2001 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

Seeking the setting aside of the impugned order dated 3-10-1995, passed by the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab (Annexure J), the appellant Ahmed Ali, A.S.-I., also prayed that respondent No.2 (I.-G. Punjab) be directed to relax the condition of Intermediate Class Courses or at least age condition in his favour; that respondents Nos. l and 2 be directed to promote him as A.S.-I. on regular basis w.e.f. 1-12-1992 and that he be also directed to be brought on list 'D' w.e.f 1-12-1972 and on list 'E' from the date on which his juniors were so relisted.

2. The background of the case is that on 15-5-1991, one Fateh Muhammad Ghauri and other Mohalladars had produced the appellant before the A.C. and D.S.P., Depalpur reporting that he was found in a compromising position with a prostitute Mst. Naila in the house owned by Wali Muhammad. A formal F.I.R. was registered (F.I.R. No.205 of 1991) under section 18 of Ordinance VII of 1979 read with section 294, P.P.C. at Police Station Hujra. The case was investigated. On the Departmental side, the S.P., Okara, issued a show-curie notice on 9-8-1993 and after observing other formalities, had dismissed the appellant. His appeal was dismissed but in revision before the I.-G.P., he was awarded the penalty of reduction in rank vide order, dated 7-6-1994. This punishment was then set aside by the Punjab Service Tribunal by judgment, dated 2-5-2000 in Service Appeal No.747 of 1994. In the meanwhile, many Head Constables junior to the appellant were selected for Intermediate Class Course and on successfully passing the course, were promoted as A.S.-Is. The appellant had meanwhile become overage. His application was rejected on 3-10-1995 on tire ground that there was no practice for relaxing the upper age limit for promotion courses. This order was issued under the signatures of the A.I.-G., Training for the I.-G., Punjab. Hence this appeal.

3. The contention of the appellant was that once the appellant was exonerated of the criminal charge and was reinstated by the Punjab Service Tribunal while accepting his Service Appeal No.747 of 1994 on 2-5-1995, the respondents could not have refused to nominate him for the intermediate class course on the ground that he had crossed the prescribed age limit. Referring to Annexure 'O', the appellant's plea was that the officials mentioned therein had been allowed promotion relaxing the upper age limit for promotion courses.

4. Respondents Nos. l and 2 had filed written comments/objections praying that the appeal may kindly be decided on merits. In the course of arguments on 3-12-1998, it was felt that specific reply was not filed by the respondents Nos. l and 2 with reference to Annexure 'O' wherein instances were quoted where age was relaxed by the I.-G., Punjab for upper courses prescribed for promotion. The I-G. P. was therefore, directed to submit a specific reply in the above context. On 23-11-1999, the Departmental representative was further asked to produce the A.C.R. Dossier of the appellant.

5. In response to the above orders, written reply was submitted on behalf of the I.-G., Punjab stating that the request of the appellant for relaxing the upper age-limit was rejected because of his chequered service record and relaxation was allowed to those only who had good service record.

6. Arguments were heard on 17-2-1999 partly. On 17-2-2000, learned counsel for the appellant wanted time to submit written comments as well, which he had filed on 14-4-2000.

7. I have gone through the record carefully. The appellant has a chequered history of service record. When he had crossed the upper age limit required for selection for the Intermediate Class Course, he was facing major penalty awarded by the respondents. Relaxation in upper age limit was peculiar to the indulgence of the authorities and considering the "chequered service record" of the appellant; they did not allow him the requisite concession/relaxation in age limit etc. Although in the impugned order, dated 3-10-1995 (Annexure. 'J') it was noted that there was no practice of relaxing of upper age limit for promotion cases" yet the fact of the matter is that the appellant had a shabby record. The impugned order is, therefore, upheld not for the reason stated in the impugned order but for the reason that the appellant has not a record, which is required in a disciplined force. The appellant at the relevant time was facing an action which was lecherous. Although he was exonerated in the criminal case but his record otherwise was also "chequered". He could not claim equal treatment with those who in the opinion of the departmental authorities had enviable service record. Rule of consistency for that reason could not be pressed into service for the appellant. Relaxation in age limit could be given in cases of hardships or where the civil servant concerned would miss the bus for some untoward reason for which he could not be blamed. In the large interest of justice, the Court had asked the respondents to submit a specific reply on the question if any relaxation was ever given to some people, as was claimed .by the appellant. When specific reply was submitted, it came to light that the appellant had a blemished record and that, therefore, he could not press into service the precedents of those-who had an enviable record. Rule of consistency did not apply with reference to instances as contained in Annexure ' O' . No ill-will was pointed out on the part of the respondents for not allowing relaxation in upper age limit in the case of the appellant. Standard of evidence/material in criminal cases is altogether different than the material on service roll of a civil servant. In service matter, the conduct of a civil servant is to be seen. Result of criminal proceedings could not always influence the proceedings on the departmental side. In some cases, an accused is not prosecuted on some technical grounds but that would not be a bar for the governmental authorities from enquiring into the truth of the pit charge against him by examining his service record. In the present case, I am not persuaded that the appellant has made out a case for interference on any ground whatsoever. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their costs. H.B.T./16/P/(Sr. Trib) Appeal dismissed.