2026 PLP 962 (MLD)

Muhammad Aamir Nawaz Rana, J.

The petitioner had claimed damages, on account of malicious prosecution, against the respondents by filing a suit; which was decreed vide judgment dated 31st December, 2020 by learned Senior Civil Judge, Hub ( trial Court ). The respondent assailed the judgment of the trial court by filing appeal before the Additional District Judge-I, Hub ( appellate Court ), which was allowed vide judgment dated 29th March, 2021 (impugned judgment) by setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court. The petitioner being aggrieved of the impugned judgment filed this civil revision petition. SUMMARY OF FACTS:

2. The petitioner filed a civil suit for recovery of damages to the tune of Rs. 10 million, alleging that he had been falsely implicated in FIR No. 03/2015, registered at Levies Station Layari under Sections 302, 109, and 34 P.P.C, at the instance of respondent No.1, Khuda-e-Dad. The petitioner, along with other co-accused, was tried for the murder of Gulzar (son of respondent No.1), and was ultimately acquitted vide judgment dated 08.06.2016. The acquittal appeal filed by the complainant was dismissed on 09.04.2018; thereafter the petitioner and another filed a suit against the respondents for claiming damages to the tune of Rs.10 million, alleging that, they were falsely nominated by the respondents and irreparable loss has occurred to the reputation of the petitioner and his family as they were dragged into this litigation without any justification by respondents. The learned trial court decreed the suit, however, the learned appellate court reversed the said findings, observing that the essential ingredients of the tort of malicious prosecution had not been established by the petitioner. The petitioner being aggrieved of the judgment of the appellate court filed the present civil revision petition. SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES:

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the FIR was based on concocted facts and that the subsequent acquittal of the petitioner and his co-accused proved that the criminal proceedings were false, motivated, and malicious. It was contended that the respondents had no evidence to implicate the petitioner and others, and their implication was a result of personal enmity.

4. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents supported the appellate court s findings, arguing that there existed reasonable and probable cause for lodging the FIR, based on the events surrounding the death of Gulzar, and that malice on part of the complainant had not been proved. It was further submitted that the case had undergone full-fledged investigation and trial, which negates the claim of false implication. Arguments heard. Record perused. DETERMINATION:

5. Malicious prosecution is a tort recognized under the principles of English common law, which provides a remedy to individuals who have been subjected to criminal prosecution without reasonable and probable cause and with malice. To bring a successful claim for malicious prosecution, it is essential for the plaintiff to establish: (i) that they were prosecuted; (ii) that the prosecution ended in their favor; (iii) that the prosecution was initiated without reasonable and probable cause; and (iv) that it was actuated by malice. It is well-settled that the absence of reasonable and probable cause alone is insufficient to prove malice. While it may serve as a relevant circumstance, but the plaintiff must prove malice, defined as a wrongful or improper motive. Malice is a subjective state of mind and may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, but inference alone must be supported by credible evidence. Therefore, even where reasonable cause may appear weak or absent, a claim for malicious prosecution cannot succeed unless mala fide intent is clearly demonstrated.

6. In the present case, the first two elements are not in dispute: the petitioner was prosecuted and subsequently acquitted. However, as to the remaining elements, specifically the absence of reasonable and probable cause, and the presence of malice, the petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proof. A perusal of the FIR and the facts narrated therein reveals that the respondents had reasonable grounds to suspect the involvement of the petitioner and his co-accused in the events surrounding the death of Gulzar. It is admitted fact that the injured Gulzar received bullet injuries, after which he succumbed to his injuries. In these circumstances, the lodging of an FIR and initiation of criminal proceedings cannot be deemed as lacking in probable cause. Additionally, there is no evidence on record to support the assertion that the FIR was lodged with mala fide intent. On the contrary, the FIR was registered pursuant to an order of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace under Section 22-A Cr.P.C., and the matter proceeded through a regular investigation, culminating in submission of a challan and a full trial. If the complaint had been found to be frivolous or baseless, the investigating agency would have discharged the petitioner at the initial stage. The fact that the petitioner was ultimately acquitted does not, by itself, establish that the prosecution was malicious. It is trite law that malice cannot be presumed merely from the outcome of acquittal or failure to secure a conviction.

7. The learned appellate court has rightly applied the settled legal principles while setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court. The findings of the appellate court are based on sound reasoning and do not suffer from any illegality, material irregularity, or jurisdictional error warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction. Petition stands dismissed. MQ/135/Bal. Revision dismissed.