1972 PLP 161 (SCMR)

SAMAD AHNIAD, J.‑The appellant has been sentenced to death for the murder of his father, Lal Din, which took place at about 10 a.m. on the 3rd of July 1968. According to the prosecution case, the deceased, Lal Din, had three sons, Sodagar (appellant), Nazar and Habib, all of whom were blacksmiths by profession. The appellant wanted to instal a small flour mill and had borrowed a sum of Rs. 1,025 from hi; brother, Nazar, on the condition that lie would take him as a partner in his mill. He went back on his promise and neither made Nazar his partner nor did he pay him back his money. This led to a dispute between the two brothers. A little while before the present occurrence, a panchayat was convened in the shop of the deceased to settle this dispute. The deceased supported the demand of Nazar against the appellant, which infuriated the latter. Both the father and the son exchanged abuses, where after the appellant left the shop, saying that he would soon brim the money and pay it. Soon after, the appellant re‑appeared, armed with a country‑made .12 bore pistol, and fired at his father, hitting him in the chest, causing his instantaneous death. The appellant, in his defence, pleaded innocence, and alleged that it was a case of accident, as a loaded pistol, which he was repairing at the time, had gone off and the bullet hit the deceased. Both the trial Judge and the High Court have disbelieved the defence version and have found that the prosecution case, which was supported by independent and reliable witnesses, proved the appellant's guilt beyond any reasonable doubt. On a jail petition, leave was granted to the appellant by this Court, to consider whether on account of the abuses allegedly given by the deceased to the appellant, which had infuriated and provok ed him, he was entitled to any reduction in the sentence. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on this matter. He has argued that the appellant would not have committed the murder of his own father unless he was gravely provoked, and it must be assumed in his favour that he was so provoked, by the abuses hurled at him by his father, which made him lose his balance to kill his father. The argument is wholly devoid of any substance. 1n the first place, it is not shown that the deceased had acted in any reprehensible manner to invite the dastardly assault on him by his own son. Even if the deceased had administered some rebuke to the appellant, because he was not dealing fairly with his brother, this was hardly a ground for him to be incensed and kill his father. Nor can it be said that the killing by the appellant was done in a fit of rage and provocation, because, according to the prosecution case, the appellant had left the shop and had returned to it a short while later after having armed himself with a pistol, which he fired at the deceased. In our view, there is no extenuating circumstance in this case to merit interference in the legal sentence of death awarded to the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that the appellant has suffered the torture of sentence of death for more than two years now since his conviction as far back as the 22nd of April 1969, and that this circumstance also justifies the reduction in sentence, added to the circumstance that it was a case of some provocation, although it may not legally amount to a grave and sudden provocation. These are matters which can be taken into account by the executive authorities on a mercy petition, if one is filed by the appellant, for their consideration. They are not relevant for determining the question of sentence so far as this Court is concerned. It the result, we dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed.