1979 PLP 782 (CLC)

Muhammad Abdus Saleem for Appellants. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that Muhammad lqbal and eleven others filed an application, under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) for ejectment of the first respondent, Muhammad Afzal from two rooms alleging that they were required by them for the purpose of reconstruction. All the applicants other than Muhammad Iqbal, who is the second respondent in the present appeal, were minors. The said Muhammad Iqbal, therefore, prosecuted the application as their next friend. The application was disposed of by a Rent Controller on the basis of a compromise entered into by the parties which was reflected in their joint statement made before the learned Rent Controller. In view of the terms of the compromise, the learned Rent Controller passed the following order :- "Their joint statement has been recorded in the light of which application of the petitioners against Muhammad Afzal respondent is accepted. He would vacate the two rooms in dispute in his possession when other occupants of the same property vacate their portion of the house in dispute. Thereafter, within 60 days from getting into possession of the property in dispute, the petitioners would construct a new shop the detail of which has been given in their statement and lease it out to the respondent at a monthly rent of Rs. 100 p.m. Until the time the respondent delivers possession of the two rooms in his possession he would continue paying rent at the rate of Rs. 20 p.m. Since this compromise is for the benefit of the minors, therefore, its permission is granted. The parties are left to bear their own costs."

2. The above order was made by the learned Rent Controller on 4th October, 1976. Thereafter, on 25th October, 1977, Muhammad Afzal respondent made an application for restoration of possession of the newly built shop in terms of the order of the learned Rent Controller. The application was opposed by the landlords but it was allowed by the learned Rent Controller, vide his order, dated the 21st May, 1978. This order was challenged by the landlords by means of an appeal before an Additional District Judge but it was dismissed. The landlords other than Muhammad lqbal have, therefore, come up in second appeal to this Court. As indicated above, in this appeal, Muhammad lqbal figures as the second respondent, the tenant (Muhammad Afzal) being the first one.

3. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the said compro mise did not bind the minors inasmuch as it teas to their detriment. 1 am unable to agree with him. According to the compromise, the landlords, including those who were minors, got vacant possession of the premises in dispute by avoiding lot of trouble and huge expenditure involved in the prosecution of ejectment proceedings which, more often than not, are taken up to the highest forum of the land. At the same time, they were promised a higher rate of rent inasmuch as previously the tenant was paying a monthly rental of Rs. 20 for the old premises whereas under the compromise he had to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 100 p.m. for the newly constructed shop. Thus, the compromise was for the benefit of the minors (appellants) and that is why it was permitted by the learned Rent Controller as well. It was competently entered into by the next friend of the minors (Muhammad lqbal) on their behalf. The appellants are, therefore, bound by the compromise which constitutes the basis of the order made by the learned Rent Controller.

4. It was next urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that in view of the provisions of subsection (5-B) of section 13 of the Ordinance a tenant who is ejected from certain building with a view to enabling the landlord to reconstruct it, can regain possession of the reconstructed building if he makes an application in this behalf before the completion of the new building and its occupation by another tenant. The argument proceeds that, in the present case, the original tenant (respondent No. 1) made application for restoration 'of possession of the newly-constructed shop not only after its completion but also after it had been occupied by another tenant, namely, Abdul Ghani, and, therefore, the application made by him was not competent. This argument, to my mind, has no merit. Strict observance of the provisions of subsection (5-B) of section 13 of the Ordinance can be insisted up only when an order of ejectment, on the ground of reconstruction of the disputed property, is passed ad invitum or, if it is a consent order, the parties have not agreed to some special arrangement. But where the order is made on the basis of a compromise contemplating an arrangement different from the one envisaged by subsection (5-B) what is to be enforced are different terms of the compromise and not the provisions of subsection (5-B). The appellants have since derived benefits under the impugned order, which is in terms of the compromise in question, inasmuch as they secured vacant possession of the property in dispute and also raised new construction in its place by putting the first respondent (tenant) to considerable bother and expense. They -cannot, therefore, now, on the score of the provisions of subsection (5-B), deprive the said respondent of the benefits accruing to him under the compromise. To hold otherwise would have the effect of stripping such solemn commitments as entered into by ' parties of the sanctity attached to them under law. This, it allowed, would, surely, lead to startling consequences. I am, therefore, of the view that the provisions of subsection (5-B) are not available to the appellants for escaping their liabilities under the compromise in question.

5. The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that there is no force in this appeal. It is, therefore, dismissed in limine. K. M. A. Appeal dismissed.