P L D 1967 Karachi 437 (PLP)

NOOR‑UL‑ARFIN, J.‑This is a Letters Patent Appeal against 'an appellate Judgment dated 7‑1‑1965 of our learned brother, Mr. Justice Qadeeruddin Ahmad, in proceedings of ejectment instituted by the Respondent Mst. Rubab Bai.

2. The Respondent is the owner of a building situated on. Plot No. W. W. 1/21, North Napier Road, Karachi. The residential Part of this building is in occupation of the appellant as tenant of the respondent. The respondent made an application to the Rent Controller for certificate of ejectment of the appellant under section 10 of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953, on the ground that the residential portion of the aforesaid building was required for her own use. On the repeal of this Act, the proceedings were continued under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959). This application was rejected by the Rent Controller's order dated 2nd March 1963, but was accepted in appeal by the District Judge, Karachi by order dated 2nd September 1963. A second appeal was filed by the Appellant/tenant, which was dismissed by the order which is impugned in the present Letters Patent Appeal, which has been filed on a certificate granted by the learned Single Judge.

3. The only point which was urged, before the learned Single Judge, and has again been agitated before us, is that the purpose stated by the respondent for the appellant's eviction, that she required the premises in question for her own residence because of her husband's illness, is not a ground recognised for eviction of tenants under section 13 (3) of the Ordinance, which is to the following effect: 13 (3) (a)‑‑A landlord ‑may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession‑ (i) in the case of a residential building if‑ (a) he requires it in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children; (b) he is not occupying another residential building, suit able for his needs at the time, in the same urban area in which such building is situated." Mr. Fakhruddin, the learned counsel for the appellant, based his case on the words "or for the occupation of any of his children" in clause (i)(a) of this subsection, and the absence of a like provision for accommodation of the owner's husband.

4. We are, however, of the view that the learned Counsel's approach to the question is not correct. Clause (1) (a) of sub section (3) of section 13 of the Ordinance enables the owner to apply for his tenant's eviction if the premises are required in good faith either for his own occupation or for the occupation of his children. Mr. Fakhruddin would have us hold that the words "his own occupation" are restricted, to 'the personal and individual requirements of the owner to the exclusion of the needs of the owner's family. If this narrow view is taken, it would never be possible for a landlord to take up residence in larger premises belonging to him. Thus a landlord of a bungalow, who is himself residing in a one‑room flat, would not, on his marriage, be entitled to require his tenant to vacate the bungalow. The one room flat in his occupation should, according to Mr. Fakhruddin's interpretation of section 13 (3) of the Ordinance, be sufficient for his own individual requirements though the accommodation may not be suitable for a married couple. In our view, such a construction of the expression "for his own occupation" would lead to absurd results. We think that this expression embraces not only the needs of the owner, but also the needs of his family. The words "or for the occupation of any of his children" merely relate to situation where an owner desires to provide independent and separate residence for his married or grown up children. We are supported in our view by the provisions of sub‑clause (b) of clause (i) of subsection (3) which enables a landlord to apply for eviction of the tenant if "he is not occupying another resi dential building, suitable for his needs at the time . . " Mr.' Fakhruddin was unable to convince us that the expression "needs" here is restricted to the individual and personal require ments of the landlord, independently of the needs of his family.

5. The respondent in the present case requires the tenement in question for her own occupation. This requirement has been necessitated by the illness of her husband, for whom this tenement is considered as a more healthy place to live in. It is not contend ed that the respondent herself will not live with her husband in this flat. The respondent's statement that her requirement is based on the ill‑health of her husband merely shows that her need for occupation of the tenement is a genuine and bona fide need.

6. For the above reasons, we find that there is no substance in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed with costs. K. B. A. Appeal dismissed.