1995 PLP 372 (MLD)

Ghous Bux M. Channa for Respondents Nos.3 to 5.

1. WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, J: ‑‑Granted."‑

2. Exemption is allowed but subject to all just exceptions.

3. This is an application by the respondents Nos.3 to 5 seeking review of the order, dated 27‑9‑1994, which was in the following terms:‑‑‑ "The learned A.A: G. has stated that in the event the petitioner contacts the relevant personnel at Police Station `B', Section Sukkur and makes a statement, verbal or in writing, satisfying the requirements of section 154, Cr.P.C. due action under the law would follow. This satisfies the learned counsel for the petitioner." Review is sought on the ground that no notices were issued to the respondents Nos.3 to 5 even though they were impleaded as parties and an opportunity of hearing was thus denied to them. Merits of the petitioner's case are also disputed. The respondents Nos.3 to 5 were neither necessary nor proper parties in a case, where the petitioner had merely sought compliance of the requirements of section 154, Cr.P.C. from specified Police Officers. No notices, therefore, were ordered to be issued to such respondents nor any order adverse to them has been passed. In the instant application, the referred respondents say that there is a case history in relation to the F.I.R., which the petitioner had sought to be registered. It is also stated that no criminal liability arises in the matter and the proceedings are altogether mala fide. It is, besides, proposed that before any F.I.R. is registered the police functionaries should hold an enquiry. We are afraid that none of these reservations can be entertained at this stage of the proceedings. When an F.I.R. is registered no prior notice is expected to be given to the accused cited. Likewise, none is necessary when a petition is filed, complaining of non‑compliance of the mandate in section 154, Cr.P.C. by the, concerned Police Officer: Ghulam Hussain v. Sirajul Haque 1987 PCr.LJ 1214 and Dilbar Hussain v. Riasat Jawed Bajwa 1994 MLD 1736. Besides, when an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is laid before an officer‑in‑charge of a police station, substance thereof is to be entered in a book maintained in a prescribed form. In other, but non‑technical, words due F.I.R. is to be registered. Veracity or otherwise of the information is to be determined, upon investigation, subsequently. In the same manner, dealing with a pre‑F.I.R. stage, we, as well, at this point of time, cannot determine the truth or otherwise of the information. Except when section 157 is invoked, investigation is to follow and not to precede registration of an F.I.R., persuant to section 154, Cr.P.C. Law may be different in some specified fields of activity for instance under the Federal Investigating Agency Act, 1974, where before the registration of an F.I.R. investigation may routinely be undertaken but that is a situation with which we are not concerned in relation to section 154, Cr.P.C. Lastly, it is contended by Mr. Channa, for the respondents Nos.3‑‑5, that no time was fixed by us on 27‑9‑1994 for the appearance and making of the statement by the petitioner before the police functionaries in terms contemplated by section 154, Cr.P.C. and thus a veritable sword of Democles hangs on the heads of the respondents Nos.3 to 5. if the petitioner opts to apply i at a time of his own choice for doing the needful with ulterior motives to cause harassment to the said respondents. Again, we cannot prescribe any time limit under the concept of section

154. Cr.P.C, because limitation is totally foreign to the doctrine of initiation of criminal proceedings, though delay, if any, may ultimately reflect on merits. In such circumstances, we see no substance in this application and dismiss the same. N.H.Q./I‑248/K Petition dismissed.