1975 PLP 183 (SCMR)
ABDUL QADIR — Petitioner Versus Sh. MUHAMMAD IDRIS — Respondent
| Citation | 1975 PLP 183 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | High Court |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | ABDUL QADIR — Petitioner Versus Sh. MUHAMMAD IDRIS — Respondent |
| Primary Law | West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 195.9) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1975 PLP 183 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 195.9) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1975 PLP 183 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1975 PLP 183 (SCMR) (ABDUL QADIR — Petitioner Versus Sh. MUHAMMAD IDRIS — Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Mian Faqir Muhammad, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Iqbal Ahmad Qureshi, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.
- Nemo for Respondent.
- Date of hearing t 16th October 1974.
- Mian Faqir Muhammad, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Iqbal Ahmad Qureshi, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the order of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Circuit, Baghdadul Jadid, dated 21-3-1974, in S. A. O. No. 10 of 1974).
S. 13(3)(ii)(a) - Contention that application for ejectment filed and dismissed earlier being filed on ground of default alone, present application adding further ground of requirement for personal use is males fide, held, not correct - Requirement for personal use could arise subsequently-Present requirement being based on evidence on record, question whether such ground was available earlier or not, held, cannot be raised-Such question ought to have been raised at trial stage.
Judgment & Decree
HAMOODUR REHMAN, C. J.‑This is a petition for special leave to appeal from the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in a second appeal arising out of an ejectment proceeding. The respondent herein filed an application for the ejectment of the petitioner from a shop room at Chishtian which had been rented out in the year 1963, on the grounds of bona fide personal requirement, recon struction of the shop and the default of the petitioner. The Rent Controller found that there was no default but hold that the landlord bona fide required the promises for his own use and occupa tion and for the purpose of reconstruction of the shop. Hence ejectment was allowed on these grounds. An appeal from this order failed before the District Judge, Bahawalpur. In second appeal, the High Court refused to interfere. The petitioner now seeks special leave to appeal. It is contended on his behalf that the whole application was male fide because an earlier application for ejectment on the ground of default alone had been dismissed on the 16th May 1972, yet the present petition for ejectment was filed on the 11th November 1972, fraudulently adding two other grounds. This fact by itself does not establish mala fides nor does the fact that the grounds on which ejectment was now sought had not been included fn the earlier petition. All the three Courts below have, after taking into consideration the evidence, come to the conclusion that the premises were genuinely required by the landlord. Indeed, the learned Judge in the High Court is of the view that there is no ground for interference with the concurrent finding: of the Courts below as the evidence is practically one‑sided. The landlord's evidence stands unrebutted. The contention that since these grounds were not taken in the first application for ejectment it must be held that the landlord did not require the premises for his own use is fallacious, because, the requirement' may well have arisen subsequently. In any event since the present requirement is based on the evidence on the record, the question as to whether a similar ground was available earlier or not cannot be raised at this stage. It should have been raised at the trial stage if it was intends to raise it as a plea in bar to the proceedings. We think that the High Court has rightly refused to interfere. This petition has no merits and is, accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.