1991 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

(3) The countersigning officer while recording his remarks had up-graded the category `C' of the A.C.R. to `B' and that he had directed that (only) remarks against column 15 of the A.C.R. were to be communicated. The appellant has also rebutted all the other adverse remarks recorded by respondent No.3 (reporting officer i.e. S.P. Attock). We have heard the counsel of the parties and have also gone through the record placed before this Tribunal especially the complete C.R. dossier of the appellant. We find that. besides the adverse entries in the A.C.R. for the year 1985, the officer had also received the following adverse remarks, earlier on in his A.C.R. for the year 1979 as well:--

4. Departmental enquiry instituted against him during the year Nature of the allegation and resultant punishment awarded Punishment awarded (detail attached)

15. Integrity Controversial

17. Class of report C The rest of the reports earned by him ever since he joined the service in 1964 are "Above Average" or Average". These also include the reports for the years following the impugned report of 1985 i.e. for the years 1986 to 1988. It is interesting to note that the reporting officer who had reported his integrity as `controversial' and classified the report as `C', considered him `honest' and categorised the report as B' in the following year i.e. 1980. Although the 1979 report with its adverse entries is still there in the C.R. dossier of the officer but the subsequent report of 1980 by the same reporting officer clearly signifies that the appellant, who had shown some deviation from the norm in his conduct in 1979, was soon back on the righteous path. In any case, instead of examining the impugned A.C.R. for the year 1985 in the background of all the A.C.Rs. which preceded and followed it, we propose to look at it and make an objective analysis on its own strengths and weaknesses. Para. 16 of 'I: G.P's (revised) Standing Order No. 32 lays down, that "when a report consists of opinions of different departmental superiors in gradation, it is only the opinion as accepted by the highest reporting officer which need be considered from the point of view of communication. If the highest officer does not comment on any remark of the lower authority, it will be presumed that he has accepted it". In the light of the instructions reproduced above, the adverse remarks given by the reporting officer in columns Nos.14(a) and 17 have to be ignored as the remarks of the countersigning officer i.e. D.I: G. Traffic (respondent No.2) clearly, indicated that (only) remarks of the reporting officer recorded against column No. 15 were to be communicated. Similarly, the general remarks, including classification recorded by the reporting officer against column No.17, have also been washed out by the remarks (Average) given by the countersigning officer under the same column. That being the case, the only adverse remarks left in the field are remarks against the appellant's integrity which we now proceed to examine in the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned District Attorney. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the remarks against integrity of the appellant are not based on any valid or sound reasons. He placed great stress on the fact that these remarks, apart from being violative of the Standing Order No32 of the I.G.P. quoted above, are also indicative of the subjective assessment made by the reporting officer and, therefore, these remarks are not only unfounded but also unjustifiable. He emphatically denied that there were any complaints about the reputation of the appellant. The learned District Attorney vehemently contested the pleas advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and argued that the remarks were fully justified and may, therefore, be allowed to stand on the A.C.R. In his written objections respondent No.1 i.e. I.-G.P. has disputed the claim of the appellant and has stated that the remarks on the working and general conduct and reputation of the officer have been given as-assessed by the reporting officer for the period under report. Except for making a ceremonial rebuttal, devoid of any force or reason, of the above contentions of the appellant the respondents have not been able to refer to any specific complaint which might have been filed against the appellant during the year under report about his integrity or even a stray case of corruption in which he might have been involved. In cases of this nature it is not enough to say that the integrity of the official is controversial unless the charge could be substantiated by credible evidence based on record. Although scores of cases could be cited to prove the point but the position has been explained most succinctly in 1988 P L C (C.S.) 431 Madad Khan v. Dist. Director Livestock and Dairy Development, Bannu and two others by the learned Service Tribunal N: W.F.P. and we reproduce below the relevant portion of the judgment:- "A.C.R. is a very precious document and on it the career of an officer depends. If an officer in fact deserves adverse remarks he must be given the same, but it is the duty of the reporting officer to have a check on him for the period he is given the remarks. He must check his work. If he is field officer, make a tour in order to obtain the views of the masses. He must also see whether any complaint in writing was made by any person from public against him. If it is so; whether it has been investigated by him or not. If a complaint is oral, he must examine the person in support of it ....... Even warning and counselling administered upon him is not sufficient. There must be something on the record to prove it. The adverse remarks must be supported by some cogent and visible material which in the instant case is lacking." In the instant appeal too the supportive material is completely lacking and the respondents have made no effort at all to substantiate the impugned adverse remarks. The only logical conclusion would, therefore, be that the remarks are unfounded, unjust and uncalled for. We, therefore, accept the appeal, set aside the impugned order dated 30-12-1987 passed by respondent No.l and direct that the aforesaid adverse remarks recorded by respondent No.3 be expunged from the appellant's A.C.R. for the year 1985. There are no orders as to costs. Judgment be communicated to the parties. M.Y.H./306/Sr.P Appeal allowed.