1979 PLP 427 (PLC)
WAPDA Versus F. U. MALIK AND ANOTHER
| Citation | 1979 PLP 427 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | WAPDA Versus F. U. MALIK AND ANOTHER |
| Primary Law | Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1979 PLP 427 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1979 PLP 427 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1979 PLP 427 (PLC) (WAPDA Versus F. U. MALIK AND ANOTHER). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Shahid Rehman for Petitioner.
- Ch. Anwar Ali for Respondent.
Headnotes / Summary
‑ S. 25‑A read with Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, r. 3‑Termination of service ‑Injunction against operation of order Notice to opposite‑party‑Not obligatory‑Discretion of Court Interim injunction ‑Purpose‑To prevent in deserving cases perpetua tion of a wrong which Court is likely to bring to an end‑Workman acquitted of charge by Enquiry Officer‑Termination order issued, in such circumstances, held, makes prima facie strong case in favour of workman and injunction against operation of such order, held, justified.
Judgment & Decree
Ch. Anwar Ali for Respondent. This is revision petition against the order dated 31‑5‑1979 of Punjab Labour Court No. 2, Lahore.
2. F. U. Malik, respondent No. 1, was employed as a Senior Budget and Accounts Officer. On 6‑6‑1977 a charge‑sheet was issued to him which contained three allegations. On 2‑10‑1978 the said charge‑sheet was withdrawn and a fresh charge‑sheet was issued which contained only one charge which was also mentioned in the first charge‑sheet. It was alleged that he had built a house and was thus living beyond his means. An enquiry was held and the Enquiry Officer exonerated him by passing the following order: ‑
"The accused officer has fully justified the legal and legitimate sources from which he and his wife procured the money to construct their house. I, therefore, do not hold the accused guilty of this charge."
3. In spite, of the above report the petitioner removed respondent No. 1 from service with effect from 6‑5‑1979 vide order of the same date issued by the Manager Finance (Co‑ordination). The respondent, after serving a grievance notice, filed a petition under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 on 31‑5‑1979 before the Labour Court. Along with the petition the respondent also filed an application for the suspension of the operation of the removal order. The learned Labour Court on 31‑5‑1979 suspended the operation of the impugned order till 30‑6‑1979. Against that order the instant revision petition has been filed by WAPDA.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the removal order was suspended without any notice as required under Order XXXIX, rule 3, C. P. C. Accounting to rule 3, it is not obligatory to issue notice in every case before granting injunction. It is left to the discretion of the Court either to issue notice or to straightaway grant injunction. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel has no force.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the respondent had already been removed from service and; therefore, the impugned order amounted to the granting of status quo ante which was invalid. This contention is not entirely correct because the respondent has not yet handed over charge and nobody has been appointed in his place. Therefore, he, in fact, is still holding the post and as such the temporary injunction would not amount to the granting of status quo ante.
6. Further I find that the respondent has been honourably acquitted by the Enquiry Officer and, therefore, prima facie the respondent ha a very strong case. The only purpose of granting interim injunction is to prevent in a deserving case the perpetuation of a wrong which the Court is likely to bring to an end. Such a power, therefore, cannot be denied to the Court to interfere with the order with which it can interfere ultimately unless there be some reservation in the law itself. The instant case, in my view, is a most deserving case for granting interim injunction.
7. I, accordingly, find no merit in this revision petition, which is hereby dismissed. Revision dismissed.