P L D 1989 Lahore 511 (PLP)

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑ ‑‑‑S. 151‑‑Object and scope of S. 151‑‑Dismissal of appeal in default‑ Appeal against order of refusal to set aside dismissal in default‑ Pending appeal, application by plaintiffs /appellants under S.151, C.P.C. for stay of two separate suits pending in Civil Court‑ Competency‑‑Application for stay of separate suits was simply ill‑conceived and not tenable for such an object which was a distinct and wholly different matter from the one involved in appeal. Inherent powers of High Court under section 151 of the C.P.C., the scope whereof is frequently misunderstood to be invoked as an overriding provision in such matters which stand specifically provided for elsewhere in the Code itself. That is in the nature merely of a saving clause with regard to such powers as were being exercised by the Courts at the time of codification of procedural laws whereabout is not to be found any provision made therein either way and it certainly is not the object of section 151, C . P. C . that it may be used in negation of the other provisions of the statute. The powers exercisable under that section have to, by their very description, be those which have inhered in the Courts and are not new in their nature and source. These are only those existing, but not provided for, powers of Courts that have been saved by section 151 which does not even purport to confer any new power not heretofore possessed by the Courts. The powers exercisable by the High Court under the Code of Civil Procedure have been clearly mentioned therein to be invoked and exercised in the prescribed manner with regard to cases decided below and, except when a Judge of this Court has happened to be on an inspection visit to a particular subordinate Court to exercise the power of superintendence thereabout, this Court has never had the power to interpose itself in the cases still awaiting to be decided by the competent subordinate Courts. Such a power cannot be spelt out from the Code and has never existed even in the distant past as being liable to be exercised for passing any order (other than that of transfer of case) in matters pending in the subordinate Courts. Thus, there was not any power relating to the contemplation of this petition ever possessed by this Court to be deemed to have been saved by virtue of section 151 and muchless may any power be exercisable by this Court during the seisin of one matter (appeal in present case) with regard to an altogether different one (separate suits pending below). Even otherwise, no power can Andhra Pra. 295 is just a case in support of this view which I am taking. That is a more reasonable view than the one expressed by a Single Judge of this Court in (1961) 27 Cut Lt.

326. Further the view expressed there does not appear to me to be in accord with the view of the Supreme Court in the two cases referred to above regarding the inherent power of the Court recognized under section 151, C.PX. It also appears to me to be distinguishable on facts. In that case the plaintiff's witnesses were examined and discharged in absence of the defendants and their lawyers. On 14‑4‑1960 and immediately thereafter arguments were heard and the case was posted to 1‑5‑1960 for judgment. It is only thereafter that a petition under section 151, C.P.C. was filed to reopen the case. In the present case the defence evidence had only closed and the arguments had not yet been commenced". be taken to have survived to any Court for being exercised in such a manner as to render nugatory the statutory powers conferred on that Court for the purpose of ensuring compliance of the provisions of the Code whereof section 10 is in point herein and thereunder it is for the Court concerned to stay hands in a subsequently instituted suit upon the necessary conditions being found to exist and this Court does not have to either pass the requisite order for that Court or to even advise such a Court to pass a desired order for stay of proceedings pending there. Viewed from any angle, this application is simply ill‑conceived and is not tenable here for such an object which is a distinct and wholly different matter from the one involved in the appeal. Nemo for Remaining Respondents.