1979 PLP 540 (PLC)
PARACHA TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI Versus MOHAMMAD SULEMAN
| Citation | 1979 PLP 540 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | PARACHA TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI Versus MOHAMMAD SULEMAN |
| Primary Law | Workmen's Compensation Act (VIII of 1923)‑‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1979 PLP 540 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: Workmen's Compensation Act (VIII of 1923)‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1979 PLP 540 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1979 PLP 540 (PLC) (PARACHA TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI Versus MOHAMMAD SULEMAN). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Mahmood A. Ghani for Appellant.
- Ch. M. Maarif for Respondent.
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑S. 10‑Application for compensation‑Delay in‑Injury caused in 1969 but application made in 1977‑No application for condonation of delay made‑Explanation that matter was being pursued through out with Management and Social Security Institution and further that cause of action arose only when injury became serious as formerly it was minor‑Further that workman was declared unfit by Social Security Institution subsequently and as such limitation should run from that date‑Explanations, held, not sufficient and decision of Commissioner awarding compensation, in circumstances, set aside dismissing application as time‑barred.
Judgment & Decree
2. The respondent was covered by the Social Security Ordinance and sustained injuries during the course of the employment. He was examined by Doctor and claimed compensation by a notice to the appellant. Since his claim was not accepted, he filed an application before the Commissioner for the Workmen's Compensation,
3. The application was resisted and it was pleaded that the applica tion was time‑barred and the jurisdiction of the Commissioner was barred and it was not maintainable in law. It was denied that the injury was received during the course of the employment.
4. Evidence was tendered by both the parties. On the assessment of the evidence, the learned Commissioner awarded the compensation. He, however, did not deal with the plea of the limitation.
5. At the outset the learned Counsel for the appellant raised the plea of the limitation. It was pleaded by him that the injury had occurred in 1969 whereas the application to the Commissioner was made in 1977; and no application for condonation of delay was made. In 1969, the period was one year and it was in 1973 when it was extended to 3 years. Thus, on the face of it, the application was time‑barred. The learned Commissioner failed to consider this aspect of the case.
6. The only ground which has been pleaded before me in order to explain the delay is that the respondent was running after the management and the Social Security Institution and furthermore it was leaded that the cause of action arose only when the injury became serious as formerly it was minor. It was also pointed out that he was declared unfit by the Social Security Institution in 1978 and, therefore, the limitation of period started from that date.
7. I have considered the contention raised on behalf of the respon dent and I am unable to find any force in it. The cause of action arose neither in 1978 when the respondent was declared unfit nor when the injury became serious as pleaded, but the cause of action arose when the injury was sustained. There is also no evidence to show whether the injury was minor and subsequently it became serious. The fact that the respondent was approaching the Management or the Social Security Institution is not sufficient to explain the undue delay of about 8 years. Not only this, but there was no application for condonation of delay and, therefore, on that account also the delay cannot be condoned.
8. In view of the fact that the application made to the learned Commissioner was time‑barred and there is no ground for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to deal with the remaining pleas which have been raised before me.
9. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of the learned Commissioner is set aside, with the result that the application made under section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.