1982 PLP 2134 (CLC)

Date of bearing: 5th May, 1980. This is a second appeal against an order dated 8th January, 1977, passed by Mr. Muhammad Nisar Khan, Additional District Judge, Sargodha, dismissing the appellants appeal against an order of his eviction from shop No. 1, Street No.1, Block No. 4, Sargodha.

2. The respondent filed an application for ejectment of the appellant on grounds of default in the payment of rent as well as requirement of the shop for the business of his son. The Rent Controller decided issue of default in favour of the appellant but he found the issue about personal requirement in' favour of the landlord. Consequently, he directed the ejectment of the appellant by his order dated 8th October, 1976. This judgment was maintained in appeal by the learned Additional District Judge.

3. The case of the respondent is that his son had learnt tile profession of optical repairs and was carrying on his business on a Thara almost on the foot‑path with no shade or shelter. This was supported by his wit nesses including the respondent himself. The respondent also examined four witnesses. In his own statement the appellant admitted that the son of the respondent was working on a foot‑path. Similarly, his witness R. W. Muhammad Anwar admitted in cross‑examination that the res pondent's son repaired the optical in a small Khokha and he had learnt that trade. 1n view of this, the learned Additional District Judge held that the respondent had succeeded in proving his bona fide requirement of the shop for the business of his son.

4. The matter is concluded by a finding of fact, since the learned Additional District Judge has taken into consideration all the evidence no case for interference has been made out.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, argued that since the son himself has not been produced in evidence, the evidence was not sufficient forgiving a finding in favour of the respondent, reliance was placed on Ghulam Mohy‑ud‑Din v. Suba Khan ( P L D 1977 Lah. 11194) in which there are obser vations about such evidence being relevant.

6. This argument is, however, without force since the case of the respondent is established even from the evidence of the appellant. It is clearly established that the respondent's son is carrying on business of glasses and opticals repairs on a footpath. In these circumstances, the requirement cannot be said to be otherwise than bona fade. The point is, therefore, without force.

7. The second argument of the learned counsel is that the appellant had applied for permission to amend his written‑statement with a view to add the ground that the respondent had many other shops and that one shop had been vacated during the pendency of application by one Muhammad Tariq but the same has been let out by the respondent to one Muhammad Hanif. The learned Additional District Judge did not think it proper to allow the application and rejected the same.

8. I have gone through the application. It is clear from it that the question whether the respondent had other shops in Sargodha, had been put to the respondent in cross‑examination and he had admitted that he had four shops. This was also admitted in cross‑examination by the respondent's witness Muhammad Zaigham P. W.

3. But Muhammad Zaigham had stated that all the shops are on rent. 1t is not, therefore, a case in which this was a new point for which any amendment of the written‑statement was necessary.. So far as the averment that Muhammad Tariq had vacated the shop and the same bad been given on rent, the date given in the application is hardly sufficient to displace the respon dent. Firstly, it is for the respondent to adjudge as to which shop would suit his son and, secondly, in this case, the exact locality in which the shop was occupied by Muhammad Tariq, had not been pointed out to enable the Court to judge whether this particular shop could at all serve the purpose of the respondent's son better. In these circumstances, the learned Additional District Judge was right in refusing any permis sion to amend the written statement to allow the appellant to re‑open the case.

9. The appeal is without force and is dismissed with costs.

10. This learned counsel requests for sufficient time for the vacation of the shop. The case had already been pending for several years. The appeal has also been pending for more than three years. However, the appellant is allowed to vacate the shop by the 25th of May, 1980. M. Y. M. Appeal dismissed,