1991 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

1991P L C (C.S.) 327 rel. Sardar Rafique Mahmood for Appellant. By virtue of this appeal, the appellant Sard4r Javid Iqbal, SI/S.H.O Summani, District, Mirpur has called in question the order dated 12-3-1989 passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarabad, whereby the appellant was awarded tic penalty of stoppage of one annual increment. The appellant challenged this punishment order through departmental appeal before the Deputy Inspector-General of Police who rejected it vide his order dated 17-10-1989. The appellant then riled a review petition before the Inspector-General of Police but that too was turned down vide order dated 16-4-1990. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order, the appellant has invoked the jurisdiction of this Tribunal under section 4 of the Service Tribunal Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and have gone through the relevant record. After giving my due consideration to the arguments, I am of the view that this appeal merits dismissal in limine on the ground of limitation. Under section 4 of the Act any civil servant aggrieved by any final order is required to file an appeal in this Tribunal within thirty days after exhausting any of the departmental remedy by way of an appeal, review or representation. The departmental appeal brought before the Deputy Inspector-General of Police against the original impugned order dated 12-3-1989 was rejected on 17-10-1989. Under rule 16-29(2) of Police Rules 1934 only one appeal from the original order is provided and the order of the appellate authority shall be final. Instead of filing an appeal against this final order before this Tribunal within the prescribed period of thirty days, the appellant tried his luck by preferring a revision petition before the inspector-General of Police. The remedy of revision petition is provided under rule 16.32 of the Police Rules, 1934, but under section 4 of the Act, the remedies essentially to be availed of before invoking the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, as the case may be, are an appeal, review or representation whereas the remedy of revision petition is not necessary to be exhausted before seeking the relief before this forum. In my considered view after the order passed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, the appellant had two options, either to approach this Tribunal within thirty days or to seek his redress before departmental authority by way of revision petition. The appellant opted for the latter but that was also rejected by the Inspector-General of Police vide order dated 16-4-1990. The appellant preferred present appeal before this Tribunal on 14-6-1990 with a prayer under Section 5 of Limitation Act to extend the time spent in obtaining copy and communication of the impugned order passed by the Inspector-General of Police but at the same time no prayer has been made for the condonation of the period he spent in pursuing his revision petition before the Inspector-General of Police. It was not open for the appellant to bring his appeal at this forum till the revision petition was disposed of by the Inspector-General of Police. Therefore, the period elapsed in the meantime could not legally be condoned. Thus the present appeal being filed on 14-6-1990 against the. final order passed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police on 17-10-1989 is hopelessly barred by limitation, Reliance, if necessary, may be placed on 1991 P L C (C.S.)

327. For the reason stated above, I have no alternative but to dismiss the present appeal in limine. Counsel for the appellant may be informed and record may also be consigned to the record room. M.Y.H/117/Sr.A. Appeal dismissed.