PLC 1970

1970 PLP 106 (PLC)

METAL PRODUCTS Co., KARACHI Versus ABDUL REHMAN

Jurisdiction / Court
Industrial Appellate Tribunal West Pakistan
Decided Date
N/A
Honorable Judges
Inamullah Khan, Appellate Tribunal
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1970 PLP 106 (PLC)
Forum / Court Industrial Appellate Tribunal West Pakistan
Bench Members Inamullah Khan, Appellate Tribunal
Parties METAL PRODUCTS Co., KARACHI Versus ABDUL REHMAN
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1970 PLP 106 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1970 PLP 106 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Industrial Appellate Tribunal West Pakistan bench comprising: Inamullah Khan, Appellate Tribunal.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1970 PLP 106 (PLC) (METAL PRODUCTS Co., KARACHI Versus ABDUL REHMAN). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • A. Majeed for Respondent No. 1.

Judgment & Decree

"If the workman remains absent beyond the period of leave' originally granted or subsequently extended, he shall lose his lien on his appointment unless he (a) returns within 8 days of the expiry of the leave and (b) explains to the satisfaction of the manager his inability to return before the expiry of his leave. In case the workman loses his lien on his appointment he shall be entitled ‑ to be kept on the 'badli' list." '

6. It would, therefore, appear that the respondent lost his lien to his appointment because he remained absent for move than 8 days.

7. Mr. Mirza, the learned Representative for the appel lants relied on three decisions of the Industrial Courts, namely, Gul Rais Khan v. D. M. Fawkner and others (1), Fazal Dhi v. Mehar Textile Mills Llmlied Tando Yousaf (2) and Muhatnmrtd Yameen v. United Taxtile Mills Limlied, Multan (3), in support of his (1) 1960 P L C 1195 (2) 1963 P L C 1080 (3) 1963 P L C 178 contention that where a workman lost his lien to the post because of his absence without leave for more than 8 days, the provisions of section 30 of the repealed Ordinance were not attracted. It was observed in these cases that the employer couldn t be said to have discharged or dismissed or otherwise punished the workman within the meaning of section 30 of the repealed Ordinance. His lien was lost not because of any act on the part of the employer, but because of the operation of law. It cannot also be said that the employer has altered the condition of service. The Standing Orders confer certain rights and allegations on the workman. These become part of condition of his service. The employer, therefore, cannot be said to have altered the condition of his service. He only enforced the condition of service that if the workman overstays his leave for more than eight days, he loses his lien. I would hold that the provision of section 30 of the repealed Ordinance was not violated.

8. Mr. A. Majeed, the learned Representative for the respondent, contended that where a workman overstays his leave beyond 8 days, the employer would be bound under the Standing Orders as well as on the principle of natural justice to treat it as an act of misconduct and hold regular proceedings either for termination of services or for dismissal. In this connection, it would be useful to reproduce Order 13(2) of the Standing Orders. It runs as under ‑ "A workman may be suspended for a period not exceeding four days at a time or dismissed without notice or any compensation in lieu of notice, if he is found to be guilty of misconduct."

9. Order 13(3) (e), reads as under :‑ "The following acts and omissions shall be treated as misconduct :‑ (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) habitual absence without leave or absence without leave for more than 10 days,

10. It would appear that absence for more than 10 days would amount to misconduct. In the present case, the respondent reported for duty on 25th October 1967. He would be without leave, therefore, for only 10 days and not "for morel than 10 days". He cannot be said to have committed misconduct. Even if the workman did commit misconduct, the failure on the part of the Employer to hold an enquiry would not amount to the violation of section 30 of the repealed Ordinance, so as to attract the provision of section 31 of the said Ordinance. 11: In the interest of Industrial peace and happy relation between the workman and employer I would observe that it is advisable to give an opportunity to the workman to explain where he overstays his leave and loses lien. This will serve two objects. The workman may be able to give satisfactory reasons for his overstay for more than 8 days and the employer may not enforce his right. It may also be that the workman may explain that he had not overstayed his leave for more than 8 days. The present case is different inasmuch as admittedly the respondent had overstayed his leave for more than eight days. The failure on the part of employer however, to ask the respondent to explain his overstay does not attract the provision of section 31 of the repealed Ordinance l At any rate, this failure cannot help the respondent as admit tedly he had overstayed his leave for more than 8 days.

12. Lastly, the learned Representative relied on the cross examination of Mr. Ahmad, the Manager of the appellants. Mr. Ahmad stated as under: "The application that he gave for leave from 25‑8‑67 has been misplaced." The suggestion of Mr. Majeed is that if the respondent went on leave for two months from 25th August 1967, he reported for duty before the expiry of leave. There is no force in this contention. The respondent in his examination‑in chief stated as under : ‑ "I had proceeded on two months' leave on 16th August 1967." It was never the case of the respondent that he had proceeded on leave from 25th August 1967. He cannot be allowed to take advantage of some confusion on the part of the Manager. .

13. I would, for the reasons given above, allow the appeal and dismiss the application under section 31 of the repealed Ordinance.