1992 PLP 1211 (CLC)

Nemo for Respondent. Date of hearing: 4th February 1992. This appeal is directed against order dated 14‑9‑1989, whereby the learned 1st Rent Controller Karachi West has dismissed the Rent case filed by the appellant against the respondent, on the ground of default in payment of rent. The case of the appellant was that the respondent had failed to pay rent for the month of February, 1988. The respondent pleaded that the rent for the months of February and March 1988 was paid to the appellant, but he did not issue rent receipt, in spite of repeated requests and demands. The rent was sent by Money Order, but the same was refused, and therefore, it was deposited in Misc. Rent Case. In evidence it was established that the rent for the month of February 1988 was deposited by the respondent on 30‑4‑1988. The learned Rent Controller reached the conclusion that the said deposit was made within sixty. days, from the date the rent became due for payment and dismissed the application of the appellant with cost. The learned Advocate for the appellant has conceded that the finding on the ground of default is correct. It was urged that though the learned Rent Controller could have ordered payment of compensation to the tenant, if he was satisfied that the application filed by the appellant was frivolous or vexations, but he had no jurisdiction to award the cost. He accordingly urged that the impugned order may be modified to that extent. Mr. S.H. Jafry, the learned Advocate for the appellant in support of his above submission has relied on section 17 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. Section 17 of the Sindh Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, XVII of 1979, provides that where the Controller is satisfied that any application made by a landlord for eviction of the tenant is frivolous or vexatious, he may direct that compensation not exceeding ten times the monthly rent be paid by such landlord to the tenant. But, as has been rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Controller has no power to award cost. Reference in this regard may be made to the cases of Chian Fong Wo v. Abubaker Chhaya (1990 C L C 1724), Abu Bakar v. Ch. Muhammad Abdullah (1986 MLD 227), Ismail v. Rent Controller, Shahdedpur (1983 C L C 2994), and Dawood v. Abdul Ghani (1980 CLC 1062). The satisfaction of the Controller that the case filed by the landlord is frivolous and vexatious is sine qua non for directing the payment of compensation. Unless such a satisfaction is expressed, by giving a finding of fact, that the application filed by the landlord was frivolous and vexatious, the payment of compensation cannot be ordered, The word `satisfaction' used in Section 17 of the Ordinance, is to be read with the same connotation and denotations as the said word is used in section 15 of the said Ordinance, `Satisfaction' does not mean subjective satisfaction, but objective satisfaction of the Controller, flowing from and based on the material on record. The question raised, therefore, is to be decided from the above point of view. It is to be seen whether the proceedings commenced by the appellant were in fact frivolous and vexatious. It appears from the record that the appellant was unaware of the fact that the respondent had deposited the rent in Court on 30‑4‑1988, when the rent case was filed by him. The respondent in his written statement pleaded that the rent for the months of February and March 1988 was paid to the appellant, who had failed to issue the rent receipt and to protect the tenancy rights, the rent for the said two months was also deposited in Court. Thus, it was alleged that the respondent paid rent for these two months twice. The appellant failed to prove the double payment, though he succeeded to establish that the rent was deposited by him within the prescribed time and he was not liable to be evicted. on the ground of default in payment of rent. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the application filed by the appellant was frivolous or vexatious. The respondent, therefore, is not entitled to any compensation. The impugned order is, therefore, modified to the extent that it has awarded cost to the respondent. The order to the said extent is set aside and the order of dismissal of the case filed by the appellant is maintained. AA./I‑184/K Order accordingly.