PTD 1990

1990 PLP 404 (PTD)

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX CENTRAL ZONE, KARACHI Versus Mir KHALILUR REHMAN

Jurisdiction / Court
Karachi High Court
Decided Date
I.T.R. No. 97 of 1984, decided on 7th September, 1989.
Honorable Judges
Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui and Imam Ali G. Kazi, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1990 PLP 404 (PTD)
Forum / Court Karachi High Court
Bench Members Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui and Imam Ali G. Kazi, JJ
Parties COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX CENTRAL ZONE, KARACHI Versus Mir KHALILUR REHMAN
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1990 PLP 404 (PTD)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1990 PLP 404 (PTD)?

The case was heard and decided by the Karachi High Court bench comprising: Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui and Imam Ali G. Kazi, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1990 PLP 404 (PTD) (COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX CENTRAL ZONE, KARACHI Versus Mir KHALILUR REHMAN). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Ali Athar for Respondent.
  • Date of hearing: 7th September, 1989.

Headnotes / Summary

Incometax Act (XI of 1922)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Ss.G6 (1), 10 & 13, proviso‑‑Reference‑‑‑Question referred related to examination of the factual aspect of the case whether finding of the Tribunal in treating the liabilities payable by assessee as income from undisclosed source was based on any material or evidence on record‑‑‑Interference by High Court when called for. Question referred to the High Court by the Tribunal only related to the examination of the factual aspect of the case whether the finding of the Tribunal in treating the liabilities payable as income from undisclosed source was based on any material or evidence on record. Various factors, which affected the credibility of the witness were taken into consideration in rejecting the evidence produced by the assessee. The factors which induced the Tribunal to reject the evidence of the witness were neither irrelevant nor they were appreciated in a perverse manner. The fact that on re appraisal of this evidence it was possible that High Court reached a different conclusion, was no ground to disturb a finding of fact by a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction. The interference with the finding of fact by the Tribunal could only be made on the limited ground, namely, if the Tribunal had perversely approached the appreciation of the evidence. or that the material piece of evidence on record was ignored or the evidence on record was misread by the Tribunal in arriving at the conclusion. None of these factors were present in the present case and, therefore, no interference was called for. Shaikh Hyder for Applicant.

Judgment & Decree

SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.‑‑The following question has been referred to us by the Tribunal for our decision under section 66(1) of the Income tax Act, 1922; "Whether the finding of the Tribunal in treating the liabilities payable to Syed Jam Ali Shah as income from undisclosed source was based on any material or evidence on record.

2. Mr. Ali Athar, learned counsel for the applicant contended before us that the assessee/applicant was not liable to prove the source and nature of income for the relevant year, The above argument of the learned counsel, however, does not arise in the present reference as the question referred to us by the Tribunal only relates to the examination of the factual aspect of the case whether the finding of the Tribunal in treating the liabilities payable to late Syed Jam Ali Shah as income from undisclosed source was based on any material or evidence on record. The Tribunal dealt with this aspect of the case in its judgment as follows:‑‑ "From the statement of the witness it is obvious that he has no evidence to prove that his father advanced any loan to the assessee. The manner of the assessee's reluctance in providing complete and correct address of the witness, as also withholding the information about the death of the witness's father in the first instance indicates that the assessee was reluctant to get this loan verified. There is a glaring mistake in the statement recorded by the witness. It has been stated that his father did not maintain a car, while it has been discovered from local enquiries that his father did maintain a car. The witness has also not sent his identity card for verification so far. Huge loans are advanced without a security, a receipt or even an evidence of having advanced the same only to very close and intimate friends. Yet from the statement of the witness it appears that the assessee was neither very intimate and close to him nor to his father. It had become a trend now to produce such persons as witnesses whose own assets arc not verifiable and it is for this reason that the assessee chose to show this liability from a Zamindar and that too, one who was dead. I must re‑emphasis here the fact that the liability was not shown in the assessee's wealth tax return filed in 1971. How did the assessee forget, so soon after the death of his `friend', that he owed him this money. The very identity of the witness has not been established. Even if the witness genuinely, be the person as whom he has deposed the advancing of loan by his father has not been established nor even a close relationship between his father and the assessee is not deductible from his gross assets." From the above discussion in the order of the Tribunal it is quite clear that various factors which affected the credibility of the witness were taken into consideration in rejecting the evidence produced by the applicant. The factors which induced the Tribunal to reject the evidence of the witness Syed Nazar Hussain Shah are neither irrelevant nor they were appreciated in a perverse' manner. The fact that on reappraisal of this evidence it is possible that, we, may, reach a different conclusion is no ground to disturb a finding of fact by a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction. The interference with the finding of fact by the Tribunal below could only be made on the limited ground, namely, if the Tribunal had perversely approached the appreciation of the evidence, or that the material piece of evidence on record was ignored or the evidence on record was misread by the Tribunal in arriving at the conclusion. None of these factors are present in the present case and, therefore, no interference is called for. We accordingly answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. There will be, however, no order as to costs. M.B.A./C‑147/K Question answered in affirmative.