PTD 1990

1990 PLP 58 (PTD)

LESLIE SEQUEIRA Versus INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, CIRCLE V, ZONE C and another

Jurisdiction / Court
Karachi High Court
Decided Date
Constitutional Petition No.707 of 1989, decided on 31st October, 1989.
Honorable Judges
Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui and Imam Ali Kazi, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1990 PLP 58 (PTD)
Forum / Court Karachi High Court
Bench Members Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui and Imam Ali Kazi, JJ
Parties LESLIE SEQUEIRA Versus INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, CIRCLE V, ZONE C and another
Primary Law Income‑tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1990 PLP 58 (PTD)?

This judgment primarily cites: Income‑tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1990 PLP 58 (PTD)?

The case was heard and decided by the Karachi High Court bench comprising: Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui and Imam Ali Kazi, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1990 PLP 58 (PTD) (LESLIE SEQUEIRA Versus INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, CIRCLE V, ZONE C and another). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Income‑tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)‑‑

Representation

  • R.H. Naqvi for Petitioner.
  • Shaikh Haider for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing: 31st October, 1989.
  • 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two‑fold contentions before us in support of the petition. It is, firstly, contended that the notices issued by Respondent No. l., under section 65 of the Income‑tax Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter called `the Ordinance' only for the sake of convenience) are wholly without jurisdiction as the period of limitation which was available under subsection (3) of section 65 of the Ordinance for re‑opening of the assessments for the years 1974‑75 and 1975‑76 had already expired on the date when the two notices were issued on 22‑6‑1989 by the Income‑tax Officer to the petitioner. It is accordingly contended that the impugned notices are wholly without jurisdiction. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is, that if the impugned notices are considered by the Court as having been issued by the Income‑tax Officer under section 66 of the Income‑tax Act, then too, the same could not be sustained in law, as they were based upon an alleged finding/direction recorded by the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal in its order dated 16‑4‑1989 while in fact no such finding/ direction existed in the order of Tribunal relied by the Income‑tax Officer. In reply to the above contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Shaikh Haider, the learned counsel for respondents raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the above petition. It is contended by the learned counsel that firstly, the notices dated 22‑6‑1989 could no more be challenged by the petitioner as after issuance of these notices, final orders dated 10‑7‑1989 were passed in the cases by the Income‑tax Officer and as such the notices stood merged in the final orders. Secondly, the petitioner has already filed departmental appeal against the final orders dated 10 7‑1989 and as such the petitioner having availed the alternate remedy under the Ordinance which is still pending this Court will not entertain the petition under Article 199 of the Constitution. In reply to the contention of petitioner that proceedings initiated under section 65 of the Ordinance were time‑barred, the learned counsel for the Department stated that no proceedings were drawn against the petitioner by the Income‑tax Officer under section 65 of the Income -tax Ordinance and that the notices were in fact issued by the Income‑tax Officer in exercise of his power under section 66 of the Ordinance.
  • From reading of the above letter it is quite clear that although the Income‑tax Officer in the notices issued to petitioner had also referred to section 65 of the Ordinance but in substance the action taken by him fell under section 66 ibid. Mere fact that the Income‑tax Officer had referred a wrong provision of law, in the notice cannot be a ground for holding that proceedings drawn by him were incompetent, if otherwise it can be demonstrated that such proceedings arc maintainable under any other provision of the Ordinance. However, the further contention of the petitioner in the case is that even if the notices are deemed to have been issued under section 66 of the Ordinance, then too the jurisdiction of Income‑tax Officer to issue the same was lacking, as there was no finding or direction in the order of the Tribunal, which is the basis for issuance of the impugned notices. To support his contention that the observations made about the petitioner in the order of the Tribunal dated 16‑4‑1989, which is the basis for issuance of impugned notices, neither amounted to a finding nor a direction so as to justify action under section 66 of the Ordinance, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the cases of Rajinder Nath v. Commissioner of Income‑tax (1979 (120) ITR 14), Commissioner of Income‑tax v. Homi Matha (1982 (137) ITR 213). We do not consider here necessary to go into the merit of this contention as in out view this petition can be disposed of on the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the Department.

Headnotes / Summary

‑‑‑Ss.65 & 66‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199‑‑Notice under S.65, to assessee‑‑Incometax Officer, though in notices issued to assessee, had also referred to S.65 but in substance the action taken by him fell under S.66‑‑Mere fact that Incometax Officer had referred to a wrong provision of law, in the notice could not be a ground for holding that proceedings drawn by him were incompetent, if otherwise it could be demonstrated that such proceedings were maintainable under any other provision of the Ordinance‑‑Contention that order of the Tribunal on the basis of which the impugned notice had been issued to assessee, contained no finding or direction which could justify the issuance of said notice under S.66 by the Incometax Officer‑‑Held, there was no patent or inherent lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Incometax Officer when he issued the notice‑‑Fact, whether the order of the Tribunal contained or not, a finding/direction which justified issuance of notices to assessee under S.66 was a question which related to the interpretation of the order of Tribunal which could properly be decided in a departmental appeal‑‑No extraordinary circumstances, were thus present in the case which justified filing of the petition under Art.199 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973), without exhausting the alternate remedy of appeal under the Ordinance. Rajinder Nath v. Commissioner of Incometax (1979) 120 I T R 14 and Commissioner of Incometax v. Homi Matha (1982) 137 I T R 213 ref.

Judgment & Decree

SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.‑‑The above petition under Article 199 of the Constitution was filed in this Court on 10‑7‑1989 by the petitioner initially to challenge the two notices dated 22‑6‑1989 issued by the Incometax Officer proposing to reassess the income of the petitioner for the years 1974‑75 and 1975

76. On 10‑7‑1989, the Incometax Officer concerned also passed final orders it pursuance of above notices. However the petition was admitted to regular hearing on 11‑7‑1989 against the impugned notices only, as the petitioner did not bring it to the notice of the Court at that time, that final orders in the cases have already been passed by the Incometax Officer. On 12‑7‑1989, the petitioner, applied for leave to amend the petition so that the final orders dated 10‑7‑1989 passed by the Incometax Officer, may also be included in the above petition for challenge which was allowed on 19‑7‑1989.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two‑fold contentions before us in support of the petition. It is, firstly, contended that the notices issued by Respondent No. l., under section 65 of the Incometax Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter called `the Ordinance' only for the sake of convenience) are wholly without jurisdiction as the period of limitation which was available under subsection (3) of section 65 of the Ordinance for re‑opening of the assessments for the years 1974‑75 and 1975‑76 had already expired on the date when the two notices were issued on 22‑6‑1989 by the Incometax Officer to the petitioner. It is accordingly contended that the impugned notices are wholly without jurisdiction. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is, that if the impugned notices are considered by the Court as having been issued by the Incometax Officer under section 66 of the Incometax Act, then too, the same could not be sustained in law, as they were based upon an alleged finding/direction recorded by the Incometax Appellate Tribunal in its order dated 16‑4‑1989 while in fact no such finding/ direction existed in the order of Tribunal relied by the Incometax Officer. In reply to the above contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Shaikh Haider, the learned counsel for respondents raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the above petition. It is contended by the learned counsel that firstly, the notices dated 22‑6‑1989 could no more be challenged by the petitioner as after issuance of these notices, final orders dated 10‑7‑1989 were passed in the cases by the Incometax Officer and as such the notices stood merged in the final orders. Secondly, the petitioner has already filed departmental appeal against the final orders dated 10 7‑1989 and as such the petitioner having availed the alternate remedy under the Ordinance which is still pending this Court will not entertain the petition under Article 199 of the Constitution. In reply to the contention of petitioner that proceedings initiated under section 65 of the Ordinance were time‑barred, the learned counsel for the Department stated that no proceedings were drawn against the petitioner by the Incometax Officer under section 65 of the Income -tax Ordinance and that the notices were in fact issued by the Incometax Officer in exercise of his power under section 66 of the Ordinance. It is common ground between the parties that if the notices are held to have been issued under section 66 of the Incometax Ordinance then the proceedings drawn against the petitioner by notice dated 22‑6‑1989 were not time‑barred. The letter dated 22‑6‑1989 addressed by the Incometax Officer to petitioner forwarding the notices issued under section 65 of the Ordinance reads as follows:‑‑ OFFICE OF THE INCOME TAX OFFICER CIRCLE‑V ZONE'C' KARACHI Dated: 22‑6‑1989. NO. ITO/CIR.V/1988‑89/ To, M/s. Leslie Sequera, 25‑B 11th Central Street, D.H.S. Karachi. SUBJECT: NOTICE U/S 65 READ WITH SECTION 66(2) OF THE INCOME TAX ORDINANCE. 1979‑‑ASSESSMENT YEARS 1974‑75 & 1975‑76 Please find enclosed notices a/s 65 for Assessment Year 1974‑75 and 1975‑76 which are being issued to give effect to the directions of learned Income- tax Appellate Tribunal's Order No. ITA No. 1688/KB of 1986‑87 Assessment Year 1974‑75 and No. ITA‑1689/KB of 1986‑87 Assessment Year 1975‑76 dated 16‑4‑1989, as stipulated in section 66(2) of the Incometax Ordinance, 1979. Kindly ensure compliance within Seven (7) days of receipt of this letter, Sd/‑xxxxxxx (KHAWAR SAEED), Incometax Officer Circle‑V, Zone'C', Karachi. From reading of the above letter it is quite clear that although the Incometax Officer in the notices issued to petitioner had also referred to section 65 of the Ordinance but in substance the action taken by him fell under section 66 ibid. Mere fact that the Incometax Officer had referred a wrong provision of law, in the notice cannot be a ground for holding that proceedings drawn by him were incompetent, if otherwise it can be demonstrated that such proceedings arc maintainable under any other provision of the Ordinance. However, the further contention of the petitioner in the case is that even if the notices are deemed to have been issued under section 66 of the Ordinance, then too the jurisdiction of Incometax Officer to issue the same was lacking, as there was no finding or direction in the order of the Tribunal, which is the basis for issuance of the impugned notices. To support his contention that the observations made about the petitioner in the order of the Tribunal dated 16‑4‑1989, which is the basis for issuance of impugned notices, neither amounted to a finding nor a direction so as to justify action under section 66 of the Ordinance, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the cases of Rajinder Nath v. Commissioner of Incometax (1979 (120) ITR 14), Commissioner of Incometax v. Homi Matha (1982 (137) ITR 213). We do not consider here necessary to go into the merit of this contention as in out view this petition can be disposed of on the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the Department. It is quite clear from the contention of petitioner in the above case that he is not alleging lack of authority against Respondent No. 1 in issuing the impugned notices. The challenge is based on the ground that the order of the Tribunal on the basis of which the impugned notices have been issued to petitioner, contained no finding or direction which could justify the issuance of impugned notices under section 66 of the Ordinance by the Incometax Officer. It is, therefore clear that there was no patent or inherent lack of jurisdiction on the part of Respondent No. 1 when he issued the impugned notices. The fact, whether the order of Tribunal dated 16‑4‑1989 contained or not, a finding/direction which justified issuance of notices to petitioner under section 66 of the Ordinance, is a question which relates to the interpretation of the order of Tribunal and which in our opinion can properly be decided in a departmental appeal. We therefore, do not find any extraordinary circumstances in the present case which justified filing of the above petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, without exhausting the alternate remedy of appeal under the Ordinance. It has not been contended before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner that remedy by way of appeal provided under Ordinance is onerous or futile or that the scope of appeal is so limited that the relief sought in this petition cannot be granted to the petitioner under the departmental appeal We are accordingly of the view that the above petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has an alternate remedy available to him under the Ordinance which the petitioner has availed and the appeal is presently pending before the appellate forum. We accordingly dismiss the petition but will make no order as to costs. Keeping in view the circumstances of the case and the fact that we are dismissing the petition on a preliminary objection, we direct the Incometax authorities to decide the appeal of the petitioner within three months from today. M.B.A./L‑37/K Petition dismissed.