P L D 1994 Supreme Court 160 (PLP)

MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, CJ.‑‑‑These appeals through leave of the Court are directed against the dismissal by the High Court of appellants' Constitutional (Writ) Petitions which had arisen out of settlement of land under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. Precisely the relevant facts are that the appellants challenged before the High Court the orders of the Deputy Commissioner‑‑Authorised Officer who had allowed the application of Imam Bux (the respondents' side) and cancelled the allotment of agricultural land involved in these appeals, which, had been made in favour of the predecessor‑in‑interest of the appellants herein. The cancellation was ordered on the finding that the allotments had been obtained by fraudulent means and were based on forgery committed in record of rights, amongst other similar reasons/findings. The High Court examined at length the contentions raised from the appellants' side‑‑both on merits of the orders regarding cancellation as well as the mixed question of law and fact as to whether these cases did constitute "pending proceedings". It was held that in fact the proceedings were pending before the target date. However, leave to appeal was granted by this Court in order to "examine the question, whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Land) had no jurisdiction in the matter to initiate the proceedings for the cancellation of allotment of the disputed land under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaceu Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958; after its repeal by the Evacuee Property Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 whereunder only the pending proceedings could be continued". Learned counsel for the appellants reiterated the same point as was dealt with by the High Court and for the examination of which, as noted, leave to appeal was granted. After some discussion on pure question of law when we examined the facts with reference to the findings by the High Court regarding the pendency of the proceedings it was discovered that the respondents' side had in fact, not only once but several times, laid before authorities information regarding the commission of fraud and forgery about the. allotment in question. Several dates in this behalf have been mentioned. They ale 18‑1‑74, 24‑1‑74, 18‑4‑74, 26‑4‑74 and 28‑4‑

74. This being the factual position learned counsel could not advance the case any further. We have no reason to differ with the High Court on the findings of fact in this behalf. The judgment of this Court relied upon from the respondents' side in CA‑123/1982, in so far as it goes does support their case. Not only this even otherwise also the Constitutional position is clear that the Constitutional (Writ) jurisdiction under Article 199 of the High Court, as recently held by this Court, is not controlled by the sub‑Constitutional legislation placing limitations, vis‑a‑vis, pending proceedings on the powers of the Settlement Authorities. See Muhammad Baran v. Member (Settlement and Rehabilitation), Board of Revenue, Punjab (PLD 1991 SC 691) and Mst. Resham Bibi v. Mst. Elahi Sain (PLD 1991 Supreme Court 1034). It is now beyond question that in a case of this type, if the High Court 'declines to interfere with findings of fact going against an allottee, this refusal cannot be made subject of jurisdictional attack, vin‑a‑vin, the pendency qualification. Even if the Settlement Authority could not assume jurisdiction, High Court's action, one way or the other, under Article 199 of the Constitution, cannot be termed as assailable on account of the condition of pendency of proceedings before the Settlement Authority. In this case also the same comment would apply as the High Court not only declined to interfere with findings of fact, but also affirmed those findings. Even without such affirmation; it would also be treated as a refusal to exercise discretion by the High Court in its Writ jurisdiction. For all these reasons, in the light of the foregoing discussions, no force having been found in these appeals, they are dismissed with no order as to costs. AA./S‑803/S Appeals dismissed.