P L D 1958 (W (PLP)

INAMULLAH, J.--‑ Writ Petition No. 373 of 1957, Messrs. Reyaz‑o‑Khalid Co. v. Pakistan, through the Secretary, Central Board of Revenue and two others, was heard along with Writ Petition No. 58 of 1957, Messrs. Abdul Sattar v. Commissioner of Income‑tax Karachi, and another, and Writ Petition No. 148 of 1957, Messrs. Firdaus Trading Corporation v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, Karachi and another, as common question of fact and law was involved. Mr. Sharifuddin, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, Messrs. Reyaz‑o‑Khalid Co., addressed us first, and the other learned Advocates adopted his arguments. For the decision of these Writ Petitions, it is not necessary to go into details of the facts disclosed in the petition. The common factor in all these three writ petitions is that their assessment case pending before the Income‑tax Officer of their respective circles was transferred to the Income‑tax Officer, Special Circle, Karachi. In all the three writ petitions, the Income‑tax Officer, Special Circle, Karachi, has been impleaded as the respondent. Mr. Sharif uddi n, the learned Advocate for the petitioner Reyaz‑o‑Khalid, has raised two fold contention before us : (1) That subsection 7 (A) of section 5 of the Income‑tax Act, 1922, was void being repugnant to Article 5 of the Constitution, and (2) that there was denial of natural justice inasmuch as the Income tax Commissioner did not give an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause why his matter may not be transferred to the Income‑tax Officer, Special Circle, Karachi. In order to appreciate the contention of Mr. Sharifuddin that subsection 7 (A) of section 5 of the Income‑tax Act is repugnant to Article 5 of the Constitution, it will be convenient to reproduce sub‑clause 7 (A) of section 5 of the Income‑tax Act. It reads as under :‑ "7 (A). The Commissioner of Income‑tax may transfer any case from one Inco4ne‑tax Officer subordinate to him to another; and the Central Board of Revenue may transfer any case from any one Income‑tax Officer to another. Such transfer may be made at any stage of the proceedings, and shall not render necessary the re‑issue of any notice already issued by the Income‑tax Officer from whom the case is transferred. Explanation.‑In this subsection, `case' in relation to any person whose name is specified in the order of transfer means all proceedings under this Act in respect of any year which may be pending on the date of the transfer, and includes all pro ceedings under this Act which may be commenced after the date of the transfer in respect of any year." A perusal of sub‑clause 7 (A) of section 5 of the Income to Act should show that it is not discriminatory. The Commissioner has been given a power to transfer the case of any of the assessees to any other Income‑tax Officer. The provision is an adminis trative one. The assessees whose cases may be so transferred under sub‑clause 7 (A) of section 5 of the Income‑tax Act, would also be governed by the same provision of law, and would be dealt with similarly as they may have been dealt with by the Income tax officer where their case originally was pending. The Commis sioner of Income‑tax has been given this power to transfer the cases pending before one Income‑tax Officer to another, as an administrative measure. There can be various administrative reasons for such transfer. It would appear from the affidavit of the Income‑tax Officer, Special Circle, filed in the Writ Petition No. 373 of 1957, that in order to facilitate tax collection all barter cases have been transferred to his file irrespective of the circle where they may have been pending. The Income‑tax Commissioner considered that it would be more conducive to justice if all the "barter cases" are dealt with by one officer so that there may be uniformity: So far as Writ Petition No. 58 of 1957 is concerned, the petitioner's case was transferred to the Special Circle on the administrative ground that the assessment of the petitioner would have become time barred if it had not been disposed of earlier. It is stated that "the territorial I. T. O.'s are usually hard pressed with their work, and, therefore. this case was transferred to the I. T. O. Special Circle. So far as Writ Petition No. 148 of 1957 is concerned, the Commissioner transferred the petitioner's case to the Income‑tax Officer. Special Circle, as this case also related to barter transactions. The case., of all the petitioners were transferred to the Income‑tax Officer, Special Circle, as already mentioned above because of administrative( reasons. The orders of transfer of cases of the petitioners from the Income‑tax Officers of their respective circle to the Income‑tax Officer, Special Circle, could only be challenged on the ground that these orders of the Income‑tax Commissioner were actuated by malice. In these writ petitions no malice has been urged against the Income‑tax Commissioner, at least none has been proved. Mr. Sharifuddin has candidly brought to our notice the decisions of Indian Courts where sub‑clause 7 (A) of section 5 of the Income‑tax Act, which is similar to ours, was challenged on the same ground as before us, and the contention was repelled. The important decision in this connection is that of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India and others (A I R 1957 S C 397). It was held in that case that sub‑clause 7 (A) of section 5 of the Income‑tax Act did not infringe against the provisions of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution which is in almost identical terms as Article 5 of our Constitution. The other case in which the same contention, as urged before us, was raised and repelled, is Bishan Lal Kuthiala v. The Income tax Officer, Ambala (A I R 1957 Punj. 26). The next contention of Mr. Sharifuddin was that the Income tax Commissioner should have given him notice before transfer ring the case to the Special Circle. We do not think that absence of notice to show cause why the cases of these petitioners should not be transferred to the Income‑tax Officer, Special Circle, would) amount to denial of natural justice. No useful purpose could C have been served even if the Income‑tax Commissioner had given notice to these petitioners before transferring these cases. It was) the Income‑tax Commissioner alone who was the best judge whether for administrative reason, the cases of these petitioners should be transferred to another Income-tax Officer or not. Moreover the assessees, even if their cases were transferred to another Income‑tax Officer, would not in any way be prejudiced if their cases were tried by the Income‑tax Officer of the Special Circle. The best that could be urged on their behalf, was that the transfer may have caused some inconvenience to them. The principle of natural justice would usually come into operation when the right of the person was materially affected. In these cases, except for some inconvenience, it cannot be urged on behalf of the petitioners that their rights have been materially affected. We may also point out that the conduct of these petitioners would also not entitle them to any relief under Article 170 of the Constitution, as they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Income‑tax Officer, Special Circle. Mr. Ali Athar the learned Advocate for the petitioner Messrs. Abdus Sattar, adopted the arguments of Mr. Sharifuddin, but has urged that the Income‑tax Officer, Special Circle, had no juris diction to try the case of his client, as the case that had been transferred to him was that of the individual Ahmadbhai. From a perusal of the counter affidavit filed by the Income‑tax Officer, Special Circle, we are satisfied that the case that has been trans ferred to him was that of Messrs. Abdus Sattar Ahmadbhai and the omission of the word `Messrs' against Abdus Sattar Ahmadbhai was not material. For the reasons given above, we dismiss the petitions but would make no order as to costs under the circumstances of the present petitions. A. H. Petitions dismissed.