2001 PLP 1546 (MLD)

Date of hearing: 8th November, 2000.

2. The facts giving rise to the present revision petition are that the respondents had filed an application under section 14 of the Arbitration Act alleging therein that the respondents had installed an ice factory under the name of 'Awami Ice Factory' within the territorial jurisdiction of Chak No. 116‑Murad on their own land and the petitioner had joined the business to the extent of 1/8th share. The office of the factory was established at Hasilpur and a partnership‑deed was also got registered with the Registrar of Firms, Bahawalpur. In the year 1983 the petitioner had transferred his share to the other share‑holders and received consideration of his share. He was asked to make statement for dissolution of partnership before the Registrar of Firms but he had been beating about the bush and the dispute was ultimately referred to the Arbitrator Mehmood Ali Bajwa, Advocate vide an arbitration agreement dated 9‑2‑1993 and the Arbitrator has passed his award on 18‑3‑1993. The award was made the rule of the Court vide judgment and dated 27‑6‑1998.

3. At the very outset the learned counsel for the respondents ha raised an objection that the revision petition has been filed beyond the period of limitation, therefore, is liable to be dismissed on this sole ground. Further contended that no application for condonation of delay has been filed. He next contended that the benefit of subsection (2), of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is not intended to apply to the revision applications. He relies on the cases of Deputy Commissioner, Pishin v. Abdul Salam and others PLD 1993 Quetta 121, Tahir Ali and others v. Chief Judge, Karachi Small Causes Court PLD 1960 (West Pakistan), Karachi 795, Sirajuddin v. Najamuddin 2000 CLC 467 (Quetta), City Bank N.A, a Banking Company through Attorney v. Riaz Ahmad 2000 CLC 847 (Lahore) and Divisional Forest Officer and others v. Haji Sher Muhammad 2000 CLC 650 (Karachi)

4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently opposed the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents contending that the revision petition was filed within limitation of 90 days after, computing the period for supply of copies of the documents. He relies on the r cases of Government of N.W.F.P. through Chief Secretary and 3 others v. Abdul Malik 1994 SCMR, 833 and Muhammad Mian v. Syed Shamimullah and 2 others 1995 SCMR 69.

5. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The Appellate Court has passed the impugned judgment on 25‑10‑1999. The petitioner filed application for obtaining certified copies on 29‑10‑1999 and the copy of the judgment was supplied to him on 20‑1‑2000. The revision petition was filed on 25‑3‑2000. The limitation for filing the revision petition has been provided in section 115, C.P.C. By Act No.VI of 1992 amendment in section 115, C.P.C. has been made, whereby the period prescribed for filing a revision petition is 90 days, which is not provided by Limitation Act, subsection (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act has contemplated as under:‑‑ "In computing period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed shall be excluded."

6. The benefit of above said provision of law is available only in cases where there is an appeal, an application for leave to appeal or an application for a review of judgment. This subsection nowhere mentions revision applications. The omission of the words 'revision applications' in the afore-quoted subsection is not accidental. This subsection restricts its application to merely two kinds of applications namely an application for leave to appeal and an application four review of judgment only. The benefit of subsection (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is not attracted to the revision applications. Reference in this context can be made to the case of Tahir Ali and others (supra). The judgment of the Appellate Court was passed on 25‑10‑1999. The application was filed for supply of the copies on 29‑10‑1999 after a delay of four days and the copies; were delivered to the petitioner on 20‑1.2000. Since the benefit of period of computation for obtaining copy of the judgment is not attracted to the instant case, therefore, the time in the instant case would start running from 25‑10‑1999 and the revision could be filed within 90 days only. The time limit for filing the revision petition expired on 23‑1‑2000 while the revision petition was filed on 25‑3‑2000. Therefore, revision petition is awfully barred by limitation. The petitioner has neither filed an application for condonation of delay nor the learned counsel for the petitioner has orally and verbally prayed for condonation of delay, thus, I have no hesitation in holding that the revision petition has been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation hence, not maintainable. This view has been strengthened by the cases of Deputy Commissioner, Pishin, Sirajuddin and Divisional Forest Officer and others (supra).

8. The amendment in section 115, C.P.C. was made in the year 1992. Prior to the amendment no limitation was provided for filing revision petition by the statute. Normally it was presumed to be 90 days. The cases referred to above by the learned counsel for the petitioner were decided prior to the amendment made in section 115, C.P.C. by Act No.VI of 1992, therefore, not beneficial to the petitioner. In view of the above, this revision petition being barred by time is dismissed in limine. H.B.T./S‑242/L Petition dismissed.