P L D 1957 (W (PLP)

WAHID-UD-DIN, J.

The facts leading to this appeal are that the respondent obtained a decree on the basis of an award on 15th July 1932, against the appellant for payment of Rs. 50 per month as maintenance to her. In February 1948, the respondent and her two children migrated to India. On 6th September 1949, respondent made an application for recovery of arrears of maintenance for the period 1st August 1947 to 31st August 1948, and asked for the attachment of the salary of the appellant in realisation of the decretal amount. The appellant filed objections on 24th January 1950 on two grounds :-firstly that the decretal amount is a debt in favour of an evacuee and, therefore, the matter should be referred to the Custodian for determination whether the respondents are evacuees and whether the property in dispute is evacuee property ; secondly on the ground that if it is held that the property in question is evacuee property, then no process can be issued against the appellant for realisation of the said amount, in view of section 12 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Ordinance XV of 1949. Another objection was also taken that the decree being in favour of the son and daughter of the appellant and, as they have attained majority, the decree in respect of their share cannot be executed. On 1st August 1950, Agha, J. referred the matter to the Custodian of Evacuee Property for finding out whether the respondents were evacuees and the property in dispute was evacuee property. On 13th November 1950 the Custodian passed an order to the following effect: "The debt due to the applicant evacuees is evacuee pro perty and payment is due to the Custodian under section 11 of Ordinance XV of 1949 on account of any amount due to any evacuee. I may add that there is no bar to the execution of the decree by the evacuee. Only the money realised is to be paid to the Custodian". After the above order of the Custodian the matter came up for hearing before Vellani, J. on 6th March 1952 when further objections of the appellant were considered. The learned judge held that the respondents are entitled to execute the decree and dismissed the objections of the appellant. On 1st April 1952, Muhammad Bakhsh, J, ordered attachment of the salary of the appellant for realisation of the maintenance due to the respondents under the above-mentioned decree. The appellant is aggrieved by the order of Vellani, J. dated 6th March, 1952 and has again urged before us that a decree in favour of evacuee cannot be executed under sections 6, 12 and 34 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance (XV of 1949). According to him the decretal amount in favour of respondent is a debt and when the Court passed an order for the attachment of the salary then it was an order in respect of evacuee property. This argument of learned counsel is fallacious. It is admitted that the judgment debtor has not appropriated any amount for the payment of the decree. The judgment-debtor is under an obligation to pay the amount due from him under the decree and it is only when any amount is received and deposited in Court that it can be considered as evacuee property. The order of attachment of salary of the appellant in the hand of his employees is nothing else but enforcement of a decree and' not a process in respect of evacuee property. There is no doubt that there is no provision in Ordinance XV of 1949 authorising the Custodian to execute the decree in favour of the evacuee. It must be executed through the process of the Court. We have not been able to find out any provision under the above Ordinance, whereby this power of the Court has been taken B away. In fact, section 20 of the Ordinance specifically mentions that the Custodian has got the right to continue the suit on behalf of the evacuee. In our opinion right to sue includes right to execute a decree in favour of the evacuee. If we accept the contention of the appellant it would result in various anomalies and absurdities. Such an intention cannot attributed to the legislature. We therefore find no force in this argument of the appellant. The other argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant was that under section 34 of the Evacuee Ordi nance the respondents are not entitled to continue with the proceedings initiated by an evacuee and that the Custodian alone is entitled to continue the proceedings. He referred to section 20 clause (1)-now section 22, clause (2)-and laid stress on the fact that this particular subsection only authorised the Custodian to continue the proceedings. The learned counsel's attention was drawn to section 20, clause (r), where the Custodian is authorised to delegate his powers by general or special order. This clause is now clause (u) in section 22 of the recent Ordinance issued by' the President. We are clearly of the' opinion that the order reproduced above as Exh. 8 impliedly authorised the respondents to continue with the execution proceedings with a further direction that what ever money is realised will be paid to the Custodian and not to anybody else. It is needless-to point out that an authority of a principal in favour of his agent may not be in specific terms ; it can also be gathered from the circumstances of the case. In the present case the order of the Custodian dated 13th November 1950 sufficiently authorises the respondents to continue the execu tion proceedings. In our opinion the view of the learned judge that respondents are competent to continue the execution proceedings is correct. The last contention of the learned counsel that the decree cannot be executed as the son at the time of the filing of the application was twenty-one years of age, and the daughter twenty-two years of age and both of them were earning their own livelihood is also devoid of all force. The paper-book does not contain the decree passed in favour of the respondent and therefore we are not in a position to hold whether the decree was in favour of the respondent alone or in favour of the respondent and her son and daughter. The learned counsel for the respondent has, however, stated at the bar that the decree was in favour of the respondent alone and it is not mentioned in the decree that is case the sons and daughters attain majority, then their share will not be payable under the terms of the decree. We dismiss the appeal with costs. A. H. Appeal dismissed.