1999 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

Against which order he preferred a departmental appeal to respondent No.2, Member Executive Board, (Administration, National Bank of Pakistan, Lahore on 27‑1‑1990 which appears to be within time but when it was not responded, the appellant filed a petition before Labour Court No.7, Gujranwala on 7‑9‑1991 which was dismissed by judgment dated 14‑2‑1995 and in this respect the relevant para. is reproduced hereunder: "The petitioner has deposed during the course of his statement that he was informed of rejection of his appeal one month before filing his grievance petition whereas it has been alleged in the grievance petition that his appeal was finally turned down three months before filing petition. This is a vivid and obvious contradiction of the version alleged in the petition and deposed before the Court. It is important to note that the petition was filed on 7‑9‑1991. Moreover, not an iota of proof has been placed on the file which shows that his alleged appeal was rejected by the Bank on 15‑6‑1991. If it was the oral rejection, the petitioner should have got some written proof because he has relied upon a written appeal. Considering all These factors, it becomes crystal clear that the petitioner has concocted a false version of appeal, just to save the limitation. The grievance notice dated 15‑6‑1991 served upon the respondent Bank against dismissal order dated 8‑1‑1990 is hopelessly time‑barred.? The upshot of my findings is that the grievance petition is barred by limitation and the same is hereby rejected."

5. It is just and proper to discuss that at the time of the occurrence when the appellant pocketed the money under reference he was not a civil servant and even by the time of judgment dated 14‑2‑1995 by the said Labour Court he was either riot clothed with the status of a civil servant. However, scrutiny of the record indicates that he still felt aggrieved from the said judgment and went in appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore on 26‑2‑1995 which remained pending till its statements on 6‑7‑1998 and, thereafter, filed the present service appeal before this Tribunal on 5‑8‑1998 under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973.

6. In case of abatement of judicial matters due to operation of law as a result of insertion of section 2‑A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 the appeal got abated ipso facto under operation of law in terms of judgment PLD 1976 SC 195 wherein it has been held that "no formal declaration of abatement order is required for the reason that the abatement is due to operation of law. It has further been held in the under mentioned authorities by the Supreme' Court of Pakistan that litigation undergone before I incompetent forums does not deserve condonation: PLD 1983 SC 385; 1985 SCMR 333 and 890; 1975 SCMR 259; 1991 SCMR 1841; 1997 SCMR 1167. In addition to, in such‑like cases valid reasons are required for each day's delay as has beep mentioned in 1998 SCMR 307,517 and

785. No doubt an application for condonation of delay has been annexed to the file but we are not least impressed with the reasoning mentioned therein being devoid of substance and law. Mere allegation of a fact carries no sense when found short of validity.

7. The appeal also appears to be time‑barred by more than one year when reckoned from period of ninety days provided in such‑like cases of abatement under section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. When reckoned from 10‑6‑1997, the date of enforcement of section 2‑A inserted in S the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, whereunder employees of the Corporation, etc. have become civil servants for the purpose of availing of appeal remedies in respect of their terms and conditions of service. The legal well?known maxims are. (i) delay defeats equity, (ii) time and tide wait for none. (iii) law helps the vigilant and not the indolent, and not always welcome litigants, appellants in hurdling their judicial matters appeals.

8. Limitation is most crucial and important point in the judicial system wherein more than often the default of one party confers ipso facto right to the other party and judicial forum, while acting impartially must keep even and firm the scale of justice without any tilt to one party against another for administration of ideal justice and maintaining the rule of law.

9. What has been stated above, and the compelling reasons thereof this appeal, devoid of legal substance and hopelessly time‑barred, fails and is? hereby dismissed in limine.

10. Parties to be informed. H.B.T./306/FS(trib)????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.