2003 PLP 570 (YLR)

(2) If issue No. 1 is not proved then what is the market value of the suit‑land? OPP (3) Whether the plaintiff has a superior right of pre‑emption qua the defendants? OPP (4) Whether the plaintiff has made Talbs? OPP (5) Whether the defendants are entitled to recover incidental charges, if the suit of the plaintiff is decreed? OPD (6) Relief.

4. After recording and appreciating the evidence of the parties pro and contra, the trial Court dismissed the suit. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff‑petitioner herein had preferred an appeal which came up for hearing before the learned Additional District Judge, Chakwal, who vide his judgment and decree dated 5‑4‑1995 dismissed the appeal and maintained the findings of the trial Court.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the plaintiff had made his intention of Talb‑i‑Muwasibat when he received the information of the sale in dispute. He further contended that the suit property is at a distance of 200 yards from his house and he alongwith the witnesses went there and declared his intention to pre‑empt the sale. He argued that the jumping demand would not mean the immediate demand and the plaintiff while receiving the information of the sale in dispute in his house went to the land, subject‑matter of the suit and declared his intention to pre‑empt the sale of the suit- land. The plaintiff in order to prove his case produced Muhammad Ashraf P.W.2, Muhammad Bashir as P.W.3 and he himself appeared as P.W.4. He categorically stated in his examination‑in‑chief, that about two years ago, he came to know about the sale in dispute and on the relevant day, he was sick, therefore, Muhammad Bashir and Ghulam Hussain had come to console his sickness. He alongwith the witnesses went to the land in dispute where he declared his intention to pre‑empt the sale of the suit‑land, which would mean that when he received the information, he had not announced his intention to file the suit for pre‑emption having superior right of pre‑emption. He admitted in his cross‑examination that the witnesses remained sitting with him about one or two hours.

6. The arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner has been vehemently opposed by the learned counsel for the respondents contending that the plaintiff received information about the sale in dispute in his house where he kept silent and did not make demand of Talb‑i‑Muawsibat and according to his own version, he declared his intention when he reached at the property in dispute, therefore, there was no immediate demand by the plaintiff. It has been observed by the superior Courts that as soon as the plaintiff received the information about the sale in dispute, he would make a jumping demand meaning thereby that he should declare forthwith his intention for which the plaintiff has failed to do so.

7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The question which boils down for determination in this case would be only, whether the word "jumping" would denote the meaning of immediate or forthwith? Article 236, subsection (i) of the Mohammadan Law provides that no person is enisled to the right of pre‑emption unless he has declared his intention to assert the right immediately on receiving the information of the sale. This formality is called Talb‑i‑Muwasibat (literally, demand of jumping i.e. immediate demand).

8. The word "immediate" has been defined in the Chamber's English Dictionary:‑‑‑ "With noting between, not acting by second causes; direct, present without delay." In the said dictionary, the word "jumping" has been defined as under:‑‑ "As immediate, to move suddenly, to bounce or to rise suddenly, the act of jumping, a bound, an obstacle to be jumped over, height, a sudden rise or movement. "

9. In 21st Century Dictionary, the word "immediate" has the following meaning:‑ "Happening or done at once and without delay; immediate reaction; nearest or next in space, urgent, having a direct effect and without anything coming in between. " The meanings of the word "immediately", according to the said dictionary are: "At once or without delay, directly, without anything coming in between. " In the said dictionary, the word "jumping" has been defined as under:‑‑ "To spring off the ground, pushing off with the feet or to leap or bound, to get over or across something by jumping, to rise abruptly, to make a startled movement, to pass directly from one point to another, conclusive movement. "

10. The words "immediate" and "jumping" denote the same meanings i.e. to act immediately, suddenly or a sudden rise or movement. Therefore, from the dictionary meanings, the "jumping demand" would mean the immediate demand made by the pre emptor in the same meeting and sitting without any loss of time as soon as he received the information about the sale in dispute. In this context, reference can be made to the case of Rashid Ahmad v. Bashir Ahmad through Legal Heirs 1995 CLC 1924. In the instant case, the plaintiff received the information in his house whereas he declared his intention when he reached at the land in dispute, which would mean that it took some time to reach there, therefore, making the demand of Talb‑i‑Muwasibat at the land would not mean that he had made the demand of Talb‑i‑Muwasibat immediately on receipt of information about the sale in dispute.

11. It is settled proposition of law that if jumping demand is not proved by the plaintiff, the second demand i.e. Talb‑i Ishhad if proved would not give any benefit to him because if the litigant,' who had sought a decree for pre‑emption, failed to perform all the three requirements of Talbs, is not entitled for the grant of decree as held in Rana, Muhammad Tufail v. Munir Ahmad and another PLD 2001 SC 13, Muhammad Hassan and 2 others v. Shafi‑ud‑Din and 2 others PLD 1995 Quetta 29, Salma and another v.‑ Manzoor Hussain and another 1996 CLC 623, Dilmeer and others v. Amir NLR 1996 Civil (Lahore) 627, Mst. Amir v. Soini 1997 MLD (Lahore) 2376.

12. From the perusal of the record, it reveals that the plaintiff‑petitioner has failed to establish on record all. the three requirements of Talbs in accordance with the prescribed procedure as provided in section 13 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1991, and both the Courts below have concurrently arrived at this conclusion. There is a question of fact involved in the matter, which would not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction as it cannot re‑appreciate or re‑examine the evidence of the parties even if it can take a different view. In this context, reference be made to the cases of Nazir Ahmad v. Boota 1989 SCMR 450; Riaz v. Muhammad Salim 1989 SCMR 1491; Guldar Khan v. Isa Khan 1993 SCMR 2099 and Haji Muhammad v. Malik Muhammad Abdullah PLD 1994 SC. 291.

13. For the foregoing reasons, this revision petition having no force is dismissed with no order as to costs. H.B.T./N‑262/L Revision dismissed.