1998 PLP 90 (PLC)
Syed MURTAZA ALI Versus THE CHAIRMAN, RICE EXPORT CORPORATION OF
| Citation | 1998 PLP 90 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab |
| Bench Members | Mian Ghulam Ahmad, Chairman |
| Parties | Syed MURTAZA ALI Versus THE CHAIRMAN, RICE EXPORT CORPORATION OF |
| Primary Law | (a) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1998 PLP 90 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: (a) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1998 PLP 90 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab bench comprising: Mian Ghulam Ahmad, Chairman.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1998 PLP 90 (PLC) (Syed MURTAZA ALI Versus THE CHAIRMAN, RICE EXPORT CORPORATION OF). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Ikram-ud-Din Khan for Appellant.
- Muhammad Aslam Zar for Respondents.
- Date of hearing: 16th February, 1997.
Headnotes / Summary
S.25-A
Increments of employee falling due in years 1980, 1981and 1982 having been withheld he made representation against such withholding in 1983 and lodged another representation in 1986 which was rejected in 1988 on ground that employee was inefficient and his service record was unsatisfactory
Another plea taken by employer/Authority was that employee could not be allowed to cross "efficiency bar" after eight years-- Cause of action having accrued to employee in 1988 on rejection of his representation, he filed grievance notice after more than one year of accrual of cause of action
Labour Court, thus, was justified in coming to conclusion that grievance notice was badly barred by law of limitation and his grievance petition was also barred by time
Palpable delay that was caused in submission of grievance petition, provided by grievance notice was not at all condonable
To say that employee's entitlement to receive salary in full measure, was a recurring cause of action, would be a mistaken view.
S. 25-A
Act of awarding suitable remarks in the A.C.R. of an employee was exclusive privilege of Reporting Officer and same could be corrected or reviewed by higher officer in the same hierarchy
Such exercise would not fall within scope of S. 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and was not susceptible to scrutiny by either the Labour Court or Appellate Tribunal.
Judgment & Decree
S. 25-A
Act of awarding suitable remarks in the A.C.R. of an employee was exclusive privilege of Reporting Officer and same could be corrected or reviewed by higher officer in the same hierarchy
Such exercise would not fall within scope of S. 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and was not susceptible to scrutiny by either the Labour Court or Appellate Tribunal. Ikram-ud-Din Khan for Appellant. Muhammad Aslam Zar for Respondents. Date of hearing: 16th February, 1997. By the decision dated 12-5-1996, learned Punjab Labour Court No. 1, Lahore dismissed the grievance petition of Syed Murtaza Ali, as being time-barred; and he has preferred the present appeal.
2. Syed Murtaza Ali was appointed as Junior Clerk on 21-4-1976, and at present he is an Assistant, serving in the Regional Office of the Corporation at Lahore. His increments falling on 1-12-1980, 1-12-1981 and 1-12-1982 have been withheld. He made a representation against the same on 13-2-1983 (Exh. P-1) and lodged another representation on 12-11-1986 (Exh.P-2). The representation was rejected on 16-8-1988, vide Exh. P-3. It was conveyed to him that it was not possible for the 'Authorities' to revise or amend the orders, as he had been found to be inefficient and as his service record had been treated as unsatisfactory. It was also observed that he could not be allowed to cross the 'Efficiency Bar' after about 8 years. Murtaza Ali. however, once again pursued his cause and challenged the correctness of the order dated 16-8-1988, by making a representation on 18-9-1988 (Exh.P-4). He threatened that if his case was not decided, at an early date, he would be obliged to approach the Wafaqi Mohtasib. Vide Exh.P-5, he was again, on 19-10-1988, informed that his request could not be acceded to and he was also frankly told that no further correspondence on the subject would be entertained and the case would be treated as hazing been closed. The official, however, did not sit content, and on 16-2-1989, through Exh. P-6, he made a fresh move to the Department for fixation of his pay and for award of his annual increments. The Department took it ill, and warned the employee that he should refrain from repeating such requests in future. He, however, made yet another representation on 9-4-1989 (Exhs.P-10/P-11). He was told, per Exh.P-12, on 16-5-1989, that his case had already been considered and final reply was given to him, on 12-6-1989 (Exh.P-13). He served upon his employer a grievance notice, the postal receipts being Exhs. P-14 to 17 and the A.D. receipts being Exhs. P-18 and
19. The grievance petition was filed in the Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 on 19-8-1989, the prayer being that the order of stoppage of his increments falling in December, 1980, 198r and 1982 was an arbitrary, unlawful and unjust act and the same be so declared by the Labour Court and his pay be re-fixed in routine and he be also awarded all the back benefits.
3. The learned lower Court has upheld the objection of the respondents about the grievance notice, as also the grievance petition, being time-barred. It was maintained that the annual increment had consciously and justifiably been withheld, owing to his poor service record. It was urged that there was provision for only one departmental appeal /representation, and the first one having been rejected on 16-8-1988, the cause of action accrued to him, for coming to the Court, on 16-8-1988, and within the statutory time-limit he could have recourse to the Labour Court.
4. The learned Court below has endorsed the view point that the employee had no right to make any further representation after 16-8-1988, and that if he had been harping on the same tune, he was to blame himself, and none-else, for the legal bar that would operate against him in coming to the Court. Respondents objection about the petitioner being not a workman was, however, overruled, and it was held that the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, as also the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, would be applicable.
5. To say that an employee's entitlement to receive salary in full measure, according to his entitlement, is a recurring cause of action, would be a mistaken view. Actually, when the first increment on 1-12-1980 had been withheld, the employee should have thought in terms of having recourse to the Labour. Court, although he could also initially avail of the departmental remedy, one representation or appeal. It, however, occurred to him to invoke the aid of the Labour Laws in his favour and to have access to the Labour Court too late in the day, and he did not make the requisite move within time.
6. The learned lower Court was, therefore, wholly justified in coming to the conclusion that the grievance notice was badly barred by the law of limitation. The grievance petition that followed would also not be treated to have been filed in time, considered from any angle. I would entirely agree with the Court below that palpable delay that was caused, in the matter of submission of the grievance petition, preceded by the grievance notice, was not at all condonable. Reference has rightly been made to 1988 SCMR 1354 and 1984 SCMR 1311, in that regard. I have no doubt in my mind that the impugned decision is perfectly sound, legally speaking, and there is no good ground available to justify interference with it. It is also to be borne in mind I that act of award of suitable remarks in the A.C.Rs. of an employee is the exclusive privilege of the reporting officer, and the same may be corrected or reviewed by higher officers in the same hierarchy. The exercise does not fall within the scope of section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and is not susceptible to scrutiny by either the Labour Court or this Tribunal. The appellant has approached these forums in the matter in an incompetent and unwarranted manner. The appeal has no merit, whatever, and it is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. H.B.T./896/Lb.P ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.