bar created by sections 30, 31, 32 and 33 of the Act was affirmed in Prafulla Chandara Karmakar v Panchanan Karmakar (A I R 1946 Calcutta 427) in the following words: "In the first place, the operative part of S. 41 is prefaced by the words "subject to the provisions of the Act" and therefore the Civil Procedure Code can apply only subject to the provisions of Ss. 23(2) and

32. Since those provisions forbid interference with the reference and the award except as provided for in the Act, to that extent the Civil Procedure Code is excluded. Indeed, it seems to me that the scope of S. 41, is limited to attracting the procedural rules of the Code to proceedings before the Court u.nder the Arbitration Act." This case was followed in Indian Minerals Co. v. N.I.L.M. Association (A I R 1958 Allahbad 692), and it was held that the words "subject to the provisions of this Act" in section 41 of the Arbitration Act mean that the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable only subject to the provisions of section 23(2) and section 32 of the Act. .These provisions forbid inteference with the references and awards save as provided for in the Act, and to that extent only the Code of Civil Procedure is excluded. An objection to the existence of a valid contract containing the arbitration clause, when the award is filed in Court, if affirmed. automatically results in the setting aside of the award and the matter, therefore, falls under section 30 clause (c) of the Act as that will be covered by the express provision "otherwise invalid." (See Messrs Badri Narayan Agarwala v. Messrs Pak Jute Balers Ltd. (P L D 1970 S C 43). Such an order is appealable under section 39(vi) of the Act and so also an order refusing to set aside an award. In the circumstances, this power had to be exercised, in. the first instance, by the Court mentioned in clause 2(c) of the Act. The High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction examined the validity of the contract containing the arbitration clause and held that one of the documents containing it should have been stamped so as to make the agreement valid. This controversy could only be examined by the Court referred to in sections 31, 32 and 33 of the Act if the award had been filed in the Court as the objection to the legality of the arbitration clause would have eventually affected the making of the award. The premature exercise. .)f the revisional jurisdiction, therefore, resulted in rendering the award null and void. It cannot be disputed that the High Court can exercise revisional jurisdiction to correct an order under section 8 of the Arbitration Act which suffers from jurisdictional error or procedural irregularity as no appeal lies against such an order under section 39 of the Act. However, the exercise of this power is limited by the provisions of the Act when an award has been made on the grounds mentioned in section 30 of the Act. (See sections 31(2) and 41(a) of the Act). Therefore, there has to be and order by the Court against which an appeal does not lie to the High Court. It is only then that the revisional jurisdiction can be exercised.' Here as adverted earlier the revision was filed after the award was made but not filed in Court, and, therefore, the exercise of revisional power was circumscribed. As a result of the above discussion, the appeal succeeds on both the points. Accordingly, I would set aside the order of the High Court dated 19‑11‑1975, and restore that of the Civil Judge dated 12‑4‑1975. The appeal is thus allowed with costs. M.B.A./C‑12/S Appeal allowed.