P L D 1982 Lahore 75 (PLP)

The appellant was a tenant under one Ch. Taj Din in the two rooms constructed on plot.. No. 58 Industrial Area, Dijkot Road Faisalabad, at the monthly rent of Rs. 70 only. The rights in the said plot and the super structure standing thereon were purchased by the respondents vide a registered deed dated 6‑12‑

73. A few months after the purchase of the rights by the respondents; the appellant filed in February, 1974, a suit for permanent injunction restraining the respondents from forcibly ejecting him from the premises in dispute. This suit was, however, dismissed on the statement of the respondents that they will not evict the . appellant except through process of law. Thereafter, notice under section 13‑A of the Ordinance was served on the appellant intimating the transfer of rights in respect of the said premises in favour of the respondents. As the rent was not tendered to the respondents they on 14‑10‑1974 filed an ejectment application seeking eviction of the appellant on the grounds of default in payment of rent since December, 1973, and bona fide personal need. Besides denying the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties the appellant also. controverted the other pleas on the question of default and personal need. The learned Rent Controller vide order dated 8‑3‑1977 decided the preliminary issue framed on the question of existence of relation ship of landlord and tenant against the appellant and thereafter the issues on merits were decided against the appellant vide an order dated 8‑2‑77 of the learned Rent Controller. The first appeal of the appellant was also dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, affirming the findings of the learned Rent Controller on the issues relating to default and bona fide personal need. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that rent demanded in the notice under section 13‑A was Rs. 170, as against Rs. 70 per mensum which the appellant was paying to the previous landlord and the said amount of rent has also been held by the two Courts below as the rent payable. He further submits that on account of excessive demand of rent the notice is rendered illegal and ineffective. This contention is being raised for the first time during arguments and the same has not been taken even in the memo of the second appeal. This contention need not detain me any further as the demand of excessive rent in a notice would not render the notice illegal and mere demand of excessive rent would not absolve the tenant from paying or tendering the rent due.

2. Next it is contended that the appellant deposited the rent from February, 1974, to December, 1974, and there being no default in payment of rent due the learned Courts below have erred in holding that the appellant defaulted in the payment of rent. The two Courts below were justified even on this point in holding that as the rent for the month of December and January was not admittedly deposited and the rent for the months of February and March was deposited on 6‑6‑1974, this clearly established the default made by the appellant in the payment of rent. The contention in this behalf is; therefore without any substance.

3. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the findings of the two Courts below that the landlord/respondents have successfully proved bona fide personal need is arbitrary as the appellant as well as his three witnesses as compared to the solitary witnesses of the respondents and the respondents himself had established in their evidence that the premises in dispute were not required bona fidely by the respondents. The statements of the witnesses have been persued with the help of the learned counsel and I find that firstly the witnesses and the appellant do not mention any basis for deposing as to why the landlords do not require the premises for their personal' use. One of the respondents appeared in the witness- box and nothing was obtained from him in cross‑examination to cast doubt on his plea of bona fide personal requirement. In any case, the question of bona fide personal requirement is merely a question of fact and the two Courts below having believed the plea of the respondents in this respect no interference is possible in second appeal in the concurrent findings. of the two Courts below.

4. The net result of the above discussion is that this appeal has no merit and is, therefore, dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs, As the respondent has been ordered to ' vacate the premises in dispute in which‑he is running a tea shop he is allowed two months time to deliver vacant possession of the premises in question subject to payment of monthly rent. s. A. H. Appeal dismissed.