2014 PLP 718 (CLC)

M. SOHAIL IQBAL BHATTI, J.

This Civil Revision is filed against the judgment and decree dated 14-3-2005 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jhelum.

2. Brief facts of the case are that prior to the commencement of the Financial year 1992-1993 the petitioner proposed 100% increase in the rates of octroi duty on all items including limestone and gypsum. Respondent No.1 filed objections to this increase; and thereafter negotiations ensued between the petitioner and respondent No.1 and consequent to those negotiations the respondent agreed to withdraw its objections. It was further agreed by the petitioner that 23% increased rates would remain fixed between the parties for the next three years i.e. till 30-6-1995.

3. The petitioner on 23.4.1994 through a public notice in Daily Nawa-e-Waqt proposed further increase on various items including limestone and gypsum. The respondent filed the objection on 25-4-1994 on the ground that there was a binding agreement between the parties to the effect that 23% increase would remain in field for a period of three years i.e. till 30-6-1995. The objections of respondent No.1 were not accepted and the rate of octroi was enhanced. Aggrieved by this act the respondent filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction which was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge, 1st Class, Jhelum, vide judgment and decree dated 9-10-2001. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree an appeal was preferred which was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge, Jhelum, through judgment and decree dated 14-3-2005. Hence, this revision petition.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the impugned judgment was a result of misreading and non-reading of record. There was no binding contract between the parties which would have created any legal right in favour of the respondent; there was only an understanding between the parties. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that an offer was made by the petitioner-Company through its letter dated 24-6-1992 which was accepted by the petitioner and perusal of Exh.P-1 to Exh.P-4 clearly shows that there was a binding contract inter se the parties.

5. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties.

6. It is established from record that through Exh.P-2 i.e. letter dated 24-6-1992 the respondent agreed to 23% increase in octroi rates subject to the condition that no further increase shall be made for a period of three years and this offer was to be accepted by the petitioner through a resolution passed by the Town Committee. This offer/proposal was accepted by the petitioner under resolution No.3 dated 27-6-1992 (Exh.P-3) and this acceptance was conveyed to the respondent by the petitioner through letter dated 7-7-1992 (Exh.P-4).

7. In my mind Exh.P-2 was an offer made by the respondent Company which was duly accepted through letter dated 7-7-1992 (Exh.P-4). The wording of Exh.P-4 is as under:

"With reference to your letter No.MSR:SH dated 24 June. 92, on behalf of the Town Committee Khewra, we confirm the terms and conditions mentioned therein relating to our agreement regarding increase of 23% in octroi rates with effect from 1-7-1992 to remain fixed for a period of three years uptil 30-6-1995. Certified copy of the Resolution dated 27-6-1992 of the Town Committee approving our above agreement is enclosed. We take this opportunity to thank you for your co-operation in setting this issue amicably."

8. After the letter written by the respondent no counter-offer or proposal was made by the petitioner and letter dated 7-7-1992 was an acceptance letter which created a binding contract between the parties and the petitioner could not be allowed to wriggle out of this contract for a period of three years.

9. The term "offer" has been defined in section 2(a) of the Contract Act, 1872 which reads as under:

"When one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal." Section 7 of the Contract Act, 1872 underlines that acceptance must be absolute and section 7 reads as under:

"Acceptance must be absolute.

In order to convert a proposal into promise, the acceptance must

(1) be absolute and unqualified; (2) be expressed in some usual and reasonable manner, unless the proposal prescribes a manner in which it is to be accepted. If the proposal prescribes a manner in which it is to be accepted, and the acceptance is not made in such manner, the proposer may, within a reasonable time after the acceptance is communicated to him, insist that his proposal shall be accepted in the prescribed manner, and not otherwise; but if he fails to do so, he accepts the acceptance."

10. Similarly section 8 of the Contract Act, 1872 reads as under:

"Acceptance by performing conditions, or receiving consideration.

Performance of the conditions of a proposal, or the acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise which may be offered with a proposal, is an acceptance of the proposal."

11. The petitioner had not only accepted the offer but had also performed the conditions of the proposal by not increasing the rates for two years, which also establishes that a valid contract had been concluded between the parties.

12. It is clear to my mind that the offer made by the respondent was accepted by the petitioner in absolute term and also the benefit of that contract was extended to the respondent for a period of two years which itself shows that a valid contract in terms of section 10 of the Contract Act, 1872 had been executed between the petitioner and respondent No.1.

13. For what has been discussed above, I do not find any illegality or material irregularity in the judgment of the learned appellate Court. Resultantly, this revision petition is dismissed and the judgment and decree of the appellate Court dated 14-3-2005 is upheld. KMZ/T-2/L Revision dismissed.