2005 SCMR 1926 (PLP)

FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J.

This petition, under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, for leave to appeal, is directed against judgment, dated 15-11-1999, passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in Civil Revision No.594 of 1999.

2. The petitioner instituted, against the respondent, a suit for possession through pre-emption, for the suit-land measuring 46 Kanals and 1 Marla. An application of the respondent, under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C., for the rejection of the plaint was allowed by the trial Court by order, dated 24-7-1995, on the ground that the suit was barred by time in view of the provisions of section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Additional District Judge, Sahiwal, by judgment, dated 14-7-1996, allowed the appeal of the petitioner and remanded the case to the trial Court for decision on merits after recording the evidence of the parties. The respondent filed Civil Revision No.594 of 1999 which was accepted by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, by the impugned judgment, dated 15-11-1999. As a consequence thereof, the order, dated 14-7-1996 of the Additional District Judge was set aside and the order, dated 24-7-1995 passed by the Civil Judge was restored. Hence this petition for leave to appeal.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the public notice of the sale of the suit property was not given by the Sub-Registrar as required by the provisions of section 31 of the Act. The period of limitation of four months prescribed by section 30 of the Act could not be computed from the date of the registration of sale-deed. Therefore, the limitation period would start against the petitioner from the date of his knowledge of the sale of the suit property.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length. The provisions of section 30 of the Act read as under:- "

30. Limitation. The period of limitation for a suit to enforce a right of pre-emption under this Act shall be four months from the date:

(a) of the registration of the sale deed; (b) of the attestation of the mutation, if the sale is made otherwise than through a registered sale deed; (c) on which the vendee takes physical possession of the property if the sale is made otherwise than through a registered sale deed or a mutation; or (d) of knowledge by the pre-emptor, if the sale is not covered under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) or paragraph (c)". It would thus, appear that in the present case, paragraph (a) of section 30 of the Act was attracted and the date of the registered sale-deed was terminus a quo for computing the limitation period. The other paragraphs of section 30 (ibid) would have no application. Moreover, the provisions of section 30 operate proprio vigore and are independent of section 31 of the Act. The period of limitation for filing the pre-emption suits is governed by section 30 and not by section 31 of the Act. Even otherwise the official acts by the public authorities are presumed to have been regularly performed. In the case of Muhammad Ramzan v. Lal Khan 1995 SCMR 1510, involving the sale through a mutation the pre-emptor was deemed to have acquired the knowledge of attestation of mutation of sale within two weeks thereof. The impugned judgment does not suffer from any legal infirmity so as to call for interference by this Court. This is not a fit case for grant of leave to appeal.

5. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this petition and the same is dismissed accordingly. S.A.K./Q-14/S Petition dismissed.