P L D 1961 W (PLP)
LYALLPUR Versus THE R. T. A., LAHORE AND ANOTHER
| Citation | P L D 1961 W (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | M. W. Abbasi, Member, Board of Revenue, |
| Parties | LYALLPUR Versus THE R. T. A., LAHORE AND ANOTHER |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1961 W (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1961 W (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: M. W. Abbasi, Member, Board of Revenue,.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1961 W (PLP) (LYALLPUR Versus THE R. T. A., LAHORE AND ANOTHER). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) Motor Vehicles Act (IV of 1939)‑Review‑‑Not provided for by Act‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), not applicable. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code 1908, have not ipso facto been made applicable to the cases under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and there is no warrant for the view that they can be used to fill up gaps or omissions in the special enactment. There is also no reason to assume that the Motor Vehicles Act is not a self‑contained enactment; and if a specific provision does not figure in it, it can also be argued, with greater force and justification, that the omission was deliberate and that the Legislature did not want it to be in the Special Act. P L D 1955 Ph. (Rev.) 45 ref. (b) Route permit‑R. T. A., may accept change in name of limited company for limited purpose of granting permits.
Judgment & Decree
R. O. A. M. No. 237 of 1958‑59, decided on 14th December 1960, District Lyallpur. (a) Motor Vehicles Act (IV of 1939)‑Review‑‑Not provided for by Act‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), not applicable. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code 1908, have not ipso facto been made applicable to the cases under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and there is no warrant for the view that they can be used to fill up gaps or omissions in the special enactment. There is also no reason to assume that the Motor Vehicles Act is not a self‑contained enactment; and if a specific provision does not figure in it, it can also be argued, with greater force and justification, that the omission was deliberate and that the Legislature did not want it to be in the Special Act. P L D 1955 Ph. (Rev.) 45 ref. (b) Route permit‑R. T. A., may accept change in name of limited company for limited purpose of granting permits. This is an application for a review of my appellate order dated 26‑3‑1960 in a case between the parties cited above. Originally, the Alkisan Transport Company was a single body but it was bifurcated under the order of the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, into two Groups, A and B; their assets including vehicles, permits etc., were also divided between them on the basis of the Chief Settlement and Rehabili tation Commissioner's order. In the new circumstances, the respondent company considered it desirable to change its name to "New Kisan Transport Co." in order to remove all doubt and confusion resulting from division and sub‑divisions. R. T. A. Lahore accepted their changed name for 12 permits endorsed by the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner. In appeal I re‑armed R. T. A. 's order accepting the change of name with a slight modification. A preliminary objection to the review proceedings has been taken on the ground that the Motor Vehicles Act contains no provision permitting review of an order. In reply it has been contended that where there is no specific provision of law under a Special Act resort can be had to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code have not ipso facto been made applicable to the cases under the Motor Vehicles Act and there is no warrant for the view that they can be used to fill up gaps or omissions in the special enactment. There is also no reason to assume that the Motor Vehicles Act is not a self‑contained enactment; and if a specific provision does not figure in it, it can also be argued, with greater force and justification, that the omission was deliberate and that the Legislature did not want it to be included in the Special Act. I cannot, therefore, agree with the contention that the provisions for review incorporated in the Civil Procedure Code must be used to make review petitions entertainable under the Motor Vehicles Act, Another argument advanced in this connection is that a Court has inherent powers to undo injustice or to administer justice by reviewing its own orders and reliance is placed on, P L D 1955 Ph. (Rev.) 45 in which the Financial Commissioner, following a decision of the Privy Council, held that Civil Courts "do not possess any inherent power to grant a review of an order passed by them unless exceptional circumstances existed, as for example the Court had no jurisdiction and the order passed was void or that the order was obtained by an abuse of the process of the Court". In this case it is contended that the change of the name of a company can only be effected under the Companies Act and that the R. T. A., was not competent to approve of it. Actually, the R. T. A., did not and could not adjudicate upon the issue and all it did was to accept the reported change for its own limited purpose, viz. the grant of permits, which it was perfectly competent to do. It is still open to any aggrieved party to apply to the competent Court for issue of a declaration to the contrary. However, I find no "exceptional" circumstances in the case which can entitle the appellant to ask for a review of my order. The petition is dismissed. K.M.A. Petition dismissed.