1996 PLP 640 (PLC)

Waqar A. Seth for Respondents. This appeal has been filed to call in question the legality and correctness of the order dated 7‑12‑1992 of the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Peshawar whereby the grievance petition under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 of the respondents was partially accepted. The facts relevant for the disposal of appeal are that respondents Nos. l to 21 are working in the Pakistan Railways as Assistant Air‑Condition Coach Attendants and Air‑Condition Coach Attendants. They were allowed 55 Stationary Duty Payment Allowance in the year 1977 by the Railway Administration but in view of the audit observation the aforesaid benefit of 55 as Stationary Duty Payment Allowance was disallowed by the Railway Administration vide Exh. P.W. 2/4 and it was further ordered that the amount so received by the respondents in this connection should also be recovered from them as arrears. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Railway Administration, they served a grievance notice on the employer but futile. Therefore, they approached the Labour Court by way of filing a grievance petition under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and prayed that the impugned order of the Railway Administration may be declared as illegal, unlawful, void ab initio, without jurisdiction and without legal authority. The appellant contested the petition by filing a written statement. The learned Labour Court, after recording of evidence of both the parties and affording them a chance of cross‑examination, accepted the petition to the extent that the recovery of the amount of 55 % already made to the respondent petitioners being illegal should not be recovered from them while the claim of the respondents to the extent of allowing the said allowance in future was rejected. Dissatisfied by the aforesaid order of the learned Labour Court the Railway Administration has filed the instant appeal in this Tribunal praying for setting aside the impugned order. Both the learned counsel for the parties were heard in support of their view‑points and the record was also perused in the light of their submissions. At the very outset it was argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that the appeal is time‑barred as the same was not filed within the prescribed period of thirty days as required under section 37(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed being time‑barred on this score alone. On the other hand the learned counsel for the appellant vehemently opposed the plea of the learned counsel for the respondent and submitted that authorisation for filing of appeal was received late from the Headquarters, therefore, the delay, if any, in filing of appeal may kindly be condoned. It is manifest from the case file that the appeal was filed beyond the mandatory period of thirty days as the memo. of appeal was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay but no cogent reason was given in it. It is well‑settled‑ law that where an appeal is time‑barred the delay of each and everyday is to be explained by cogent and reasonable grounds as law helps the vigilant and delay defeats equity. In the instant case no document was / produced on behalf of the appellant whereby efforts were made to get the authorisation for filing of appeal before this Tribunal well within time. Mere ground of authorisation of the Headquarters for filing of appeal is not a sufficient cause to justify the condonation of delay. Hence day to day delay in filing of appeal was not reasonably and convincingly explained. In view of the above position I hold the appeal time‑barred and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. H.B.T./205/N.‑W.F.P. Appeal dismissed.