PLC 1983

1983 PLP 581 (PLC)

LAHORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Versus KHUSHI MUHAMMAD

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab
Decided Date
Appeal No. LHR‑141 of 1983/Pb., decided on 30th March, 1983.
Honorable Judges
Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor Khan Lodhi, Appellate Tribunal
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1983 PLP 581 (PLC)
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab
Bench Members Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor Khan Lodhi, Appellate Tribunal
Parties LAHORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Versus KHUSHI MUHAMMAD
Primary Law Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1983 PLP 581 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1983 PLP 581 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab bench comprising: Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor Khan Lodhi, Appellate Tribunal.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1983 PLP 581 (PLC) (LAHORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Versus KHUSHI MUHAMMAD). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑

Representation

  • Nazi, Baig Chishti for Appellants.
  • Date of hearing : 27th March, 1983.

Headnotes / Summary

Ss. 2 (ix), (xiv) & 25‑A and West Pakistan Industrial and Com mercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S. 1(4) (c) read with Punjab Local Government Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 4‑Lahore Municipal Corporation ‑ An industry except its tax collecting branch‑Mali of Municipal Corporation making grievance petition before Labour Court due to not being consid ered for promotion ‑‑ Grievance petition accepted by Labour Court‑In appeal before Labour Appellate Tribunal contention that Municipal Corporation .was not an "industry" or industrial or commercial establishment" ‑ Further contention that in view of 0. 4 of Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 Labour Laws were not applicable‑Contentions repelled‑Held: Labour Laws being special laws. not overridden by Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 ‑ Municipal Corporation though have statutory rules governing service matters of its employees, held, not run by or under authority of Government .but an independent body found and functioning under law ‑ Not ousted from purview of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968‑Petitioner having a guaranteed right under rules to be considered for promotion could not be ignored without consideration while promoting leis juniors ‑ Petition, in circum stances, held, rightly accepted by Labour Court. P L D 1978 Lah. 270 rel.

Judgment & Decree

This appeal arises from the decision dated 27‑1‑1983 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No: 1, Lahore, whereby the promotion of the appellants Nos. 3 to 6. were set aside and the appellants Nos. 1 to 2 were directed to redecide the question of promotion considering the case of the respondent also.

2. The respondent was working as Head Mali since 1981. Admittedly, he is senior to appellants Nos. 3 to 6 as admitted ‑ by the Deputy Superintendent, Garden (D. W. 1). The learned lower Court has rightly held that promotion is made according to the rule of seniority‑cum -fitness. It was not found that the respondent was not fit for promotion, He was, therefore, wrongly ignored when his juniors i.e appellants Nos. 3 to 6 were promoted,

3. The learned counsel for the appellants has argued that Lahore Municipal Corporation is pot an `industry'. or industrial or commercial establishment', therefore, industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is not applicable. No doubt, such a question was raised on behalf of the appellants in the written statement, but no evidence was produced about the duties and functions of the appellants. Only on the basis of the functions performed by the Corporation it can be said if it was covered by the definition of `industry'. As such an objection was raised by the appellants, onus was upon it to prove that it was not an `industry'. It has been held, in P L D 1978 Lah. 270 that Corporation is an industry, except its tax collecting branch, which has regal functions. Learned counsel has not been able to cite any authority in which Lahore Municipal Corporation may be held as not an `industry'.

4. This argument is also devoid of force that the appellants do not come within the definition of employer. Needless to say that Lahore Municipal Corporation employ workmen. The relevant portion of the definition goes as under :- "Section 2 (viii).‑Employer" in relation to an establishment means any person or body of persons, whether incorporated or not, who or which employ workmen in the establishment under a contract of employment, and includes :‑" Learned counsel has also argued that according to section 4 of Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, the Ordinance overrides all laws, therefore, Labour Laws are not applicable. This argument is also not tenable. Under section 4 supra all general laws are superseded but no special laws. Punjab Local Government Ordinance is meant for all kind of employees of the Corporation but Labour Laws are applicable only to the workers. They are in nature purely special laws and that are no overridden by the Municipal Ordinance or the Punjab Local Government Ordinance.

5. Standing Orders Ordinance is applicable as only one condition given in its section (4) (c), second proviso stands fulfilled and not both. The appellant, no doubt, has its statutory rules but it is not being run by or under the authority of any Government. This is an independent body found and functioning under Municipal Laws and bye‑laws. So fart as the promotion is concerned, the respondent has a guaranteed right under the rules to be considered for promotion. Since his case was not considered even though he was senior to appellants Nos. 3 to 6, he was rightly directed to be considered.

6. It has also been argued that the case of the appellants was wrongly closed by the learned lower Court. .This is also not correct that the date on which the case was closed was an adjourned date not on the request of the appellants. Superintendent Garden was to be produced as a witness but‑it was not done. As a matter of fact there was no necessity of examin ing the Superintendent, Garden, because whatever he had to say was said by the Deputy Superintendent, Garden.

7. As a result of what has been said above, I do not find any force in the appeal and dismiss the same in limine. Appeal dismissed.