2026 PLP 745 (MLD)

GUL HASSAN TAreen, J.

Appellants made an application under sections 94 and 540, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ( Code ) for summoning the CDR (Call Detail Record) of PW-1 s cell phone which was dismissed by the learned Special Judge, Control of Narcotic Substance, Quetta by an order dated 19 December 2025. Aggrieved from this order ( impugned order ), appellants have preferred this criminal appeal under section 48, the Control of Narcotic Substance, Act 1997.

2. Mr. Rehmatullah Khan, the learned counsel for the appellants stated that the PW-1 deposed that, on 21 May, 2025, he had taken the report (Murasila) to the police station for registration of an FIR against the appellants, and when the FIR was registered, he, returned back to the place of recovery with a copy of FIR and report. Learned counsel stated that PW-1 had deposed falsely, and, that s why, to contradict him, appellants applied to the Trial Court to summon his mobile phone records, which would prove that he was not present at the time and place of recovery of the narcotic substance. In conclusion, the learned counsel stated that the CDR record was relevant; however, the learned Trial Judge misinterpreted the provisions of sections 94 and 540, the Code. He placed reliance on the case laws reported as Chaudhary Muhammad Usman v. State (2023 SCMR 1676) and Hazrat Usman v. State (2025 PCr.LJ 130).

3. Heard and have considered the record, the cited statutory provisions, and the case-laws, cited by the appellant s learned counsel.

4. Appellants made an application to summon the C.D.R of PW1 s cell phone in order to contradict him and to shake his credit by injuring his character. Under Article 18, the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 10, 1984 ( the Q.S.O. ), evidence may be given in any suit or proceedings of the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue or of such other facts which have been declared relevant under Articles 19-69, the Q.S.O. However, Article 149, places a clog on the admissibility of an evidence intended to be given to contradict a witness. Article 149 reads as:

149. Exclusion of evidence to contradict answers to questions testing veracity. When a witness has been asked and has answered any question which is relevant to the inquiry only insofar as it tends to shake his credit by injuring his character, no evidence shall be given to contradict him, but if he answers falsely, he may afterwards be charged with giving false evidence. Exception

1. If a witness is asked whether he has been previously convicted of any crime denies it, evidence may be given of his previous conviction. Exception

2. If a witness is asked any question tending to impeach his impartiality and answers it by denying the facts suggested, he may be contradicted . PW-1 was cross-examined by the appellants. Responding question 12, the PW-1 told his mobile phone SIM number. A suggestion was made regarding his deposition, to which he replied as follows:

13. It s incorrect that the report wasn t given to me, I didn t go to the police station, and I didn t bring back the copy of FIR to the venue to give to the Faisal IP . To contradict the answer 13, appellants made an application to summon the C.D.R of his cell phone. The PW-1 was asked questions which were relevant to the inquiry merely to shake his credit by injuring his character.

5. Article 149, limiting the right to call evidence to contradict a witness on collateral issues excludes all evidence of fact which are incapable of affording any reasonable presumption or inference as to the principal matter in dispute, therefore, Article 149 must be strictly construed and narrowly interpreted. However, a witness answering falsely can be proceeded against for perjury. Article 149, prescribes two exception of this rule of exclusion of evidence. Firstly, previous conviction when denied can be proved, and secondly, any fact tending of impeach his impartiality when denied, can be proved. Otherwise, the court would have to investigate on irrelevant facts which have no bearing upon the matter in issue. Evidence intended to be brought on record to shake the credit of PW-1 by injuring his character was not admissible and did not fall within the two exceptions.

6. Appellants application was not competent which was rightly dismissed by the Trial Court. Case laws cited by the appellants learned counsel are distinguishable on facts, and in view of Article 149, the Q.S.O; thus, the impugned order suffers from no illegality. Consequently, I dismiss the appeal in limine. The impugned order stands. JK/3/Bal. Appeal dismissed.