1995 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

NASIM HASAN SHAH, CJ.‑‑‑This is a petition for leave to appeal against the order dated 19‑4‑1993 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court refusing to review his earlier order passed in Writ Petition No. 88 of 1987.

2. The relevant facts are that the petitioner was charge‑sheeted in 1981 on serious charges of defalcation and was dismissed from service by the Bank authorities. This order was challenged in the High Court through a Writ Petition No. 635 of 1983 and the High Court found that the departmental proceedings had not been carried out according to law and remanded the case with the observation that the respondent should hold a fresh enquiry against the petitioner in accordance with law (vide an order dated 31‑1‑1984). Thereafter, the respondent‑Bank authorities held an enquiry and again passed an order of dismissal on 7‑1‑1987 and this order was maintained in appeal on 16‑6‑1987. The petitioner, thereafter, again challenged the said two orders through Writ Petition No. 880 of 1986. When the petition came up for final hearing before the Court on 7‑12‑1992 the petitioner was not present in person but his learned counsel duly appeared before the Court. It appears that during the course of the arguments before the Court the question arose whether the writ petition was itself competent. The learned counsel perhaps, not fully ready to meet this objection made a statement that he was prepared to withdraw the writ petition provided the respondent‑Bank considered the petitioner's case sympathetically and converts the order of dismissal to an order of removal. The learned counsel for respondent‑Bank assured that this request will be taken into consideration provided the petitioner does not claim the back benefits. The learned Judge thereupon disposed of the writ petition with the direction that the respondent‑Bank will consider the conversion of the dismissal order of petitioner to that of removal and the petitioner will file a regular application before the respondents for this purpose.

3. The petitioner himself, when he learnt of this order was taken aback because he had not given any such instructions to his counsel. He, therefore, filed a review petition for recalling of the order dated 7‑12‑1992 passed by the learned Judge.

4. The learned Judge in the High Court was not inclined to accept the review petition on the ground that it involved a disputed question of fact namely whether the learned counsel of the petitioner had made the statement after consultation with him or not and an enquiry could not be held on this question, in review proceedings. Accordingly the petition of review was dismissed in limine vide order dated 19‑4‑1993. In this petition for leave to appeal it is submitted that the learned counsel was not given any authority to enter into any compromise with the Bank authorities but was required to press the petition and that the general authority possessed by the counsel to enter into compromises on behalf of his client did not extend to make any such compromise as was entered into in this case, unless specific authority in that regard had been given. Reliance in this behalf is placed on "Mst. Noor Jahan v. Azmat Hussain Farooqi and another 1992 SCMR 876 Moreover, the compromise affected was practically of no avail to the petitioner in that only an undertaking was given on behalf of the respondent‑Bank to consider favourably any request made by the petitioner to convert the order of dismissal to order of removal in case he filed a formal application in this behalf. This can hardly be considered to be compromising a matter. Rather it appears to amount to withdrawal of the case without any authority given by the petitioner for this purpose.

5. It appears to us that the learned counsel for‑the petitioner appears to have felt that he could not answer the objection that the writ petition was not competent. Hence he rushed into a practically useless compromise, thinking that the writ petition was about to be dismissed as incompetent. However, to examine this very question leave has been granted by this Court namely, whether the Service Rules framed by the National Bank of Pakistan possessed the status of statutory rules and its violation could be questioned through a Writ Petition i.e. in Mukhtar Ahmad v. National Bank of Pakistan C.P. No. 322 of 1993.

6. Leave to appeal is also granted in this case. To come with the appeal arising out of C.P. No. 322 of 1993. AA./M‑1924/S ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? Leave granted.