1976 PLP 721 (PLC)

Aziz Mubarak for Petitioner. Amjad for Respondents. Date of hearing: 28th May 1976. The petitioners who are manufacturer of the leather goods used to manu facture boots and other leather article for hone consumption as well as for export purposes. According to them, towards the end of 1973 demand for boots stopped and therefore they were compelled to close down the boot factory. In order to keep Industrial peace they introduced a scheme of phase wise retrenchment and so the workers v-re retrenched in different batches. Initially there was lay of for 14 days and thereafter their services were terminated. They were however paid all the benefits to which they were entitled in accordance with law. When the petitioner had retrenched 50 workers, the Workers' Union filed a Civil Suit n the Court of Civil Judge, Hyderabad for declaration and injunction against the termination of services. A temporary injunction was issued restraining tile petitioners from retrench ment of workers on 23rd October 1973 which was subsequently confirmed on 19-11-1973.

2. During the pendency of the Civil Suit, 82 workers including respon dents 3 to 19 filed applications under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the Junior Labour Court. There applications were granted and it was held on 15.3-1974, that the applicants would be considered as in service and they would be further entitled to wages uptil 15-3-1974.

3. Against the order of the Junior Labour Court the petitioner filed appeals against 75 workers as the rest of the workers had settled their dispute outside the Court. In the meantime the District Judge, Hyderabad before whom the appeal had been filed by them . Challenging the jurisdiction of the civil Court to interfere in Labour matters and the consequent orders passed by it was also allowed and the injunction issued by the civil Court stood vacated with effect from 13-4-1914. Out of the appe )Is which were pending before the Labour Court 50 appeals were drawn as their cases bad been compromised during the pendency of the appeals. Out of remaining 25 appeals which were pending, the Labour it Court reversed the order of Junior Labour Court in 8 appeals and in the remaining 17 appeals which bad been filed against respondents 3 to 19 the Labour Court upheld the order of the Junior Labour Court on the ground that these workers v ere laid of after the injunction was issued by the Civil Judge and so they were entitled to half wages for the first 14 days and full wages thereafter up to 15 3-1974 i. e. the date on which the Junior Labour Court has passed its order. It is against the order of the Junior Labour Court dated 15-3-1974 and the order of the Labour Court dated 6-11-1974 that this Constitutional Petition has been filed.

4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Labour Court's order m respect of respondentents to 9 was without jurisdic tion because they had bean legally laid of. According to him they should have gone before the authority under the Payment of wages Act for their wages and that Labour Court was not competent to adjudicate the matter. The contention is untenable in view of the law laid down in General Steel Tools Co., Gujranwala v. Presiding Officer, Punjab labour Court No. 11 (P L D 1976 Lah. 528) in which an identical question had been raised and the Court had held that the argument that due to the bar created by section 22 of Payment of Wages Act, the matters initially liable to be dealt with under the said Act would) not be proceeded with under any other Court was not correct. Section 22IA bad not created a bar to the entertainment of a case by the Labour Court pertaining to claim for payment of wages. In this connection reliance was) placed on M/s Luxury House v. 1st Labour Court (P L D 1969 Dacca 410) also. Keeping in view the above-cited case-law the learned counsel dropped his argument. I am also of the view that the respondents 3 to 19 were competently seeking redress of their grievance through the Labour Court and it was not essential that they should have invoked the jurisdiction of the authority under the Payment of Wages Act.

5. Before I part with the case I may refer that the appeals filed by the petitioner before the Labour Court were divided into three categories. The first category was of the appeals which covered the case of those workers who had been issued termination notices before the grant of injunction by the Civil Court on 23rd October 1973. These appeals were allowed by the Labour Court. The second category was of such appeals in which the workers were laid of before 23-10-1973 and no termination notices were served upon them. These appeals were also allowed. The Labour Court however, dismissed the appeals of the petitioner in case of those workers which were covered by 3rd category. This category comprised of the workers who had been laid of after the issuing of the injunction by the Civil Court and on whom no termination notices had been served upto 15-3-1974, i.e., the date on which the Junior Labour Court passed its order. In my opinion the judgment of the Labour Court is free from any error since in case of respondents 3 to 19 who are covered by 3rd category no notice of termination had been served upto the date of the order passed by the Junior Labour Court therefore they were entitled to half wages for the period of 14 days to full wages for the subsequent period up to 15-3-1974.

6. For the foregoing reasons I do not find any substance in this petition which is hereby dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.