1999 PLP 32 (PLC)

1986 PLC 705; 1990 PLC 93; 1986 PLC 596; 1993 SCMR 609 and 1995 PLC 539 ref. Ch. Shabbir' Ahmad for Appellant. Ghazi M.A. Rashid for Respondents. Amjad Ali has come up in appeal to this Court, assailing validity of learned Labour Court's decision dated 24‑1‑(996, dismissing the grievance petition, filed by him under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

2. Amjad Ali got appointment on 2‑11‑1983, a., work‑charged employee, for working in the Sabzazar and M.A. Jauhar Town Schemes (Exh.P‑1). He was again employed on work‑charged basis for 89 days, with effect from 1‑10‑1987 (R‑1). Yet another appointment, on similar pattern, he was lucky to secure, with effect from 1‑1‑1988 (Exh. R‑2). On 12‑5‑1988, however, he was made aware of the fact that his services had come to an end on 29‑3‑1988, whereafter he had not been given any extension. Exh. R‑3 is the application dated 30‑3‑1988, seeking further extension from the said date onwards. He, however, did not get success in his latest request.

3. The Authorities of the L.D.A. had taken up the plea that the nature of the employment of the appellant being work‑charged, no vested or secured right available to him had been infringed, and the labour forum, as such, could not come to his rescue. These were World Bank assignments and could remain only operative, so long as the funds provided for the purpose were available, and not afterwards. These were not budgetary pots, and the work could have lasted over any length of period, but the sane could not confer on him status of a permanent workman.

4. On behalf of the appellant it is not denied that originally it was a work‑charged assignment, but the Labour Laws had made all the difference, as an employee remaining in service for a period exceeding nine months, after having satisfactorily completed three months' probation period, would acquire the status of a regular and a permanent worker, beyond all manner of doubt. In the schedule appended with the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, there is no category of work‑charged employees, although such terms as permanent, temporary and ' Badli' do find mention. The appellant, as such, even if he was initially regarded as a work‑charged employee could not be treated continuously as work‑charged or temporary throughout, till end of his service. 1986 PLC 705, 1990 PLC 93, are the authorities which have been cited in support of his contention by the learned counsel for the appellant, who has pointed out to the Court that Amjad Ali has been getting his salary on monthly basis, without any deduction, in respect of the weekly holidays. Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 stipulates that even a temporary workman has to be communicated reasons for termination of his services and an order passed in arbitrary and whimsical manner, verbally and without stating reasons for such termination, would not be sustainable in law. Termination of services of an employee, stating that the same were no longer required would be an order having no sanction of law (1986 PLC 596). L.D.A. is an industrial and commercial establishment and the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 have been held to be applicable to the organisation, as also its employees. Learned counsel has also cited 1993 SCMR 609, and 1995 PLC 539, maintaining that the law on the subject has undergone considerable change over the years. It is also submitted that the post against which the appellant had been employed still exists and one Maqsood had actually been employed as a clerk, against the said post. Numerous other persons had also been appointed in the same category. The respondents have not been able to establish that the appellant was the junior‑most person; at the time his ouster from service was ordered.

5. Legal position is quite clear. Intention and the spirit of law could not be permitted to be offended against, by keeping an employee on the rolls just for 89 days (a day less than the probationary span). I am not, in the least, in doubt that Amjad Ali could claim regularisation and permanence in service, and he could not arbitrarily be ousted from service in the manner it was done. I would, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the lower Court's decision, but there shall no order as to costs, as success of the parties to the litigation has been divided. The L.D.A. people having been labouring under an erroneous assumption that they could lawfully terminate the services of the appellant, without observance of any procedural or legal formalities, I will also refuse back benefits to the appellant, although he would be deemed to have continued in service, earning corresponding seniority, at the same time, from 25‑1‑1996. Uptil the time the appellant succeeds in securing his reinstatement in service, he will be deemed to be on extraordinary leave without pay. H.B.T./931/Lb.P Appeal allowed.