P L D 1959 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP)

It may perhaps be improper for a Prime Minister to review an order honestly made by his predecessor but such impropriety cannot be a ground for the officer concerned to rush to a Court of law or for a Court to set aside the later order. R. T. Rangachari v. The Secretary of State for India in Council 64 I A 40 mentioned. Faiyaz Ali, Attorney‑General for Pakistan, (Abdul Salam Farooqi, Advocate, Supreme Court, with him), instructed by Iftikharuddin Ahmad, Attorney for Appellants. Respondent in person. Date of hearing: November 21, 1958. MUHAMMAD MUNIR, C. J.‑This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of a Karachi Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan, ordering the appellant, namely, the Government of Pakistan to restore the respondent Qazi Syed Hikmat Hussain to the post of Post‑Master‑General or to an equivalent post. The relevant facts are stated in full in the order granting leave to appeal. By a notification of the Government of Pakistan, dated the 13th August 1956, the respondent was appointed officiating Post -Master‑General, Southern Circle, Karachi, until further orders. By a later order dated the 19th December 1956, however, he was reverted to his original rank and appointee] to the post of Assistant Director‑General, which is a lower post than that of the Post‑Master‑General. Thereupon he filed an application in the High Court under Article 170 of the late Constitution alleging that since by the subsequent order he had been reduced in rank without his having been given an opportunity to show cause, the action taken by the Government was illegal. The contention succeeded in the High Court where on the arguments addressed a lengthy judgment was delivered. The Government asked for special leave to appeal from that judgment and such leave having been granted, the consequent appeal is now before us for disposal. After perusing the judgment of the High Court we did not consider it necessary to call upon the learned Attorney‑General to address us in support of the appeal, because the view taken by the High Court appeared to us to be wholly unsustainable As expressly stated in the notification, the respondent's appoint ment was in an officiating capacity and until further orders. The subsequent order of the Government appointing him as Assistant Director was, therefore, in accordance with the terms of the notification and, subject to the result of a departmental repre sentation, could be passed at any time in the interests of service. The officiating appointment gave to the respondent no vested right, and if the Government subsequently thought it fit to appoint him to another post not lower than the one he was holding before his officiating appointment, he could have no grievance. He had been appointed as officiating Post‑Master‑General by the acting Prime Minister, contrary to the advice of the Selection Board; but the Prime Minister, on the representation of the superseded officer, acted in accordance with the advice of that Board in terminating the respondent's officiating appointment and appoint ing another officer as Post‑Master‑General. There is therefore no question of his having been reduced in rank, and the High Court was plainly wrong in the view that in these circumstances the respondent was entitled to a show‑cause notice under Article 181 of the late Constitution. The Privy Council judgment in the case of R. T. Rangachari v. The Secretary of State for India in Council (64 I A 40) has nothing to do with the question arising in the present appeal. When an officer is expressly appointed in an officiating capacity and until further orders, Government can at any time terminate his officiating appointment and revert him to his original position, even if such revision may amount to a review of the earlier order. It may perhaps be improper for a Prime Minister to review an order honestly made by his predecessor but such impropriety cannot be a ground for the officer concerned to rush to a Court of law or for a Court to set aside the later order. It was contended by the respondent before us that the order appointing him officiating Post‑Master‑General until further orders was contrary to the terms of the Prime Minister's order. This point was neither taken in the petition before the High Court, nor has this aspect of the matter been investigated by that Court. The respondent had relied on the notification of the 13th August 1956, but that notification had clearly stated that the respondent was appointed in an officiating capacity and until further orders. We accept this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. The respondent will have to pay costs both here and in the High Court. A. H. Appeal accepted.