CLC 1989

1989 PLP 1475 (CLC)

S. AKHLAQ AHMAD‑‑Petitioner Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and 2 others‑‑Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
Karachi
Decided Date
Constitutional Petitions Nos.1739; 1739 of 1979; 160, 549, 637 of 1983; 316, 356, 510, 1204, 1338 of 1988; 99, 172, 505 and 604 of 1988, decided on 11th April, 1989.
Honorable Judges
Saeed-uz-zaman Siddiqui and Abdul Rasool Agha, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1989 PLP 1475 (CLC)
Forum / Court Karachi
Bench Members Saeed-uz-zaman Siddiqui and Abdul Rasool Agha, JJ
Parties S. AKHLAQ AHMAD‑‑Petitioner Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and 2 others‑‑Respondents
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1989 PLP 1475 (CLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1989 PLP 1475 (CLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: Saeed-uz-zaman Siddiqui and Abdul Rasool Agha, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1989 PLP 1475 (CLC) (S. AKHLAQ AHMAD‑‑Petitioner Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and 2 others‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Rehmat Ellahi for Petitioner (in C.P. No. 1739 of 1979).
  • Nasim Farooqui for Petitioner (in C.Ps. Nos. 160, 549, 637 of 1983; 316, 356 and 510 of 1986). Rashid Tariq Khan for Petitioner (in C.Ps. Nos. 1204, 1338 of 1986 and 99 of 1987). Mumtaz Ellahi also for Petitioner (in C.P. No.99 of 1987). Arif Hussain and Jan Muhammad Daud for Petitioner (in C.Ps. Nos. 172, 505 and 604 of 1988). Hussain Adil Khatri, Standing Counsel. Abut Khair Ansari, Kamal Mansoor Alam, Zaheeruddin Khan and A. Sattar Pinjer for Respondents.

Headnotes / Summary

Customs Act (IV of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑‑S. 31‑A [as added by Finance Ordinance (II bf 1988), S.5(2)]‑‑Provisions of S.31‑A are retrospective in effect‑‑Petitioners, whether liable to pay customs duty on the goods imported by them according to rates applicable on the dates of presentation of bill of entries by them, or they were still entitled to the clearance of their respective‑ consignments upon payment of customs‑duty according to rates which were prevailing on the dates they entered into firm contracts for their import with the foreign suppliers in accordance with the law laid down by Supreme Court in the case of Al‑Samroz 1986 SCMR 1917‑‑S.31‑A having been incorporated by Finance Ordinance, 1988, is deemed to have been so incorporated from the date of enforcement of Customs Act, 1969 and would be deemed to have come into effect retrospectively‑‑Vested right of a party to pay customs duty at concessionary rate under an exemption notification which was in force at the time he entered into contract for import of such goods was taken away by legislature viz., Finance Ordinance of 1988‑‑Customs‑duty demanded by Customs Authorities was thus strictly in accordance with law. The clear effect of section 5(2) of the Finance Ordinance, 1988, is that by a fiction of law, section 31‑A of Customs Act, 1969 is deemed to have been incorporated after section 31, in the Customs Act, 1969, from the date of enforcement of Customs Act, 1969. There is, thus, no force in the contention that section 31‑A has not come into effect retrospectively. One of the important consequences provided by the newly‑added section 31‑A is, that amount of customs‑duty which may have become payable on imported goods in consequence of withdrawal of the whole or part of exemption or concession from duty whether prior or after conclusion of the contracts or agreements for sale of such goods or opening of letter of credit in respect thereof, became recoverable on such imported goods as provided in section 30 of the Act, notwithstanding anything contained m any other law for the time being in force or any decision of any Court. This clearly meant that the vested rights of a party to pay customs‑duty at concessionary rate under an exemption notification, which was in force at the time he entered into contract for import of such goods, were taken away by the Legislature. It cannot be doubted that Legislature is fully sovereign and is competent to legislate both prospectively and retrospectively. However, where a provision of law is enacted with retrospective effect and has the effect of taking away the vested rights, such effect can only be produced by express words or necessary intendment. The fact that section 31‑A has the effect of taking away a vested right and it has come into effect retrospectively, is sufficiently borne out by section 5(2) of the Finance Ordinance of 1988 and the language of section 31‑A. Where the rate of customs‑duty prescribed in the Schedule to the Act is varied or altered by a competent legislative Act and such altered and varied rate of duty is operative on the date of filing of bill of entry by the importer, then the importer is liable to pay such altered/varied rate of customs‑duty in accordance with section 30 of the Act. The aforesaid proposition fully apples to the cases where the importer had submitted bills of entry for clearance of the consignments for home consumption long after the amendment brought about in rate of duty in the Schedule in respect of cement had become effective. In these circumstances the customs‑duty demanded by the Customs authorities was strictly in accordance with law. Al‑Samroz 1986 SCMR 1917 rel.

Judgment & Decree

3. That from language of section 31‑A it is clear that it did not become operative from a date prior to its insertion in the Customs Act, 1969.

4. That in any case section 31‑A could not affect the transactions which were past and closed and as the goods in the above cases had arrived at Karachi port before introduction of section 31‑A in the Customs Act, 1969, it could not apply to these cases. Before considering the above contentions of the learned counsel for the parties we would like to mention briefly the salient features of the above cases. In C.P. No.1739/79 the petitioner imported in 1975 Wood free writing papers. At the time of entering into contract, opening of letter of credit and shipment of the goods `Wood free writing papers' were exempted from payment of customs duty under SRO No.631(1)/75, dated 7th June, 1975. This exemption was later on withdrawn by the Central Government vide Notification No.SRO 980(1)/75, dated 16th September, 1975, and accordingly when the goods arrived at Karachi and bill of entry was submitted for their clearance for home consumption, the Customs Authorities recovered a sum of Rs.32,281 by way of customs‑duty on the above consignment. The petitioner paid the customs‑duty under protest and, thereafter, applied for refund of the amount which was refused. After exhausting remedyof appeal available under Customs Act, 1969, the petitioner filed the above petition on 23‑10‑1979. C.P. No.D‑510/86 relates to import of Viscose fiber. The petitioner in this case was granted import licences on 1‑12‑1985 and 22‑12‑1985 which were valid for import for a period of one year from the date of their issue. The petitioner entered into contract for import of Viscose fibre under the above import licences which were shipped under bill of lading dated 31st January, 1986 and 6th Feb., 1986. Under SRO No.645(1)/85, dated 1‑7‑1985 the customs‑duty payable on imported Viscose fibre was Rs.20 per kg. which was raised to Rs.25 per kg. by SRO No.430(1)/86 dated 30‑4‑1986. Accordingly when the consignment arrived at Karachi and the petitioner submitted bill of entry on 3‑5 1986 for its clearance the Customs authorities demanded payment of customs duty at the rate of Rs.25 per kg. which is challenged by the petitioner. In C.P.No.D‑172/88 the petitioner entered into agreement for import of 500 metric tons of Soyabean oil on 9‑3‑1986 against two import licences which were issued to petitioner on 26‑2‑‑1986 and 16‑3‑1986. The petitioner established an irrevocable letter of credit in favour of foreign supplier on 18‑3‑1986 and the consignment was shipped on 31‑7‑1986. Import of Soyabean oil was free from customs‑duty up to 6‑4‑1986. By notification dated 7‑4‑1986 issued under section 18(2) of the Customs Act, customs‑duty at the rate of RS.3,000 per metric ton was imposed on Soyabean oil which vas reduced to Rs.2,350 per metric ton by a subsequent notification dated 17‑4‑1986. As a result of the above notification when the bill of entry was submitted by the petitioner on 10‑9‑1986, Customs authorities demanded customs‑duty at the rate of Rs.2,350 per metric ton on the consignment which is challenged by the petitioner. In C.P.N D 1204/86, D‑1338/8b and D‑99/87 the petitioners entered into contracts for import of palm oil on 10th July, 1986. They also established letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers in the month of July, 1986. It is alleged that rate of customs‑duty on imported palm oil at the time of entering into the contract for import of palm oil as well as at the respect of opening of letter of credit was Rs.2,350 per metric ton. However, when the consignment arrived and the hills of entries were submitted by the petitioners for clearance of the consignments, the customs duty stood at the rate of Rs.5,450 per metric ton. vide SRO No.890(1)/86, dated 24‑9‑1986 which the petitioners have challenged. 190, In Petitions Noc.505 and 604 of 1988 the petitioners entered into contracts for import or palm oil on 29th Feb.. 1988 and 9 Feb., 1988 respectively. Letters of credit were opened by them in the month of March, 1988. The consignment arrived at Karachi in April, 1988 in both the cases. It is alleged by the petitioner that at the time they entered into contract for import of palm oil. under notification SRO No.22(1)/88, dated 13‑1‑1988, the customs duty payable on palm oil was Rs.5,250 per metric ton which was subsequently revised under SRO dated 21‑3‑1988 w.e.f. 31‑3‑1988 at the rate of Rs.6,250 per metric ton, Accordingly when the consignments in the above cases arrived at Karachi, in' April, 1988 the Customs authorities demanded customs‑duty thereon at the rate of Rs.6,250 per metric ton which is challenged by the petitioner. In Petition No.D‑160/83 the petitioner was granted two import licences for import of cement on 25‑1_198? and 1f?‑6‑1983. Against these import licences the petitioner established `two letters of credit on 4‑4‑1982 and 13‑6‑1982 respectively The consignments in both the cases were, however, shipped by the same ship, under bills of lading dated 31‑1‑1983. Advance bills of entries for clearance of consignments were filed by the petitioner on 14‑2‑1983, while the .,hip carrying the consignments arrived at Karachi on 27‑2‑1983. Under SRO No.650(1)/81 dated 25‑6‑1981 the customs‑duty payable on cement was 25% ad valorem which was revised by the Government under SRO No.21(1)/83, dated 10‑1‑1983 to 40%. Accordingly when the consignments arrived at Karachi and petitioner applied for their clearance, the Customs authorities demanded customs‑duty at the rate of 40% ad valorem which is challenged by the petitioner. In Petitions Nos.D‑549/83 and D‑637/83 the import licences were granted to the petitioners during the period from January, 1983 to May. 1983. Letters of credits were established by the petitioner in respect of import of cement under the above import licences between the period from March, 1983 to May, 1983. The three bills of lading in CP No.540/83 are dated 21‑6‑1983 while in Petition No.637/88 these are dated 2‑8‑1983. Under SRO No.650(1)/81 as amended by SRO 21(1)/83 dated 10‑1‑1983 the customs‑duty payable on import of cement was 40% ad valorem on the date of contract and the opening of letter of credit by the petitioner. However, when the consignments arrived at Karachi and bill of entry for their clearance were filed, customs‑duty stood modified to 55%. by SRO No.608(1)/83, dated 11‑6‑1983, which is challenged by the petitioners From the above‑stated facts it is quite clear that the petitioners in all the above‑mentioned cases are affected by subsequent withdrawal of exemption the Government, under section 19 of the Customs Act, which was available at the time they entered into contract for import of the goods in each case. Learned counsel for the petitioners, accordingly, jointly urged that subsequent withdrawal of exemption from payment of customs duty by the Federal Government did not affect their vested right to get the consignment cleared on payment of concessionary rate of customs duty which was prevailing on the dates of contracts in view of the rules laid down in Al‑Samroz's case. With regard to insertion o'. section 31‑A at section 31, in the Customs Act, 1969 the learned counsel challenged its validity on the grounds already mentioned by us earlier in thi: order. We will therefore, now consider these grounds. Section 31‑A was introduced in the Customs Act by section 5(2) of the Finance Ordinance, 1988 which reads as follows:‑ "(2) after section 31, the following new section shall be inserted and shall be deemed always to have been so inserted, namely:‑ 31‑A. Effective rate of duty:‑ (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any decision of any Court, for the purposes of sections 30 and 31, the rate of duty applicable to any goods shall include any amount of duty imposed under section 18, section 2 of the Finance Ordinance, 1982 (XII of 1982), and section 5 of the Finance Act, 1985 (1 of 1985), and the anti‑dumping or countervailing duty imposed under the Import of Goods (Anti‑dumping and Countervailing Duties) Ordinance, 1983 (II1 of 1983), and the amount of duty that may have become payable in consequence of the withdrawal of aster the whole or any part of the exemption or concession from duty whether before or after the conclusion of a contract or agreement for the sale of such goods or opening of a letter of credit in respect thereof. (2) For the purpose of determining the value of any imported or exported goods, the rate of exchange of which any foreign exchange is to be converted into Pakistan currency shall be rate of exchange in force7‑ (a) in the case of goods referred to in clause (a) of section 30, on the date referred to in that clause: (b) in the case of goods referred to in clause (b) of the aforesaid section, on the date referred to in that clause; and (c) in the case of goods referred to in section 31, on the dates referred to in that section." (3) in section 156, in subsection (1) in the table, in column 1, in serial 8, in column 2, for the words "ten years" the words "fourteen years" shall be substituted. (4) For the First Schedule, Schedule set out in the First Schedule to this Ordinance shall be substituted " The clear effect of section 5(2) of the Finance Ordinance, 1988, is that by a fiction of law. section 31‑A is deemed to have been incorporated after section 31, in the Customs Act, 1969, from the date of enforcement of Customs Act, 1969. We, therefore, find no force in the contention of learned counsel for th6 petitioners that section 31‑A has not come into effect retrospectively. One of the important consequences provided by the newly‑added section 31‑A is, that amount of customs‑duty which may have become payable on imported goods in consequence of withdrawal of the whole or part of exemption or concession from duty whether prior or after conclusion of the contracts or agreements for sale of such goods or opening of letter of credit in respect thereof, became recoverable on such imported goods as provided in section 30 of the Act, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any decision of any Court. This clearly meant that the vested right of a party to pay customs duty at concessionary rate under an exemption notification which was in force at the time he entered into contract for import of such goods were taken away by the legislature. It cannot be doubted that Legislature in Pakistan is fully sovereign and is competent to legislate both prospectively and retrospectively. However, where a provision of law is enacted with retrospective effect and has the effect of taking away the vested rights, such effect can only be produced by express words or necessary intendment. The fact that section 31‑A has the effect of taking away a vested right and it has come into effect retrospectively is sufficiently borne out by section 5(2) of the Finance Ordinance of 1988 and the language of section 31‑A The remaining contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners are covered by the decision in C.P. Nos.D‑1016 and 1338/88, with which we fully agree mention here that Petitions Nos.D‑316 and 356 of 1986 were also heard along with the remaining petitions mentioned above. However, these two petitions are quite distinguishable from the rest of the petitions as would appear from the facts which are stated herein below In Petition No.D‑316/86 the petitioner was granted two import licence dated 2‑5‑1985 and 20‑5‑1985. These import licences were valid for import of cement for a period of one year from the date of their issue. The petitioner claims to have established letter of credit against the above import licences in favour of foreign supplier on 20th May, 1985. However, the invoices and bill of lading in this case are dated 17‑3‑1986 and 12‑3‑1986, respectively. Similarly, in Petition No‑D‑356/86 the petitioner was Granted import licence on 23‑7‑1984 which was valid for import upto 22‑7‑1985. The petitioner claims to have established letter of credit in this case in favour of foreign supplier on 1‑8‑1984. However, the bill of lading and invoices in this case also are dated 12‑3‑1986 and 15‑1‑1985. The petitioner further claims in this case that the consignment was originally shipped on 14‑1‑1985 under a bill of lading of that date but it was later on transhipped to Karachi under another bill of lading issued on 12‑3‑1986. The bills of entry for clearance of the consignment for ]tome consumption in both these cases were submitted by the petitioner in April, 1986. From the above‑stated facts it is quite clear that the petitioners in these cases are affected by the amendment brought about in the rate of customs‑duty in respect of cement, by Finance Act of 1985. By a separate order announced by us in Petitions No.389, 421 and 422 of 1985 today, we have held that where the rate. of customs‑duty prescribed in the schedule to the Act is varied or altered by a competent legislative Act and such altered and varied rate of duty is operative on the date of filing of bill of entry by the importer, then the importer is liable to pay such altered/varied rate of customs‑duty in accordance with section 30 of the Act. The aforesaid decision fully applies to these two cases as the petitioners in these cases had submitted hills of entry for clearance of the consignments for home consumption long after the amendment brought about in rate of duty in the schedule in respect of cement had become effective. In these circumstances the customs duty demanded by the customs authorities was strictly in accordance with law As a result of above discussion all the Petitions are dismissed but there t will be no order as to costs. A.A./S‑372/S Petitions dismissed.