1983 PLP 2956 (CLC)

Muhammad Nazir Bhinder for Respondent No.

1. Sardar Sami Hayat for Respondents Nos. 2 to

4. The petitioners are transporters. Respondent No. I is the Regional Transport Authority, Multan; while the remaining three respondents are the, Municipal Committee, Deepalpur, The Town Committee, Hujra Shah Muqim and the Town Committee Haveli Wasawaywala District Sahiwal. The three respondent Committees have provided within their respective local limits bus stands for the benefit of the public and the Transporters alike. The Regional Transport Authority being generally interested in maintaining and regulating the public transport facility, fixed the fee to be paid by the Transporters to the local authorities for the bus stand at the rate of Rs. 2 per bus per trip. Until recently, the rate was only rupee one per bus per trip. Being aggrieved by the latest fixation of fee by the Regional Transport Authority, the petitioners have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court to challenge the authority of the Regional Transport Authority respondent No. 1 to prescribe the fee and also to challenge the authority of the three respondent local Committees to levy and collect it.

2. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the local authorities have no power under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance to impose any tax unilaterally without consulting or associating the parties to be affected thereby. He also contends that the order of the Regional . Transport Authority, that is, respondent No. 1 is also ultra vires the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance and the rules framed there under. But it is to be noted that under section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance in general and under clause (f) subsection (2) of the said section in particular, the Government has the power to make rule. to provide for the mainte nance and management of parking places and the fee, if any, which may be charged for their use. Under this authority, the Government has framed the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1960. Rule 253 thereof deals with the bus stands which have been classified 'hereunder into four categories, namely: ‑ Class (A) Class (B) Class (C) and Class (D). The bus stands in question fall under Class (C) and sub‑rule (5) of rule 253 has laid down that the Regional Transport Authority shall from time fix the fee or the maximum fee payable at every stand of Class (A), (B) and (C).

3. It is thus clear that the Regional Transport Authority has the power, nay, it is under a legal obligation either to fix the fee or prescribe a maximum of the fee to be payable at every stand of Class (A), (B) or (C). 9 Therefore, the recent fixation of the fee by the Regional Transport Authority at the rate of Rs. 2 per bus per trip cannot be said to be without legal authority or lacking in legal effect.

4. The petitioners appear to have been provoked by the enhancement of the fees oar account of the fact that no amenities required under the law o1 t4e rules have been provided at the bus stands. A cursory glance into the record of the Regional Transport Authority produced before the Court has indicated that the management of the bus stands by the local authorities or their maintained leaves much to be desired. It is the duty of the local authority to provide all the necessary 'facilities and amenities at the bus stands at leant :as prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Rules Nos. 256 and his also the duty of the Regional Transport Authority to ensure the observation of these by the local authority. But merely because adequate facilities have not been provided to the satisfaction of all concerned, the Regional Transport Authority cannot be prevented from prescribing the fee and the local authorities front collecting it. The aggrieved members of the public and the aggrieved Transporters will have to seek redress of their grievance from the Government which is supposed to over‑see the functioning of the Regional Transport Authority as well as the local bodies The local authorities being elected bodies, they are also answerable to the public for this failure to discharge their legal duties and obligations.

5. Therefore, there is no good ground on which this Court can interfere with the impugned order in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs. M. A. K. Petition dismissed.