1988 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the points raised by the learned counsel for the appellant and counter arguments of the learned District Attorney. I have also gone through the precedent cases referred to and cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. I now proceed to deal with the points one by one.

7. The first argument that the appellant was never superseded but his confirmation was deferred from time to time, `therefore, seniority of the appellant remained intact and he was entitled to confirmation from March, 1981. The learned counsel for the appellant in this behalf has referred to Concise Oxford Dictionary (1968 Ed.) meanings of the word 'deferred'. The following meanings have been assigned:‑ "Defer, put off, postpone, procrastinate, be dilatory." There is no dispute as to the appellant of having been deferred and not superseded. Both the terms are quite distinct. The argument of the learned District Attorney is that the appellant was rightly deferred. On the other hand the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant was that since the hurdle in the way of the appellant has been crossed by him successfully and the reasons for deferment of his confirmation have since disappeared therefore, he is entitled for confirmation from March, 1981. It is clear from the order of Respondent No.l that the effect of involvement in criminal case as well as pending inquiry was completely washed away and he was deferred only on account of adverse reports. I will discuss the effect of disappearance and disqualification or hurdle in the way of confirmation of the appellant in the end of the judgment.

8. The second limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the appellant was due for confirmation w.e.f. March, 1981, therefore, his reports beyond 1980 should not nave been taken into consideration. In the alternative it was argued that in any case the reports have been set aside, therefore, the appellant should have been confirmed from the due date. The learned counsel for the appellant in this behalf, has referred to the following cases:‑ (1) Muhammad Abdul Majid v. The Government of Punjab through the Chief Secretary, Lahore reported as 1972 P L C 83 (C.S.T.) (2) Syed Aftab Ahmad v. D.I.‑G. Police Lahore Range and 76 others reported as 1984 P L C (C.S.) 1068. (3) Abdul Razzaq v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary Home reported as 1988 P L C (C.S.) 216. (4) Nazir. Ahmad Swati and another v. Establishment Secretary, Government of Pakistan and another reported as 1984 P L C (C. S.) 183. (The Government filed appeal in the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan which was dismissed and judgment is reported as 1986 S C M R 2001). (5) Manzoor Ahmad v. Superintendent of Police and 2 others reported as 1988 P L C (C. S.) 206. (6) Muhammad Zaman Khan v. Government of Punjab and others reported as 1981 P L C (C.S.) 434. (7) Syed Sultan Shah v. Government of Baluchistan and another reported as 1985 S C M R 1394. The learned counsel for the appellant has also referred to the instructions dated 7‑11‑1983, as Annexure 'D', policy letter dated 16‑10‑1973, and some other precedent cases. On the other hand learned District Attorney has argued that the same are not relevant for the decision of this appeal as these cases and instructions deal with the pro forma promotion. In my considered view, the relevant guideline is contained in the letter dated 16‑10‑1973, relevant portion reads as under: ‑ "Pro forma promotion is generally granted in the typical cases mentioned below:‑ (ii) The official is under suspension of facing a departmental inquiry on serious charges, and therefore, his promotion is deferred. Eventually he is exonerated of the charges and he has to be given pro forma promotion from the date on which he would otherwise have been promoted; (iii) An official is considered unfit for promotion because of adverse remarks in his Character Roll. Subsequently, he succeeds in getting the remarks expunged and claims pro forma promotion; and" The position which ultimately emerges is that the appellant was deferred on account of adverse entries of 1985 and 1986. It is admitted ponders that the same have been expunged by Respondent No.l and order communicated thereof through memos. dated 24‑1‑1988 and 28‑1‑1988. of The same have been placed on record. It was in the interest justice that Respondent should have taken both the representations together at one and the same time. It would have saved the appellant from unnecessary harassment and filing of appeal before this Tribunal. The position is that confirmation of the appellant has been deferred of on account of adverse entries against which the representations of the appellant were already pending and were subsequently accepted. The orders passed on the representations nullify the first order.

9. There is yet another reason which can be advanced in favour of my observation. It is that since expunction of adverse remarks and confirmation were inter‑connected matters, therefore, it was all the more conducive to justice that the same should have been de/ been together. The awkward position in the present case could have been easily avoided. I have dealt with this point at length in the case of Abdul Razzaq v. Government of Punjab. The relevant portion judgment reads as under: "Legally speaking this adverse report was subject to scrutiny then at the departmental level through the representation and then the by this Tribunal and still the matter can be agitated in' the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The report being not final cannot furnish the basis for the order under section 12(ii). If the adverse remarks are expunged tomorrow by the department in the representation or thereafter by this Tribunal in an appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 or by the Supreme Court of Pakistan then what basis will be left to justify the action under section 12(ii) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act. On the other hand the matter could be postponed till the representation of the appellant was decided. It could be postponed till the adverse remarks attained finality the parties have exhausted the remedies." This disposes of all the points raised by the learned counsel fob r the appellant.

10. The result is that I accept the appeal, set aside the impugned order of Respondent No.2 and hold that the appellant is entitled to confirmation from March, 1981. There is no order as to cost. M.Y.H./208/Sr.P???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? Appeal allowed.